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Drafted by: DCM:JWAdams:ems:12/26/63					Contents and Classification Approved by:																																																																
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Page 2, A-519 from Baghdad

be profitable enterprise. Minister concurred and then went on to remark that he aware of US techniques as he himself had spent 5½ years in US, attending Universities of Michigan and Texas. He returned to Iraq in 1956.

Claims of US Contractors. I thanked the Minister for his support of TACI's claims under the Baghdad University contract. Alusi said that, since the plans had been completed and \$72,000 were obviously owing to TACI, he could see no grounds for holding up payment. He wished TACI to continue on the job. Added that he could not understand position of Minister of Planning, Abd al-Karim Ali, in opposing payment since both Ali and he, as consultants to GOI in previous years, had themselves had difficulty in collecting fees. The Minister expressed full agreement with my further remark that we would like to see all outstanding claims of the US contractors against the GOI expeditiously settled and said he would support such settlement.

US Policy Toward Iraq. Stating that I wished all Ministers of new government to understand US policy toward this area of world, I briefly outlined our even-handed approach to area problems, including non-intervention in Iraqi politics. While stating we prepared work with any Iraqi government which not communist, I emphasized that our attitude was not simply negative one of anti-communism. Rather, we sought positively to support constructive policies which would promote welfare of Iraqi people and thus internal stability of country.

Alusi responded to effect present government was anti-communist and that, except for brief period under Qasim, no Iraqi government had been so inclined. Alluding to his own personal attitude, said he felt many Iraqis prior to Qasim period had been inclined discount anti-communist talk as US propaganda. However, the communist atrocities at Mosul and Kirkuk had provided personal experience of real nature communism and had served in effect as an inoculation for Iraqi people.

The Kurdish Problem. I next raised Kurdish question, stating that, while it was an internal Iraqi problem, we were concerned over its international implications and its threat to stability within Iraq. We hoped it could be amicably and quickly settled. The Minister echoed this sentiment and stated that at meeting of Council of Ministers on December 21 a decision had been taken to supply immediate relief to refugees from the northern areas now settled in Mosul and Kirkuk. The government also contemplated long-range assistance to those areas in form reconstruction of housing, new schools and new highways, especially lateral roads.

Regarding possibility of political settlement between Kurds and Arabs, the Minister alluded to ability various national groupings within US to live in harmony. I commented that while this generally true we still had the negro question to resolve. I said this would probably take many years to accomplish but that important point was we were working on it. The Minister remarked that he thought President Kennedy had been pursuing right line in attempt solve this problem. I took occasion to state President Johnson was equally determined on question of civil rights and that, in general, he was a strong man of goodwill and forceful action.

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Authority NRD 938522
By SE NARA Date 11/18/05

ORIGIN/ACTION

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAM

POL 26 IRAQ
 XK POL 13-3 IRAQ
 FOR RM USE ONLY

A-505

CONFIDENTIAL

HANDLING INDICATOR

TO : DEPARTMENT OF STATE

207 DEC 21 11 7 06

INFO : AMMAN, ANKARA, BASRA, BEIRUT, CAIRO, DAMASCUS,

JIDDA, KUWAIT, LONDON, TAIZ, TEHRAN, TEL AVIV.

FROM : Amembassy, BAGHDAD

DATE: December 21, 1963

SUBJECT : Kurdish Account of Recent Actions Connected with Revolt

REF : Embtel 632, December 12, 1963.

SUMMARY: According to a KDP representative the Kurds are concluding that the west is committed against them; nonetheless he asked if the United States would be willing to participate in negotiation of the Kurdish problem. The Kurds are capable of sabotage of the oil installations and of Arab cities of the south and may soon conclude that they have more to gain than lose by such action. Although the Kurdish Army is still well equipped, there is unprecedented suffering among civilians this winter. There is no truth in the GOI propaganda of a serious split among the Kurds. The Kurds would like to open negotiations but the GOI still talks only of "surrender and amnesty". Nasser has urged the GOI to negotiate with the Kurds. The invitation to send an American observer to Kurdistan was repeated.

A representative of the Kurdistan Democratic Party made the following observations and statements during a conversation with the reporting officer December 17, 1963:

Kurds Relations with the West

The Kurds still hope to win the understanding and the friendship of the west, particularly the United States, but many have concluded that this is impossible. The United States could encourage its supporters in Kurdistan by publicizing the Secretary of States' statement to former Foreign Minister Shabib and the Ambassador's statements to the present government that the

GROUP 3

Downgraded at 12-year intervals,
 not automatically declassified.

FORM 4-62 DS-323

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Drafted by:

JEA POL:JEA:mlh:12/19/63

Contents and Classification Approved by:

AMB:RCStrong

Clearances:

DCM:JWAdams

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Authority NND 938522

By SE NARA Date 11/18/08

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Page 2, Airgram No. 505
Baghdad, Iraq.

United States would favor a peaceful, negotiated settlement of the Kurdish problem. Material assistance to the Kurds, particularly the provision of a radio transmitter, would of course be even more appreciated.

Would the United States be willing to participate in negotiating if both the Kurds and the Iraqi government asked it to? (He was told that the case was purely hypothetical; neither side had asked for such action and it was highly unlikely that the government would ever do so. If it did, the proposal would of course be studied by Washington. However, we would prefer an agreement reached freely by Kurds and Arabs by themselves. We feared that foreign - particularly American - involvement would enable either side at a later date to charge that the settlement was void because it had been "imposed by imperialists".)

Sabotage in Iraqi Cities and the Oil Installations and other Vital GOI Installations

The Kurds are capable of destroying the Kirkuk oil installations and of carrying out widescale sabotage in the rest of Iraq. They have refrained from doing so for two reasons: the Kurds have hoped that the restraint in Kirkuk would win them the friendship of the west and they feared that action there or elsewhere would alienate the Arabs, whom the Kurds believe - officially - to be opposed to the war against them. Furthermore the Kurds fear that the Iraqi Army would reply to any sabotage by severe reprisals against Kurds in their control.

The Kurds are now reexamining the question of aggressive action outside of Kurdistan. They appear to have no hope of influencing the west to change its policy of hostility toward the Kurds especially as the west is actively aiding the new government. The "friendship" of the Arabs is equally illusory. The Iraqi Army has already carried out a drastic anti-Kurdish policy in the north and many Kurds ~~now~~ believe that the Kurds could now hurt Iraq more through sabotage than the GOI could hurt Kurds through reprisals. This should not be interpreted, however, as a Kurdish threat to sabotage Kirkuk in the near future - only an indication that the Kurds are giving up their self-imposed obligation not to do so.

Conditions in the North

Living conditions in Sulaimaniya have improved slightly since November 18 but they are "disasterous" throughout most of Kurdistan where the winter so far has been much more severe than usual. Food is very short, almost all villages have been destroyed and there is no fuel. The Kurds have probably not suffered so much, as a race, in modern history. The suffering however is making the Kurds more determined to win their rights and if conditions are not changed soon will almost certainly reduce them to acts of desperation.

State of Kurds Armed Forces



The Kurdish "Army" is well-equipped and has enough food - although the civilians in the north of course put a serious drain on the Army. Mahmud Doski, an anti-Barzani Kurd who recently saw President Arif, was told by Arif, that the Kurds were almost

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By SE NARA Date 11/18/05

ORIGIN/ACTION			DEPARTMENT OF STATE		POL 13-3 IRAQ	
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<p>27</p> <p>2</p> <p>5/5</p> <p>5/10</p> <p>1</p> <p>1</p>			<p>TO : Department of State</p> <p>INFO : Tehran, Baghdad Ankara, Cairo, Damascus, London, Moscow</p> <p>FROM : AmConsulate, Tabriz</p> <p>SUBJECT : Consulate's Reply to Barzani Message</p> <p>REF : Deptel 6 to Tabriz (330 to Baghdad).</p> <p>DATE: December 18, 1963</p> <p>COPY NO. 6</p> <p>SERIES B</p> <p>During a visit to Mahabad on December 15 I talked to Cyrus Habibi, former Consulate employee who had helped relay the recent message from Mullah Mustapha Barzani asking that a USC representative come talk to him (Tehran's 532 to the Department). Habibi said he had been contacted by a Barzani representative two days earlier who had asked about the reply, and Habibi had been planning a trip to Tabriz to take the matter up with me. I therefore related the gist of the Department's reply as set forth in the first paragraph of Deptel 6. Habibi said he would pass the word on through the proper channels.</p> <p style="text-align: right;">  Carleton S. Coon, Jr. American Consul </p> <p style="text-align: center;">GROUP 2 Exempted from automatic downgrading by </p> <p style="text-align: center;">SECRET</p> <p style="text-align: right; transform: rotate(90deg);">SECRET</p>			
<p>THIS DOCUMENT CONSISTS OF 1 PAGE</p> <p>EXEMPTED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING</p>			<p>FORM 4-62 DS-323</p> <p>Drafted by: CS/Coon/rlr 12/17/63</p> <p>Clearances:</p> <p>Content and Classification Approved by: CS/Coon</p> <p style="text-align: right;">FOR DEPT. USE ONLY <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> In <input type="checkbox"/> Out</p>			

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Authority NND 938522
By SC NARA Date 11/18/05

NEA:LFDinsmore:awf 12/19/63
(Drafting Office and Officer)

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: December 18, 1963

SUBJECT: Iraqi Kurds and the Government of Abd al-Salam Arif

PARTICIPANTS: Shafiq Qazzaz - Iraqi, representing the Kurdish Students
Organization in the United States of America
Muhammad Amin - Iraqi Kurd, AID Participant Grantee
Lee F. Dinsmore - NEA

DEC 21 1963

COPIES TO:

NE - 2 (lcc)
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GTI - lcc
NR - lcc
INR - 8

The American Embassy, Baghdad - 1
The American Embassy, Tehran - 1
The American Embassy, Ankara - 1

Abd al-Salam Arif's recent statement calling upon the Kurds to lay down their arms and his declaration about Arab-Kurdish brotherhood are meaningless gestures, Shafiq Qazzaz asserted. Arif's background and reputation give Kurds nothing to hope for by way of concessions to Kurdish nationalism. Qazzaz expanded on the familiar repressive measures which the Government of Iraq had taken against Iraqi Kurds.

He asked for the Department's views. Mr. Dinsmore said that the attitude of the United States Government had not changed and that the Kurds of Iraq must find a way to accommodate their aspirations in Iraq with the GOI. We sympathize with the Kurds for the suffering they are enduring and we think we are aware of Kurdish objectives, but the United States can do no more than to indicate its belief and hope, as it has often done, to representatives of the GOI that they will seek a peacefully negotiated solution to the Kurdish problem.

Mr. Qazzaz commented that President Arif's call for Kurds to lay down their arms left the Kurds with no choice but to remain vigilant and to resist the Government since they could not supinely end their just campaign without an indication of what the Government was willing to concede. Mr. Dinsmore stated that the Kurdish side in this affair is the weaker one, and whether President Arif's undefined statement regarding brotherhood was satisfying or not, it was the first conciliatory declaration the Kurds had heard officially in a long time. The Kurdish side should swallow its pride and make the first move toward getting together across a table with Government representatives. Qazzaz cautiously asked how the Kurds could trust the Government. "What if they arrest Kurdish negotiators again? What should the

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Kurds

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By SC NARA Date 11/18/05

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Kurds propose?" Mr. Dinsmore said that the United States has no advice for the Government of Iraq or the Kurds of Iraq as to what they should do to solve their problem. The Kurds know best what they want to discuss, and they are capable of assessing how much they can ask for and how to go about the negotiations. Presumably, the Kurds can make contact at an appropriate level in the Government in an exploratory manner with a view to determining whether the GOI is willing to meet them. The Kurds ought to be able to come to the Government without preconditions to their talks. The important thing is to use the winter months to talk with the GOI rather than to console each other with their grievances.

Mr. Qazzaz said the Kurds would be somewhat encouraged to take a step toward opening talks if the GOI voluntarily would take actions to give the Kurds some assurance of its good will. Asked for examples of what he meant, Qazzaz said that free commercial traffic to towns in Northern Iraq could be allowed to operate; Kurdish prisoners could be released; and Kurds could be reappointed to the civil service positions from which they were sacked.

(Mr. Amin did not join in this conversation, having come to speak with Mr. Dinsmore on another subject.)

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Authority <u>NND 938522</u>
By <u>SC</u> NARA Date <u>11/18/05</u>

ORIGIN/ACTION

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAM

POL 13-3 IRAQ

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OSD	USIA	NSA
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A-19

SECRET

NO.

HANDLING INDICATOR

TO : Department of State 1963 DEC 24 PM 12 37

INFO : Tehran, Baghdad Ankara, Cairo, Damascus, London, Moscow

FROM : AmConsulate, Tabriz DATE: December 18, 1963

SUBJECT : Consulate's Reply to Barzani Message

REF : Deptel 6 to Tabriz (330 to Baghdad).

COPY NO. 1 SERIES A

During a visit to Mahabad on December 15 I talked to Cyrus Habibi, former Consulate employee who had helped relay the recent message from Mullah Mustapha Barzani asking that a USG representative come talk to him (Tehran's 532 to the Department). Habibi said he had been contacted by a Barzani representative two days earlier who had asked about the reply, and Habibi had been planning a trip to Tabriz to take the matter up with me. I therefore related the gist of the Department's reply as set forth in the first paragraph of Deptel 6. Habibi said he would pass the word on through the proper channels.

Carleton S. Coon, Jr.
American Consul

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Drafted by: CS/Coon/rlr 12/17/63

Contents and Classification Approved by: CS/Coon

Clearances:

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Authority NND 938522

By SC-NARA Date 11/18/05

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ORIGIN/ACTION			DEPARTMENT OF STATE		POL 12 IRAQ X2 POL 15 IRAQ	
AIRGRAM			A - 492		X2 POL 1 IRAQ - ZLAR	
CONFIDENTIAL			NO:		X2 POL 13-3 IRAQ	
TO : DEPARTMENT OF STATE			INFO : BASRA		DATE: December 17, 1963	
FROM : Amembassy BAGHDAD			SUBJECT : Call by Ambassador and DCM on British Ambassador, Sir Roger Allen		REF :	
Accompanied by DCM, I called December 14 on British Ambassador for first review with him since mid-October of current Iraqi developments. Covered following topics:			1. Fate of Baath Party. Commenting on events of the last month, Sir Roger, rather pleased, said, "The Baath is dead." I responded that the Baath has seriously weakened itself and is in disarray, but a number of its ideas appeared to have gained considerable acceptance, and its ability to come back depended on such things as resolution of conflict between Baath and non-Baathi elements in Army and on how current struggle in Syria was resolved. On latter I suggested moderate Baath seemed to have learned lesson of recent Iraqi events and was trying save itself by reaching accomodation with other elements. I doubted Baath in Iraq could effectively reorganize for a year or more but said possibility not excluded Saadi group might provoke armed struggle in near future in desperate effort regain power. Sir Roger appeared agree these were valid considerations but seemed inclined, on balance, to count Baath out. This consistent his views during our previous conversation (A-319, Oct. 15, 1963) wherein he said Baath not long for this world.		2. Evaluation of Present Government. Above discussion led to evaluation principal leaders present government with Sir Roger expressing	
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CONFIDENTIAL			FORM 4-62 DS-323		FOR DEPT. USE ONLY <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> In <input type="checkbox"/> Out	
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By SC-NARA Date 11/18/05

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Page 2, A- 492 from Baghdad

view that Arif not a forceful individual and that probability was he would be "disposed of". On contrary, he had found Prime Minister Yahya to be "alert, intelligent and determined"--much more so than he had expected. We both agreed Yahya was the most difficult figure in present government to evaluate. I said we understood hard-core Baathis considered Yahya a loyal party member; whereas some nationalists equally convinced he not a Baathi. This no mean achievement on Yahya's part. The British Ambassador also thought that Hardan Tikriti, the Defense Minister, was a force to be reckoned with. If he and Yahya should work together, they should have little trouble easing Arif out of picture. While Arif appeared command loyalty of important military elements, in particular 5th Division which commanded by his brother, much of this loyalty might readily disappear under stress. In short, Sir Roger expects a change in the current GOI setup, but doesn't know the timetable.

3. Relations with Egypt. In response my query what he understood was attitude present government toward relations with Egypt, Sir Roger replied this depended on who one talked with--there appeared to be at least two voices: (a) Arif, who wants to move toward closer relations with Egypt, and (b) Hardan Tikriti, who is against any close alignment. In conversation with him last week, Sir Roger confided, Tikriti had categorically denied press reports that invitation had been extended Nasser to visit Iraq. Talk of reviving the April 17 unity agreement, he said, was "eyewash". The government might talk about unity with Egypt for propaganda purposes but actual unity was out of the question, Tikriti asserted. He also told British Ambassador Iraq plans push military union with Syria. Sir Roger added that in his own view Nasser was aiming not at union with Iraq but at using Iraq to bring about reunion with Syria. I told Sir Roger that I could not detect any major element within Iraq which wanted an Egyptian-dominated union, mentioning the Shia, Kurds, and business elements as three groups almost unanimously opposed. Sir Roger agreed but said he had talked on occasion with Iraqis who seem genuinely to wish rule by Nasser. Sir Roger agreed that Nasser's dealings with Syria had pretty well disillusioned rest of Arab world as to his intentions.

4. Kurdish Issue. Turning to Kurdish problem, I said we thought we detected shift in Kurdish situation with some indications that Barzani and the tribal groups were being shunted aside by intellectuals of the KDP from urban centers whose ultimate aim was independence and who were giving the Kurdish movement a fully nationalist bent. Sir Roger was uncommunicative, his only substantive comment being to doubt KDP could do much without the tribal elements. "Where would they get their power?" he asked.

5. OPEC. Balance of discussion concerned OPEC developments and role of Iraqi Oil Minister Wattari. This separately reported.

Robert C. Strong
Robert C. Strong

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Authority NND 938522

By SC-NARA Date 11/18/05

ORIGIN/ACTION			DEPARTMENT OF STATE		POL 13-3 IRAQ	
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ARA	EUR	FE	A - 495	CONFIDENTIAL		
NEA	CU	INR	NO.		HANDLING INDICATOR	
E	P	IO	TO : DEPARTMENT OF STATE	1963 DEC 20 AM 8 52		
L	PBO	AID	INFO : ANKARA, BASRA, DAMASCUS, TABRIZ, TEHRAN.	RM/AN ANALYSIS & DISTRIBUTION BRANCH		
AGN	COM	FRB	FROM : Amembassy, BAGHDAD	DATE: December 17, 1963		
INT	LAB	TAR	SUBJECT: Former Kurdish Qaimaqam of Aqra, Rania, and Makhmura Calls at Embassy.			
TR	XMB	AIR	REF :			
ARMY	CIA	NAVY				
OSD	USIA	NSA				
		NSC				

Isma'il Haqqi Shawais, a Kurd and former Qaimaqam of Aqra, Rania, and Makhmura during the 1940's, called at the Embassy on December 14 to express his views on the Kurdish situation. Shawais, now living in retirement in the Chwarbakh area of Sulaimaniya, had the following to say:

- Recent Military Activity
 - About November 14 in the villages east of Zakho Kurdish forces engaged a Syrian battalion. Of five hundred Syrian troops, only six escaped alive. They are now in Mosul military hospital.
 - About December 7 Kurdish forces engaged a platoon of Iraq Government troops near Sayyid Sadiq (between Sulaimaniya and Halabcha). Although the Government troops had armour, they were defeated by the Kurds and retreated, leaving Sayyid Sadiq to the Kurds.
 - Daily military contact with the Iraqi Army is being maintained at Derbendi Khan, Sulaimaniya, Kirkuk, and Arbil (cities). Kurdish troops are successfully raiding police and Army positions within two hundred meters of the cities, but are not entering the cities themselves to avoid killing innocent bystanders.
 - Total killed among Kurdish non-combatants (old men, women, and children) since June 10 is about 60,000. Over two hundred villages have

GROUP 3
Downgraded at 12-year intervals,
not automatically declassified.

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FORM 4-62 DS-323

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☒ In ☐ Out

Drafted by: 76 POL:JMLord:mlh:12/17/63

Clearances: DCM:JWAdams

Contents and Classification Approved by: AMB:RCStrong

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DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 938522
By SE NARA Date 11/18/05

CONFIDENTIAL

Page 2, Airgram No. A - 495
Baghdad, Iraq.

been destroyed by air attack.

e. On the other hand less than 200 combatant Kurds have been killed by the Army.

f. In Sulaimaniya, the Army controls the city. The Kurds have the mountain ridge (Azmar Dag) dominating the city to the East. The Army has heavy artillery placed to fire into the mountains, but has not moved to take the Kurdish positions.

2. General Political Observations

a. The Kurds are Aryans, related to the Iranians, and want nothing to do with the "camel culture" of the Arabs.

b. Islam has proved a curse for the Kurds. They are, anyway, basically Zoroastrians (as witness the Yezidis), and reject Islam as an evil Arab influence.

c. The British are responsible for the Kurds' troubles in modern times, as they, successors of the Turkish Caliph, forced the Kurdish vilayet of Mosul into union with Iraq.

d. Despite the fact that the Kurds detest the Arabs, they will still accept a political status of "self-rule within the Iraqi state". However, the Kurds prefer the Iranians to the Arabs.

e. The Kurds nevertheless demand complete social, cultural, and economic autonomy.

f. The Kurds are most grateful to the French for allowing the publication of Kurdish views in its press.


g. The Kurds regret that the United States has taken no action through the United Nations or otherwise to stop the extermination of the Kurds. He wondered how we could square this with our conscience.

h. He criticized our "refusal of a visa to Jalal Talabani" to go to the US and UN to present his case. He thought that the US State Department must be sadly misinformed about the Kurds. (He was told that Jalal Talabani had received a visa but not used it. He was probably confusing this with more recent refusals of visas to Kurdish nationalists).

i. Despite this, the Kurds have for long admired America and want to imitate our development socially, culturally, and economically.

j. Although Kurdistan is backward, it is "sitting on a sea of oil" and has other great mineral wealth ready to be exploited when self-rule is achieved. American capital (and also European) would be sought for this purpose.

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
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Page 3, Airgram No. A - 495
Baghdad, Iraq.

k. The Kurds see no difference between the present (post November 18) government and the previous one so far as conduct of the war is concerned. The 'Arif amnesty offer of November 28 is a farce and has not been seriously considered by any Kurd.

Biographic Note: Shawais is a pleasant, intelligent man of about 60-65 years. His English vocabulary is excellent though he is somewhat unpractised in its use. He is scholarly and expressed regret that while British, French, and German scholars were writing on Kurdish issues, he has seen nothing by Americans on this subject. He is to return to the Embassy in a few days to read Mr. Eagleton's book on the Mahabad Republic. He has traveled to Europe only once, a trip to Paris some time ago. He seems to know Arabic, but refuses to speak it, at least with Americans.

For the Ambassador:


William C. Lakeland
First Secretary of Embassy

CONFIDENTIAL

0 6 3 4

DECLASSIFIED
Authority <i>NND 938522</i>
By <i>SC</i> NARA Date <i>11/18/05</i>

CONFIDENTIAL

1
Cairo 1367
12/17/63

CONFIDENTIAL

DATE	TO	FROM
12/17/63	R.D.	
17	CFV H/K FMD	CR Jones D. Keigore Francis M. Dickman

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Authority NND 938522
By SP NARA Date 11/18/08

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State* **PERMANENT RECORD COPY**

ACTION COPY

POU 133 IRAQ

33
Action
NEA
~~SS~~
Info

(55)

SECRET

Control: 11461
Rec'd: December 17, 1963
7:57 a.m.

FROM: Cairo

ACTION: Secstate 1367

INFO: Baghdad 246

DATE: December 17, 2 p.m.

001/26

NOFORN

LIMIT DISTRIBUTION S/S

KDP Representative Shawqat Akrawi (who begs that this information be most closely held) told Embassy Office December 17 that he leaving Cairo shortly for Kurdistan bearing message from Nasser to Barzani. Akrawi refused to divulge contents of message. As indicator Nasser attitude, however, Akrawi said Nasser has steadfastly refused Iraqi requests to close Cairo KDP office and deport Akrawi. Akrawi claimed Nasser told Iraqis UAR thoroughly disapproves of Kurdish war, that Iraq Embassy Cairo had opportunity present GOI viewpoint and that UAR must have views Kurdish side as well.

Akrawi made vague request that USG be prepared use its influence at appropriate time so that US could claim some of credit for peaceful settlement Kurdish problem.

GP-2.

BADEAU

HRW

D

RECEIVED BY NEA

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ACTION	ASSIGNED TO: <i>NEA: NE</i>	ACTION TAKEN	DATE OF ACTION	DIRECTIONS TO RM/R
NAME OF OFFICER	<i>RPO</i>	<i>noted</i>	<i>12/23/63</i>	<i>file</i>
OFFICE SYMBOL				

0 6 3 6

DECLASSIFIED
Authority *NNO 938522*
By *SE* NARA Date *11/18/05*

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☒ CHARGE TO

SECRET

Classification

DEC 2 8 13 PM '63

INFO: AmEmbassy ANKARA 492
" CAIRO 2417
" DAMASCUS 218
" LONDON 3386
" MOSCOW 1713
" TEHRAN 423

Tehran's 532 to Department.

Department concurs in your response to Barzani's emissaries. If they inquire further you should inform them under instructions from Department that USG unable agree send representative to talk with Barzani. We would have nothing to say beyond our often reiterated position on Kurdish problem. We now have established channel for receiving anything Barzani wishes to say to us. Sending USG representative could/^{not}in our view help Kurds but on contrary would likely hurt them by arousing ~~XX~~ Iraqi Government suspicions of USG motives.

FOR BAGHDAD: According Baghdad Domestic Service November 28 as monitored by ~~the~~ FBIS, President Aref pledged to pardon; protect money, lives and families; develop northern areas; and repair damage caused in area if Kurds would surrender themselves and arms immediately to GOI authorities. General tone of Aref's statement conciliatory. Embassy may wish refer to statement in discussions with Iraqi officials in effort determine GOI intentions. Seems possible it may represent a new departure which would provide some hope of negotiated solution Kurdish problem. If appropriate opportunity arises
would be

Telographic transmission and
classification approved by:

NEA - John D. Jernegan

Clearances: GTI - Mr. Tiger (subs) al
NE - Mr. Davies em

FORM 8-63 DS-322

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Authority *NND 938522*

By SC NARA Date 11/18/05

Page 2 of telegram to AmConsul Tabriz, AmEmbassy BAGHDAD

SECRET

Classification

[would be useful to have GOI attitude towards Iraqi counter-offer to Kurds announced
shortly before ^{June} ~~new~~ outbreak of fighting. Will be recalled Kurds regarded it as
sound basis for negotiations.

GP-3.

END.

RUSK

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Classification

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Authority	NND 938522
By	SC NARA Date 11/18/05

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
JUSTIFICATION FOR MULTIPLE-ADDRESS AND CIRCULAR TELEGRAMS

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2. Note that these sections explain how to use "By Pouch" indicator for posts not requiring information urgently by telegram.
3. Remember that most consular posts normally handle an extremely small volume of telegraph traffic and are not equipped to receive long telegrams or telegrams of dubious urgency.
4. In using all-inclusive addresses like "All Diplomatic Missions" there rarely should be an instance where telegraphic transmission to all posts can be justified; therefore, make sure maximum use has been made of "By Pouch" indicator.
5. Prepare two circulars rather than one when: (1) many posts require the information urgently but only a few need a full explanation; (2) the major part of a message is unclassified and only the Departmental comment or instruction need be classified.
6. When press releases have to be sent to posts telegraphically, first determine whether the release is being broadcast by the USIA Bulletin, thus making the telegram unnecessary for many posts. When a circular telegram is classified because it contains a press release sent out in advance of the release date, send the full text to only the posts needing full text; to other posts, send a brief digest so as to reduce post decipherment work.
7. For information on pouch transit times, consult your pouch schedule or call extension 4233 in DC/P for specific details. For technical assistance involving circular or multiple-address telegrams, call DC/T, extension 4324. If assistance was obtained from DC on this message, show below name of person consulted.

(Write in name of person in DC/P)

(Write in name of person in DC/T)

CERTIFICATION

Following certification to be completed and signed by person whose name appears in authorizing block of telegram form:

Telegram Identification: Date drafted 12/2 Drafting Office Symbol NEA/NE

The attached telegram has been prepared with full consideration of the above seven guidance points. The urgency of the subject matter makes it essential to send the message telegraphically to all posts shown. Pouch services will not provide sufficiently fast service except to those posts where the "By Pouch" indicator has been used.

A. I. Killgore
(Signature)

A. I. Killgore - NEA/NE

(Typed name and organization symbol of authorizing officer)

GPO 812750

0 6 3 9

ORIGIN/ACTION

NEA-5		
RM/R	REP	AF
ARA	EUR	FE
NEA	CU	INR
E	P	IO
L	FBO	AID
BTP	S/S	S/P
AGR	COM	FRB
INT	LAB	TAR
TR	XMB	AIR
ARMY	CIA	NAVY
OSD	USIA	NSA

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAM

POL 7 IRAQ
XR POL 13.3 IRAQ
XR POL 26 IRAQ
FOR RM USE ONLY

A-341

CONFIDENTIAL

HANDLING INDICATOR

TO : DEPARTMENT OF STATE

INFO : Baghdad and Bonn

FROM : USBER

DATE: NOVEMBER 26, 1963

SUBJECT : Proposal for Meeting Between Representatives of Kurdistan Democratic Party
and U.S. Government Officials
REF : Deptel 382 dated November 6, 1963

The information contained in the referenced telegram was conveyed to Saadi Dizayee by a Mission officer on November 7. Dizayee thanked the Mission officer for having obtained a reply to the KDP proposal. He indicated that he was disappointed but not surprised by the nature of the reply which he said he would promptly pass on to his principals.

For the Assistant Chief of Mission:

Arthur R. Day
Chief, Political Affairs Section

GROUP 4
Downgraded at 3-year intervals.
Declassified after 12 years.

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Drafted by: POL:DGleysteen/dhc 11/21/63

Contents and Classification Approved by: ARDay

Clearances:

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Authority NND 932522

By SE-NARA Date 11/18/05

10
INCOMING TELEGRAM

82
Department of State

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PERMANENT RECORD COPY

33

SECRET

Control: 18657

Rec'd: November 29, 1963

Action

NEA

Info

FROM: Tehran

SS

TO: Secretary of State

G

SP

NO: 532, November 29, 10 a.m.

L

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RMR

ACTION DEPARTMENT 532, INFORMATION ANKARA 41, BAGHDAD 53, CAIRO 8, DAMASCUS 6, LONDON 68, MOSCOW 25.

Consul Coon in Tabriz has received another message from Barzani, delivered November 27 by Omar Kamali (Embassy telegram 166) and Ali Amir-Ashayeri, former Majlis Deputy from Mahabad. Following is gist of message which Kamali said Barzani had given him November 21:

1. Requests USG send someone to talk to him. He is only 10 kilometers from Iranian border.
2. If USG will start talking seriously with him, he will turn out Iraqi Communists to whom he gave refuge during Baathi regime or do with them whatever USG says. (In reply to question Ashayeri estimated there are 4,000 of these.) Barzani reiterated previous insistence he has no connections with Soviet bloc or Communism.
3. Just as Kurds accepted Communists during Baath regime, so they will now extend similar treatment to anti-Communist Baath National Guard members who may be fleeing new regime.
4. Kurds for two years have tried to convince USG their good intentions and therefore refrained from disrupting oil facilities in Iraq, which they could easily do, and similarly refrained from unleashing dissidence among Iranian Kurds.

Notable that neither Barzani nor emissaries this time mentioned idea of cease-fire. Kamali stressed Kurds seeking understanding US attitude

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NAME OF OFFICER: AKelgare			file

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Authority NND 938522

By SC-NARA Date 11/18/05

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
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Classification

10822

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Nov 22 5 14 PM '63

Origin
Info:

ACTION: AmEmbassy BAGHDAD

315

INFO: AmEmbassy ANKARA

472

" BEIRUT

503

" LONDON

3260

" TEHRAN

398

Baghdad's 572; London's 2472 to Department.

When in your view might be useful, you authorized express to newly-constituted GOI USG hopes Kurdish War can be ended. We continue regard Kurdish problem as strictly internal Iraqi matter in which we will not intervene directly or indirectly. However, appears to us all true friends of Iraq wish see end of fighting on reasonable terms. Continued conflict can only benefit Iraq's enemies. If GOI believed would be helpful, USG willing be messenger in establishing contact between two sides.

GP-3.

END

ACTING

BALL

Drafted by:

NEA:NE:AIKilgore:he:11/22/63

Clearances:

NE - Mr. Davies

GTI - Mrs. Bracken

Telegraphic transmission and

classification approved by:

NEA - John D. Jernegan

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FORM
8-63 DS-322

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NND 938522

By SC-NARA Date 11/18/05

FORM DS-1161
8-6-67

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
JUSTIFICATION FOR MULTIPLE-ADDRESS AND CIRCULAR TELEGRAMS

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(Write in name of person in DC/P)


(Write in name of person in DC/T)

CERTIFICATION

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Telegram Identification: Date drafted 11/22/63 Drafting Office Symbol NEA:NE

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(Signature)

NEA - John D. Jernegan

(Typed name and organization symbol of authorizing officer)

GPO 912750

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NNO 938522

By SE NARA Date 11/18/05

0 6 4 3

ACTION		
RM/R	REP	AF
1	5	
ARA	EUR	FE
	5	
NEA	CU	INR
	3	5
E	P	IO
L	FBO	AID
AGR	COM	FRB
INT	LAB	TAR
TR	XMB	AIR
		4
ARMY	CIA	NAVY
5	10	5
OSD	USIA	NSA
15	8	3

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAM

47

A-1136

UNCLASSIFIED

NO.

TO : Department of State 1963 NOV 16 AM 10 51

FROM : AmEmbassy LONDON DATE: November 15, 1963

SUBJECT: Transmitting Kurdish Appeal

REF :

There are transmitted herewith:

- One copy of an Appeal by the Kurdistan Democratic Party in Iraq to various world leaders; and
- One copy of a publication by the Kurdish Students' Society in Europe, UK Branch, on the Kurdish problem.

Both of these were sent to the Embassy last week by the Kurdish Students' Society in England.

For the Ambassador:

Hermann Frederick Eilts
First Secretary of Embassy

Enclosures: *[Signature]*

As stated above.

UNCLASSIFIED

FORM 4-62 DS-323

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Drafted by: POL/N:HFEilts:mw 11/13/63

Contents and Classification Approved by: POL: Mr. O'Shaughnessy

Clearances:

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Authority NND 938522

By SC-NARA Date 11/18/05

APPEAL

Enclosure to London
Airgram No. A-1156/N

RECEIVED
AMBASSADOR'S OFFICE
NOV -2 1963

By Kurdistan Democratic Party in Iraq to :

- U Thant, Secretary General of the U.N.O.
- The Security Council of the U.N. O.
- Presidents of all the countries in the World
- International Organisations, Trade Unions and Committees
- The International Red Cross
- International News Agencies

For more than two years, our peace-loving people have been fighting a war, that was forced on them by an enemy equipped with murderous arms and weapons, not for a crime they had committed but because they have been dominating an autonomous state within the Iraqi Republic, the least right of all nations to self determination.

The "Baath" took power after the 8th of Feb. Coup through a policy of torture and mass atrocities, without consideration for negotiations and reason only just to gain time, to destroy the opposition and regroup its exhausted military force, although Qassim's Dictatorial Regime had ended.

We have repeatedly tried to solve our problem peacefully in a way to guarantee our demands, so that the country may live in peace. But the "Baath" suddenly declared a war of extermination, arrested the Kurdish negotiators in Baghdad (where they are now under severe torture) contrary to International Law and instituted a military curfew in all the Kurdish towns without letting the people know about it, so that when innocent civilians were on their way to work the next day (June the 9th 1963) hundreds were shot!! In Sulaimaniya alone (267) were killed. Houses and shops were raided and more than (15000) persons were imprisoned and were put to severe and inhuman torture.

Since 9th of June 1963 our country, Kurdistan, has been exposed to air raids and bombardment by the Iraqi Air Force which have spread death and destruction in every part of Kurdistan. In their hundreds old men, women and children have been killed; crops have been burned, houses and villages have been completely destroyed together with their innocent inhabitants, and cattle slaughtered.

Although the "Baath" Government in Baghdad is carrying on a War of Extermination in Kurdistan, without distinction to nationality or religion, the government have failed to obtain a single important military victory against our revolutionary forces.

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Authority NND 938522
By SE-NARA Date 11/18/05

Passiveness or non-interference, in the organized Genocide War and mass murders being carried out against the Kurdish People, does ^{not} coincide with the spirit of the Twentieth Century, of progressive humanitarian ideas, or with the obligation of U.N.O. and its Charter towards all nations. The Members of this organization are supposed to respect the Universal Declaration of human rights and to preserve peace in their countries.

Our people are facing a policy of discrimination carried out by Iron and Blood by the "Baath" Government in Baghdad which has surpassed even that of the Government of South Africa in tactics although it is less organized, because it has destroyed most parts of Kirkuk. All its Kurdish people were forced to leave the town, and to spread all over Iraq, having left all their valuables and houses behind, just because they were Kurds. And on the whole frontier between Kurdistan and the Arabic part of Iraq, the Kurds were forced by the baath army to leave their houses and villages and a committee was formed to distribute their lands, crops and houses to Arab tribesmen, and thousands of Kurdish employees were dismissed. The Iraqi Government is carrying out a fascist policy by Arabising everything that is Kurdish or related to the Kurds.

The Iraqi Government is trying desperately, by constant protest against any interference by the U.N.O., to keep our case as an internal affair of Iraq. But the Iraqi Government is losing its fight (as in the case of the resolution proposed in the U.N. against the South African Government which tried so hard to stop the interference of the U.N.O. claiming that its policy of Apartheid is an internal matter.) But the U.N.O. found that it was one of its obligations to defend the citizens of the Republic of South Africa and to oppose the policy of discrimination which is against the Universal Declaration of human rights; The policy, that is being carried out by ^{the} "Baath", against the Kurdish People, is, in principle, a policy of discrimination by not giving them their national rights and by following a policy of Arabisation

What the Iraqi Government is doing in Kurdistan is far more brutal than what people on some colonies have accused the ruling powers in their countries of doing; and the fact that Iraq is a non-European country or is not advanced economically does not stop the "Baath" from carrying out a colonial power policy, especially as the Iraqi Government has given its army in Kurdistan the right (according to the declaration of 9-6-1963) to kill, raid, destroy and imprison at will without trial, that right which no

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Authority <u>NND 938522</u>
By <u>SE</u> NARA Date <u>11/18/05</u>

colonial government has ever given to its army in its colonies because it is against human rights and against humanity.

From all the above facts and related incidents in the early Twenties, the U.N.O. (the successor of the League of Nations) has special obligations towards the Kurdish People, since Southern Kurdistan, which is known today as Iraqi Kurdistan, was not part of the country formed by Britain in Mesopotamia, in 1922, which was called Iraq, but Kurdistan was attached to it in 1926 by a resolution of the League of Nations after a pseudo referendum and on certain conditions that the British and Iraqi Governments would carry out towards the Kurdish Nation, in 1932, when Iraq was accepted as a member in the League of Nations.

It is clear from the above facts that Iraq has not carried out the conditions which were tabled in 1932, and it declared an unlawful war against the Kurds to Arabise them or to drive them out of their country and exterminate them; and then, by not letting them exercise their just and democratic rights, trying to attach Kurdistan to the Arab World. This is not only a callous violation of the U.N. Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights but proves that Iraq is deliberately not carrying out the conditions by which Southern Kurdistan was attached to it. These facts should compel the U.N. to interfere in Iraq: to solve these problems in a radical and liberal way and the Kurds full right to decide for themselves to live peacefully in a country not only with Arabs but even with the ruling Baath in Iraq.

The old methods used and the desperate claims made by the Iraqi Government to keep the Kurdish problem as an internal affair, away from the peace loving countries, those who respect the U.N. Charter and the Declaration of Human Rights, inferring that they have no right to discuss it or raise it in the U.N. General Assembly, have failed throughout the World.

We see that there is no reason why ^{the} U. N. should ignore our problem while one of its main duties is to protect all nations from aggression and torture. And it is the responsibility of all the member countries of the U. N. O. to insist on ending this Genocide War carried out by the Iraqi Government against the Kurdish people. WE therefore ask for help by every possible means.

Our People are suffering from one of the worst and severest wars of extermination that any nation has suffered in the second half of the 20th century.

Tens of thousands of old men, women and children have been dispersed

)))

0 6 4 7

all over the country without food, shelter and any means of subsistence because their houses were destroyed, their crops burned and their cattle slaughtered, and they need help of every available way however little it may be; In particular, and of primary necessity, we should stress aid in the furnishing of medical supplies, clothing and the basic minimum of food.

We should like to make the point that no earthly force whatsoever can force us to accept today's conditions in Iraq, or can check our struggle for our democratic, just and national rights, no matter how long or how many sacrifices it may take. Our Kurdish Nation is willing to prove to the World that it is not less active than other nations have been to defend its rights.

The fact that we are so willing to defend our rights despite the "Baath"'s murderous policy, strengthens our APPEAL to you to interfere and to force the Iraqi Government to stop the Genocidal War in Kurdistan, to recognize the demands of the Kurds for an autonomous Kurdistan within Iraq, and to pass a resolution to stop the flow of arms from any country (member of U.N.) until justice is done.

WE APPEAL to the peoples of the whole World to help the Kurdish people, either by pressing their governments to maintain a friendly policy towards the Kurds or to aid them in any way they can.

WE APPEAL to the International Red Cross and similar organisations to help in easing the sufferings of the victims of the war and send a fact finding mission to Kurdistan.

The Political Bureau of Kurdistan Democratic Party in Iraq sends its greetings to all well-wishers and hopes that this appeal will bring some response.

The Pol. Bureau

K . D . P . I .

For further information contact:

O. Sheikhmous,
34, St. James Ave.
LONDON W. 13

0 6 4 8

Encl to A-1156
London
NEA

Kurdish Students' Society in Europe U.K. BRANCH

16 PANTON STREET, LONDON S.W.1.

Appeal by the K.S.S.E. (U.K. Branch) on account of the violation of the Charter of the United Nations by the Government of the Republic of Iraq.

1.—Preamble of the Charter.

"We, the people of the United Nations determined . . . to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small . . ."

2.—Article 1:

"The purposes of the United Nations are . . . to achieve international co-operation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural or humanitarian character, and in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion; . . ."

The Kurds are the inhabitants of Kurdistan, that tract of land or region which from time immemorial, maybe from the dawn of history, has been inhabited by this race.

The boundaries of Kurdistan, as far as the aspirations of this race are considered, extend from the Mediterranean in the West to the Persian Gulf in the East and from the Caucasus in the North to the Jabal Hamrin in the South.

The origin of the Kurds can be traced to the Indo-European race: Aryan stock. It is not strange to find all Kurds speak one and the same language, Kurdish, which belongs to the modern Iranian section of the Indo-European group.

Kurdistan is nowadays politically divided among Iraq, Turkey, Iran, ~~and~~ and Syria.

The Kurdish population is around 13,500,000; Turkey 6,000,000; Persia 4,500,000; Iraq 2,000,000; Syria 500,000 and Russia 500,000.

History reveals that Kurdistan was administered by her own people in different times even at least 2,500 years B.C. Examples to substantiate this statement are enormous, e.g. "Lolo" Kurdish regime was established about 2,500 years B.C. which includes all areas from "Zahaw" to "Hacaria." This regime lasted for about 140 years after the downfall of which the Kurdish "Guti" regime was formed and was later subdivided into four other entities—these were: Kashay, Citani, Nairi and Sobari.

The most famous and most ancient of all Kurdish governments was that of the Medes whose capital was Akibtan or "Hamadan" of Persian Kurdistan, in 740 B.C. Another example of a modern Kurdish government is that of the Kurdish Republic of Mahabad in 1945.

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By <i>SC</i> NARA Date <i>11/18/05</i>

The Kurds were fighting for self-determination and the Treaty of Sevres made more than a quarter of a century ago assured the Kurdish people the right of unity and independence; this treaty was obtained by sustained efforts and bearing sacrifices. Even though this treaty has never been executed, its moral force has been strengthened by new factors. We have only to think of the principle of autodisposition adopted by the United Nations, the right of self-government, the moral principle concerning human rights and the dignity which develops therefrom.

Following the 8th February coup in Iraq, the armed Kurdish patriots, on their own initiative, ceased the military operations directed against the government forces. By this move they hoped that the Kurdish national problem, namely: obtaining autonomy, would be solved peacefully through negotiations with the new rulers, taking into account Kassem's repeated refusals of a peaceful and democratic settlement.

But, on Monday, 10th June, a declaration was issued by the Iraqi National Council for the Revolutionary Command which amounted to a declaration of war against the Kurdish people in Kurdistan. The Iraqi government imprisoned the Kurdish delegates, contrary to International Law. These acts were followed by a wave of arrests, incitements to murder were made and the Iraqi Air Force is going to bomb the towns and villages of Iraqi Kurdistan.

We, the undersigned, wish to draw your attention to the following:

1.—On the 10th June, 1963, the Iraqi government declared a war of extermination on the Kurds, without consideration or due regard to their national demands, although the Kurds showed good-will and a desire for peaceful co-existence.

References: 'The Guardian,' 11th June, 1963.

'The Daily Telegraph,' 11th June, 1963.

'The Times,' 11th June, 1963 and 12th June, 1963.

2.—The Iraqi government offered a reward of £100,000 for the capture of General Barzani—dead or alive. According to the 'Daily Telegraph' correspondent in Beirut on the 12th June, 1963. Ali Salib Saadi, the Deputy Prime Minister, confirmed that the government had offered a reward of £100,000 for the capture of the Kurdish leader, Mullah Barzani, dead or alive.

3.—The Kurdish negotiators in Baghdad were imprisoned.

4.—The 3,000 Kurdish prisoners from the time of General Kassem's rule have not been released, although the Kurds released all (2,000) Iraqi prisoners. See 'Sunday Times' of the 2nd June, 1963.

5.—The Iraqi government did not have any intention of recognising the Kurdish human and just rights, from the beginning.

This was stated in the 'Observer,' June 16th, by Mr. Stonehouse, M.P., for—

"Mr. Talib Shebib, aged 32, Minister for Foreign Affairs, assured me when I spoke to him during a recent visit to Iraq with a parliamentary delegation, that there was no question of the Iraqi government's agreeing to the demands of a group of Kurds led by Mustafa Barzani."

6.—Ministers and senior army officers at the time of the negotiations had been heard boasting that they could end the Kurdish problem in a few days and solve this problem once and for all. In the 'Daily Telegraph' on the 20th May, 1963, Richard Beeston declares:

"Ministers and senior army officers have been heard recently boasting that Iraq could bring about a final settlement to the Kurdish problem in a 10-day ruthless offensive. They blame failure to defeat the Kurds last year on General Kassem's leadership."

7.—Only after it declared war did the Iraqi government publish on the 11th June, a plan to give the Kurds their rights on the basis of decentralisation by dividing Iraq into six "Liwas" (satraps or provinces) of which the Kurdish language will be taught in the elementary stage only in one liwa; "Sulaimaniya"—a very small portion of Kurdistan.

'The Times,' June 12th, 1963 (Beirut, June 11th)—

"To back up its case the government today published for the first time details of a plan to give the Kurds decentralised rule as the counter-offer to the Kurdish demands for autonomy. The government plan offered on March 9th, provided for dividing Iraq into six provinces: Mosul, Kirkuk and Sulaimaniya in the north and Baghdad, Hilla and Basra in the south. Each province would have wide autonomous authority. Kurdish would be the first language in elementary education in Sulaimaniya."

8.—The economic blockade which was set up during Kassem's regime, on Kurdistan, was not removed and up to this date still exists.

9.—The concentrations of Iraqi armed forces on the Kurdish borders were left in their places and lately these have been reinforced.

10.—The government did not agree to the Kurdish proposition for dividing the oil revenue in proportion to the Kurdish population in Iraq, that revenue to be used for the economic progress of Kurdistan.

11.—Kurdish papers and Kurdish books are not allowed to be published.

12.—Thousands of Kurds and Arabs have been imprisoned. 14,000 persons according to the 'Daily Telegraph,' although this number is underestimated.

13.—More than 100 persons, Arabs and Kurds, have been executed according to Radio Baghdad and the B.B.C.

14.—A martial court has been formed to try Kurdish rebels summarily.

15.—On the 11th June, the National Revolutionary Council of Iraq appealed to the people for aid in pursuing Mullah Barzani's supporters and destroying them—'Daily Telegraph,' 11th June, 1963.

They also announced that persons who continue to support the Kurdish guerilla leader, General Barzani, after that date will face the death penalty—'Daily Telegraph,' 13th June.

16.—Instead of protecting the Kurds against any abuses, the Iraqi government have started the bloodiest war Kurds have ever known: a ruthless fight, the massacre of women and children, burning crops and burning villages with bombs, and then destroying them completely with bulldozers, in which 40,000 soldiers, i.e. three divisions out of five, are massed in Kurdistan. Kurdish villagers are threatened with banishment and death if they help the Kurdish rebels, and Kurdish students are kept in Baghdad as hostages and are not allowed to see or communicate with their families.

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By SC-NARA Date 11/18/05

According to the 'Daily Telegraph,' 19th July—

"This first attack since the resumption of the Kurdish war, on the British managed company installations is General Barzani's reply to the ruthless war of extermination being carried out by 40,000 Iraqi troops and by aircraft razing Kurdish villages and massacring Kurdish old men, women and children."

It continues: "The campaign against the Kurds which began last Tuesday, is far more brutal and cold-blooded than anything Kassem ever waged. The inhabitants of all Kurdish villages within 25 miles radius of Kirkuk, the oil town, have been shelled, then finished off by tanks and bulldozers. Crops have been burned and cattle slaughtered."

'The Observer' on 16th June, described it as:

"The campaign launched this week with more ruthlessness and illogic than Kassem ever showed. The Kurds are in for a hard time."

'The Guardian' editorial on 21st June, says that:

"The new government's campaign appears likely to be even bloodier than that of its predecessor. Almost the whole of the army has been moved to the area, and an official communique boasts of rebels killed in their hundreds."

In view of the foregoing and the emergency with which we present our plea, we are prepared to hold in abeyance any claim with regard to territorial autonomy, until the mass murder and worse atrocities have ceased. We would draw your further attention to the fact that it is only the supply of arms to the Iraqi Government that allows them to be so overwhelmingly brutal. We beg you, in the name of thousands of Kurdish victims, to ask the British government to reconsider its decision and cease the supply of arms to Iraq, for they are used against the Kurds and Arabs alike: Britain, although indirectly, must share their guilt.

We thank you for your urgent consideration in stopping the genocidal war against the Kurds and the supply of arms to the Iraqi government.

K.S.S.E.,

29th June, 1963.

Courier Printers of Halifax - Telephone 3788

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Authority	NND 938522
By	SE-NARA Date 11/18/05

ACTION			DEPARTMENT OF STATE		POL 13-3 IRAQ	
AIRGRAM			A-17		CONFIDENTIAL	
NO.			NO.		HANDLING INDICATOR	
TO : Department of State			INFO : TEHRAN, BAGHDAD, LONDON, ANKARA, MOSCOW		DATE: November 20, 1963	
FROM : AmConsulate, Tabriz			SUBJECT : Kurdish Situation: Miscellaneous Information		REF : (A) Consulate's Memcon dated September 9, 1963; (B) Consulate's A-12 of September 18.	
<p>Attached are memoranda of two conversations the reporting officer had in Mahabad on November 11, with Major General JAM, Deputy CO of the IIA's First Army (Enclosure 1), and with Cyrus HABIBI, former Consulate employee, presently the principal of the Mahabad High School.</p> <p>In both of his conversations with the reporting officer (Ref A and Enclosure 1) General Jam has stressed the danger of Soviet capture of the Iraqi Kurdish nationalist movement. In the earlier conversation he suggested Barzani was in effect already a Soviet instrument; more recently he did not go that far, but implied he thought the trend was very much in that direction. Even this latter view, however, seems extreme when contrasted with other available information, e.g. that provided by our Embassy in Baghdad, regarding current attitudes within Iraqi Kurdistan toward communism and dependence on the USSR. Jam is in as good a position as any Iranian official to know what is really going on in Iraqi Kurdistan, but even so he may be somewhat misinformed. He may also be deliberately overemphasizing the Soviet threat when talking to us, perhaps to smoke out our position a bit more clearly, perhaps because he is concerned that US officialdom may itself be misinformed and therefore insufficiently aroused at the threat. This is not necessarily inconsistent with the probability that he suspects we may be playing some devious game with Barzani. Evidently he remains unclear as to where we really stand, and curious.</p> <p>The feeling is mutual. The reporting officer derived a certain quiet satisfaction from Habibi's statement that Kurds around Mahabad were confused as to what the Iranian Government's attitude toward smuggling into Iraq really was. Misery loves company. No doubt the</p>						
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Drafted by: CSCoon/rlr 11/18/63			Contents and Classification Approved by: CSCoon			
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Authority: NND 938522

By: SC-NARA Date: 11/18/05

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
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
Page 2

A-17 from Tabriz

Iraqis are confused too, and that makes three of us.

We believe Jam's resounding statement at the end of the interview ("All of Kurdistan is Iranian") should be taken as an essentially passive recognition of an ethnic and linguistic near-truth, rather than as an espousal of a national policy of irredentism. Nevertheless, the firmness with which he phrased this thought is interesting, especially in context.


Carleton S. Coon Jr.
American Consul

Enclosure: 

- (1) Memorandum of conversation
- (2) Memorandum of conversation

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By	SE-NARA Date 11/18/05

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Date: November 19, 1963

SUBJECT: Kurdish Situation

PLACE AND TIME: General Jam's Office, Mahabad, November 11, 1963

PARTICIPANTS: Major General Jam, Deputy CO, 1st Army, IIA; Brig. General Solhju, 1st Army, Deputy to General Jam; Mr. C.S. Coon, U.S. Consul, Tabriz

As he had in our earlier conversation (see memcon dated September 9), General Jam asserted that Barzani's forces were receiving assistance from the USSR and Israel. He said several "Germans" had been variously reported as being with Barzani in Iraqi Kurdistan. He thought these were Israelis who had been mistaken for Germans by inexperienced observers, perhaps because they spoke German to each other. He had nothing specific to say about Soviet aid. However, he stated flatly that DPK leaders in Iraq were now calling each other "comrade" and expressed concern over what he described as increasing use of late of communist terminology in Iraqi DPK pronouncements of one kind or another that he had seen.

Jam referred to a suggestion he made to me last September, namely that the US Government arrange to send someone in to Barzani on some basis or other so that we could obtain a firmer idea of the extent to which the movement was being subverted by communism. I noted that such action might be misconstrued as implying a departure from our policy of non-involvement. He replied that we would no longer consider ourselves uninvolved if the movement became an outright Soviet instrument. Wouldn't it be wise to make it clear to the movement's leaders just where the US would stand should they go all the way with the USSR? I muttered something about it being an interesting idea and let it go at that.

We briefly discussed the border situation. Jam admitted some smuggling was going on from Iranian to Iraqi Kurdistan. It would be impossible to stop it, Jam continued, without erecting a Soviet-type system of watch towers, cleared strips, etc. all along the frontier. Given the length of the border and the terrain, this would be an exceedingly difficult and expensive operation. Even if the Iranian Government were willing to undertake the expense, it would involve committing all IIA forces available in the region to man it, in a thin and militarily indefensible line. Furthermore, Jam continued without pausing, Iranian Kurds felt a deep sense of kinship with the Kurds in Iraq and inevitably sympathized with their present plight. As a matter of fact,

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By <u>SE</u> NARA Date <u>11/18/05</u>

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Page 2
Encl. No 1
A-17 from Tabriz

he himself felt a deep sense of kinship to the Kurds. In their hearts, he said, all Iranians think of the Kurds as being Iranians. And he meant all Kurds, not just those within Iran itself. Basically, he said, all of Kurdistan is Iranian, despite what the accidents of history may have decreed.

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Authority	NND 938522
By	SC-NARA Date 11/18/05

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Date: November 19, 1963

SUBJECT: DPK Activity in the Mahabad Area

PLACE AND TIME: Habibi's house, Mahabad, November 11, 1963

PARTICIPANTS: Mr. Cyrus Habibi, Principal, Mahabad High School
Mr. C.S. Coon, U.S. Consul, Tabriz

Habibi said he had a strong feeling that the DPK was about to begin organizing in the Mahabad area on a more intensive scale than in the past few years. In this connection he mentioned a visit to Mahabad early in October by one Ali Homan GHAZI, currently studying in Germany on an Iranian Government scholarship. Young Ghazi, according to Habibi, is the son of Qazi Mohamed, deceased President of the Mahabad Republic of 1946, and is not known as a communist or communist sympathizer. Habibi knows that en route from Germany, Ghazi stopped off in Moscow and visited one Rahim Seyf al-Ghazi, also a relative of Qazi Mohammed, who is known as a communist with DPK connections who has been living in the USSR for years. Habibi hasn't been able to find out anything specific but has been given to understand that Ali Ghazi's detour to Moscow constituted the main reason for his trip. (See material at end of memcon from Consulate's bio file).

Habibi said DPK members had been sufficiently energetic of late in their efforts at fund-raising (from non-DPK Kurds) to attract a warning from Savak.

He said three armed Iraqi Kurds (originally from Mahabad) who had been fighting with Barzani's forces visited Mahabad early in October on some kind of a mission, unbeknownst to the Iranian Government.

He said Iranian Kurdish supplies were being smuggled through to Iraqi Kurdistan almost entirely through the Baneh area at present, and that Kurdish circles in Mahabad were genuinely confused as to just what the current Iranian Government attitude toward such smuggling was.

He said there had been a flurry of interest in Mahabad recently over a rumor that Barzani had gotten a radio transmitter on the air and much time was wasted combing the wave bands, but the rumor proved false.

* * * * *

Note: Consulate bio files contain the following:

QAZI, Ali (Son of Qazi Mohammed)

"Son of Qazi Mohamed, age 22, and is now a student. At present no known activities are noticed linking him with the communists (~~XXXXXXXXXXXX~~).

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By	SE NARA Date 11/18/05

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Page 2
Encl No. 2
A-17 from Tabriz

Professes to be non-communist. Has not been arrested but is under surveillance". (16 February 1955).

"Made contact in Mehabad with known Soviet agent, ANALIOV, in September 1952" (31 August 1954).

QAZI Rahimi Seyif

"is married to one of the daughters of Sadr QAZI. His wife is reported to be an active communist. Has fled to the Soviet Union" (25 June 1954).

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By SC NARA Date 11/18/05

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AIRGRAM

POL 26 IRAQ

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A-377

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HANDLING INDICATOR

TO : Department of State 1963 NOV 15 PM 2 06

INFO : Amman Cairo London
Ankara Damascus Taiz
Basra Jidda ~~ANALYSIS & DISTRIBUTION~~
Beirut Kuwait BRANCH Tehran
Tel Aviv

London
Taiz
Tehran
Tel Aviv

FROM : Amembassy BAGHDAD

DATE: November 7, 1963

SUBJECT: Government order imposing curfew on Sulaimaniya and restricting movement in Sulaimaniya Liwa

REF : A-373

Al-Kashkul, a Mosul weekly, on November 1, 1963, carried the text of an order issued by the governor of the liwa of Sulaimaniya establishing a curfew in the city of Sulaimaniya from 5:00 p.m. to 5:00 a.m. and ordering all persons, "in the interests of security," to stay off all secondary roads leading into Sulaimaniya. The only road remaining open to the public is the paved road running east from Sulaimaniya to Arbid and west to Kirkuk.

The report of this order was not carried in the Baghdad press.

For the Ambassador:

William C. Lakeland
First Secretary of Embassy

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Drafted by:

POL:JEAKins:jp

11/4/63

Contents and Classification Approved by:

RCStrong

Clearances:

JWAdams

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Authority **NND 938522**

By SC NARA Date 11/18/05

ORIGIN/ACTION			DEPARTMENT OF STATE			POL 13-3 IRAQ		
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TO : DEPARTMENT OF STATE

INFO : AMMAN, ANKARA, BASRA, BEIRUT, CAIRO, DAMASCUS, JIDDA, KUWAIT, LONDON, TAIZ, TEHRAN, TEL AVIV.

FROM : Amembassy, BAGHDAD

DATE: November 5, 1963

SUBJECT : Kurdish War; Government Again Announces End; Reported Drive in Sulaimaniya Liwa and Government Overtures for Negotiations

REF : Arma CX23563, 31 Oct 1963; CX 23663, 2 Nov 1963.

Lt.Col. Subhi Abd al-Hamid, Iraqi Director of Military Operations, commenting on the recent dearth of Army communiques listing successes in the North, informed the official Iraqi News Agency October 30, 1963 that military operations in the north have been completed. True, he said, there are a few bandits operating in the mountains who engage in robbing and plundering and the Army is "actively eliminating such pockets of criminals". But, he said, these are minor actions which "are not worth mentioning and do not merit issuance of communiques".

Baghdad Radio on October 30 and 31 and the press of October 31 gave headline coverage to the colonel's statements. The government's optimism, however, does not appear to be shared by many Baghdadis. Indeed Abd al-Hamid's statements seem to have been greeted by most Iraqis known to the Embassy's Political officers with even more scepticism than they usually show toward their government's announcements.

A representative of the KDP told the reporting officer October 30 that the Iraqi Army is now advancing on Sulaimaniya from Kirkuk on foot and on a very wide front - a complete departure from its usual procedure of moving men in highly guarded convoys. (Army attache sources report that the Army is moving in 5 parallel columns toward Sulaimaniya - see CX 23563 and CX 23663). The Kurds are baffled by the action and wonder if the Army is trying to convince itself that it is now engaging in the "mopping-up"

GROUP 3
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Not automatically declassified.

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FORM 4-62 DS-323

Drafted by: JJA POL:JJAkins:mlh:11/04/63

Clearances: DCM:JWAdam ARMA (in draft)

Contents and Classification Approved by: AMB:RCStrong

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Authority NND 938522
By SC-NARA Date 11/18/05

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Page 2, Airgram No. A-373
Baghdad, Iraq.

operation it continually speaks of. The Kurds see no useful purpose in the move; the Army already controls all of Kurdistan up to Darband Bazian; the area between Darband Bazian and Sulaimaniya is a fairly open plain completely unsuited to guerrilla activity. They wonder if the Army intends to march in this manner into the mountains; they hope it will but as they cannot envisage such ineptitude on the part of the Iraqi military leaders they have concluded that it is part of an elaborate trap to lure the Kurds into the open or to persuade the Kurds that the main attack is to take place in Sulaimaniya whereas the real offensive will be launched in Mosul or Erbil Liwas. Lt.Col. Subhi Abd al-Hamid, Director of Army Operation, told an Embassy officer earlier in the week that the Iraqi Army's tactics would be to locate the Kurdish forces, then drive them into pockets and eliminate them. Perhaps the current maneuver is part of such a plan.

The KDP representative said, however, that the Kurds do have information that the Army intends to launch a major attack in the Sulaimaniya Liwa soon. The Kurdish counter plan is to evacuate the civilian population of Halabja, and probably Sayid Sadiq and Arbid and occupy them. The Iraqi Air Force could then bomb them at will but the civilians would be safe and the Kurds would have a secure rear when they attacked the Iraqis trying to move north of Sulaimaniya.


There have been frequent reports in Baghdad recently that the government is interested in a cease-fire but that its overtures to the Kurds have shattered on the Kurds' insistence that the GOI must first agree in principle to Kurdish autonomy. The KDP representative here has told us that the Party in Baghdad knows only that the government has tried to contact the rebels several times within the last two months - most recently on October 28 when Major Karim Quruni, a Kurd still in the Iraqi Army, was sent north. Kurds here claim to know no details of any government proposal or of the Kurdish reply.

For the Ambassador:

William C. Lakeland

William C. Lakeland
First Secretary of Embassy

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INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

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POL 13-3 IRAC

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Control: 2470

Rec'd: NOVEMBER 5, 1963
4:35 AM

Action

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FROM: TEL AVIV

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TO: Secretary of State

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ACTION DEPARTMENT 520, INFORMATION ANKARA 5, BAGHDAD 42, DAMASCUS 98, LONDON 71, TEHRAN 7, GENEVA, THE HAGUE, PARIS, USUN, JERUSALEM UNNUMBERED.

KURDS

WE CHECKED NOV. 4 WITH ACTING DIR. FONOFF MIDDLE EAST DEPT. MRS. BERED RE LOCAL PRESS REPORTS OF CAMPAIGN BY ISRAELI "KURDISTAN IMMIGRANTS CIRCLE" TO STIMULATE MORAL AND MATERIAL HELP TO KURDISH REBELS IN IRAQ.

ACCORDING PRO-GOVERNMENT JERUSALEM POST, GROUP'S SECRETARY HAVIN SHIMONI, DESCRIBED AS JERUSALEM "YOUNG MAPAI" LEADER, AT OCT. 31 PRESS CONFERENCE SAID:

1. GOI SHOULD CONDEMN GENOCIDE BEING COMMITTED AGAINST IRAQI KURDS;
2. CIRCLE INTENDS CONDUCT FUND CAMPAIGN IN ISRAEL, PROCEEDS GOING TO JELAL TALABANI IN GENEVA;
3. IN REPLY JULY 22 LETTER TO PRIMIN ESHKOL, CIRCLE INFORMED MATTER UNDER CONSIDERATION, BUT IT UNDERSTOOD GOI "WOULD NOT FROWN UPON" CIRCLE'S ACTIVITIES;
4. CIRCLE NOT CONCERNED WITH POLITICAL QUESTION OF INDEPENDENT KURDISTAN, ONLY WITH IRAQI EXTERMINATION POLICY;
5. REBEL CIRCLES IN GENEVA, PARIS AND HOLLAND MADE CLEAR THAT KURDS - LONG STAUNCH FRIENDS OF JEWS - WOULD NOT BE EMBARRASSED

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Authority NND 938522

By SE-NARA Date 11/18/05

ORIGIN: ACTION			DEPARTMENT OF STATE			POL 3 UAR		
7EA-5			AIRGRAM			FOR RM USE ONLY		
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TO : Department of State

INFO : Ankara
Basra
Beirut
Cairo

Damascus
London
Tabriz
Tehran

FROM : Amembassy BAGHDAD

DATE: OCTOBER 19, 1963

SUBJECT : Possible UAR Support for Kurds

REF : A-983 April 23, 1963; A-18 July 3, 1963; Department Memorandum of Conversation Akins-Aqrawi July 30, 1963; Cairo tel. 633 October 14, 1963, to Department.

Kurdish leaders Shawkat Aqrawi and Jalal Talabani have been in regular contact with Egyptian President Nasser since April of this year. Aqrawi, who has now established residence in Cairo (Cairo tel. 633), told the reporting officer who saw him in Bern on September 25, 1963, that both he and Talabani were extremely impressed by Nasser's friendliness and his (privately expressed) statements that he would be willing to grant the Kurds an even greater degree of autonomy than they themselves had asked. Aqrawi said that neither he or Talabani in any way doubted Nasser's sincerity.

According to Aqrawi, Nasser has told the Kurds repeatedly that "Arab politics" make it difficult for him to support them openly at present but he will be able to in the future. Nasser is quoted by Aqrawi as saying that the UAR would be forced to vote against the Kurds if the Outer Mongolian item on the Kurds ever came before the UNGA. However, he promised that Egypt would quietly advise other African and Asian states that Egypt was forced to take the stand and would in no way object to contrary positions of anyone else. Nasser also reportedly told the Kurds that he would not supply the Iraqi government with arms or ammunition which could be used against them. (He, of course, has done so.)

Aqrawi's and Talabani's faith in Nasser is not shared by all Kurdish leaders. Taha Maruf, an ex-Iraqi diplomat now living in London and representing the Kurdish movement there, told the reporting officer in London

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Drafted by: JEakins:jp 10/16/63

Clearances: RCStrong (RM)

Contents and Classification Approved by:

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Page 2, A-330
Baghdad, Iraq.

on September 23, 1963, that he feared Aqrabi and Talabani had been deceived by Nasser. Nasser was doubtlessly happy that the Kurds were embarrassing the Iraqi government but Maruf said he was convinced that if Nasserites were to succeed to power in Baghdad, they would be even less accommodating toward the Kurds than had been the Ba'th or Qasim. This view was repeated by Asad Khailani, KDP member representative for Baghdad, on October 14, 1963. Both Maruf and Khailani said, however, that there was no question of refusing any Egyptian aid - the only problem is that Egypt has offered none in spite of repeated Kurdish requests.

The situation may be changing. Cairo broadcast a condemnation of the government's action against the Kurds shortly after the GOI's ultimatum on June 10, 1963, but the reaction in Baghdad - not only from the Ba'th but from other Arab nationalists - was so negative that Cairo denied the existence of the broadcasts. The war against the Kurds was, until recently, largely ignored by Radio Cairo. Cairo's reactions to the newly proclaimed Iraqi-Syrian military union by branding it an imperialist scheme and a recent suggestion on the Voice of the Arabs' commentary that CENTO elements will now intervene with the Iraqis and Syrians against the Kurds may presage a revision of the Egyptian attitude. Khailani now believes that Cairo will react by giving the Kurds more than moral support; ^{and} they are disposed to accept any help from any source which offers it. The major concern of the Kurds is that Egyptian aid could prejudice their currently good relations with the Iranians.

The difference of opinion on the views of Mulla Mustafa on this subject was interesting. Aqrabi spoke of Mulla's regard for Nasser and his trust in him. Khailani said that Mulla knows precisely why Nasser wants to use the Kurds now and he has no more faith in him than he has in the communists.

For the Ambassador:

William C. Lakeland
William C. Lakeland
First Secretary of Embassy

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Authority NND 938522
By SP-NARA Date 11/18/05

ORIGIN ACTION		
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OSD	USIA	NSA
15	8	3

AIRGRAM

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

POL 2-4 IRAQ
XR POL 13-3 IRAQ

A-340

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FOR RM USE ONLY

TO : DEPARTMENT OF STATE

INFO : ADANA, AMMAN, ANKARA, BEIRUT, DAMASCUS, LONDON, TABRIZ, TEHRAN, TEL AVIV.

FROM : Amembassy, BAGHDAD

DATE: OCTOBER 19, 1963

SUBJECT: Kurdish Version of Military and Political Situation in Northern Iraq.

REF : Embtel 407, October 12, 1963.

SUMMARY:

KDP leader has recently given Embassy Officer Kurdish version of fighting in north. Said Kurds, who in key strong positions, were disturbed by GOI managed tours of north for military attaches. They invited USG send observer to north to all parts of Kurdistan, all phases of revolt and make judgement himself. Kurds claim over 3000 Iraqi soldiers now being held in Kurdish prison camps. KDP representative said GOI had approached Kurds recently on negotiations but were referred to Kurdish negotiators still held in GOI prisons. Implied possibility of aid from Israel and gave descriptions of Kurds strongholds.

* * * * *

The Kurdish Democratic Party leader responsible for Baghdad, Asad Khailani, who has just returned from Kurdistan, told the reporting officer on October 14, 1963 that the Kurds were somewhat disturbed by the recent tours of the north given to military attaches stationed in Baghdad. He said the Kurds believed the government was putting on a show designed to deceive the foreigners and they were afraid that some might have been taken in. He said he was authorized to invite an American military or civilian observer to Kurdistan. He could come disguised as a newspaper man if he wished. The Kurds would "guarantee" his safety and would take him to any corner of Kurdistan and give him a "completely accurate" picture of military conditions in the north. He could be picked up in Iran or Baghdad or Kirkuk or Mosul. Khailani was not encouraged to believe that the offer might be accepted. (A similar offer was made to the British and presumably to Embassies of other

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Authority NND 938522

By SC NARA Date 11/18/05

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Page 2, Airgram No. A-340
Baghdad, Iraq.

countries whose attaches participated in the tours).

Khailani was most optimistic about the Kurds' military position in the north. While he admitted that the government controlled all large civilian centers, he claimed that the Kurds were now stronger than at any time since June 10 and when the winter came would proceed to do some "mopping-up" of their own on isolated Iraqi units.

Prisoners

Khailani said the Kurds held 1,300 Army prisoners in a camp at Mawat near Sulaimaniya and about 1,000 each in camps at Baitwata near Dikan and Badinan. He said there was a strong inclination on the part of the Kurdish soldiers especially those who had lost wives and children, to kill all prisoners, but the KDP leadership had determined that the world must understand the difference between Arab and Kurd and eventually it will react in favor of the Kurd. Khailani said the prisoners "are given meat every other day (as are the Kurdish soldiers), are bathed once every twenty days and given haircuts every month". The Kurds have asked the International Red Cross to examine their prison camps and any American observer would of course also be welcome to do so. The prisoners are engaged in building housing for Kurds whose homes have been destroyed by the Army and Air Force.

Negotiations

Khailani said the government contacted the KDP around October 5 and asked it to send a delegation to Baghdad to resume talks. Mulla Mustafa is supposed to have replied that the chief Kurdish negotiator (Salih Abdullah Yusufi) was already in Baghdad (in an Iraqi prison) and the government was free to resume talks with him. Yusufi could then bring any message the government might have to the north.

British position vis-a-vis the Kurds

Khailani, like most Kurds, was particularly bitter about the action of the British in selling weapons to the Iraqi Army which can only be used against Kurds. He also said the Kurds were particularly disturbed by their intercept of an Iraqi Diplomatic message recording a recent conversation between the British Ambassador in Amman and a member of the Iraqi Mission there. The British Ambassador is alleged to have told the Iraqi about the recent talks between King Husain and the Kurds and assured him that Iraq had nothing to worry about. (The Kurds had assumed Husain would not tell the British of this contact). The Ambassador reportedly went on to say: Husain would not be able to help the Kurds, the Russians were far too busy with their own problems to engage in trouble in Kurdistan, the Americans could not help the Kurds because of possible repercussions in Turkey and Iran, Nasser could not take an anti-Arab stand any place and Britain was ready to stand by the Iraqi government with any military help it might need.

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By <u>SE</u> NARA Date <u>11/18/05</u>

COMMON/ACTION

NEA-5

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		NSC
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAM

POL 13-3 IRAQ
X POL 27 IRAQ
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A-248 MESSAGE CENTER
NO. CONFIDENTIAL

AIR POUCH

HANDLING INDICATOR

TO : 1963 OCT 16 AM 9:20

Info : Amembassy Amman
" Baghdad
" Cairo
" Damascus
" London

FROM : Amembassy Beirut

SUBJECT : Kurdish Opposition to Baath

REF :

1963 OCT 15 PM 1 19

HER
ANALYSIS & DISTRIBUTION
BRANCH

DATE: October 8, 1963.

RM/R file
her
10-21-63

SUMMARY

Former Iraqi Prime Minister Ahmed Mukhtar BABAN, a Kurd, reports that the strength of an anti-Baath movement in Iraq is increasing. There is, however, little evidence of any significant organization behind the anti-Baathist forces which he mentions.

In a private conversation pursuant to his request, Ahmed Mukhtar Baban, former Prime Minister of Iraq (1958), declared flatly on October 7 that no solution of the Kurdish problem is possible as long as the Baath party rules Iraq. Ahmed Mukhtar and his nephew Mahmoud Baban, both Kurds, reported that the Kurdish position is quite good in the current hostilities in northern Iraq. They referred to a recent Kurdish raid at Halubja which netted many prisoners and much military loot. They felt the Iraq Army will be in increasingly difficult position when its garrisons become isolated by the snows in Iraqi Kurdistan.

Ahmed Mukhtar and his nephew echoed much of what had been said in an earlier conversation by former Iraqi Minister Baba Ali (Embassy A-234). They felt the Shias and the Kurds are practically unanimously against the Baathist regime. They claimed there is widespread dissatisfaction and unrest in Iraq and that the ouster of the Baathist regime is a virtual certainty. When asked what sort of organization does this movement have, they were most vague.

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FORM 4-62 DS-323

Drafted by: Amb Armin H. Meyer:fln Oct. 8, 1963

Contents and Classification Approved by:

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Authority NND 938522
By SC-NARA Date 11/18/05


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- 2 -

With regard to King Hussein, Ahmed Mukhtar felt that it was not impossible to restore a Hashemite in Iraq. He said he himself has not been in direct contact with the King and is not sure what sort of a role the King might play in support of an Iraqi anti-Baath movement.

Ahmed Mukhtar said that when the Baath is ousted, the potential successors are the Communists, the Nasserists, and truly democratic and pro-Western forces such as he represents. He felt there was scarcely any possibility of a Communist takeover, since the Communists are quite thoroughly discredited in Iraq. As to Nasser, he felt the Egyptian leader's prestige has dropped sharply and most Iraqis would oppose Nasser's policies of unity, etc. Thus he felt the likely successors could and should be truly democratic elements oriented to the West. His obvious implication was that the West should give indication of support to such a movement. In reply I reiterated USG policies of non-involvement and our belief that the destinies of countries must be left to the people directly concerned.

COMMENT. While the Babans are extremely likeable individuals, this conversation tended to confirm the observation made in A-234 that the anti-Baath movement which Ahmed Mukhtar advocates is not much more than wishful thinking.


Armin H. Meyer

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CONFIDENTIAL

October 8, 1963

Memorandum of Conversation With the British Ambassador, Gordon N. Jackson

From: James A. May, Charge' d'Affaires, Baghdad

Subject: Iraqi Armed Forces

The Ambassador stated that according to British information the Iraqi Armed Forces had no significant capacity available in view of the amount of its forces tied down by the Kurdish revolt. He noted that although the Iraqis stated to the Kuwaitis that this revolt would be put down completely within three months this was highly improbable. The British consider that despite all Iraqi efforts the Kurds still occupy large areas of Kurdistan. Moreover they have avoided any major battle with the Iraqi forces and have most of their forces intact. Their withdrawals have been strategic in nature rather than retreats resulting from Iraqi military victories. He foresees that with the advent of winter the Iraqi forces will be in a virtually untenable position in the mountains in Kurdistan and will be forced to withdraw or face steady attrition from the Kurds. He believes that the Iraqis will continue to be unable to work out a political settlement with the Kurds along the lines that Iraq has thus far been willing to consider. Accordingly, even assuming bad faith on the part of Iraq in agreeing to recognize Kuwait, it has little immediate ability to use any significant portion of its armed forces against Kuwait either directly or as a nearby threat.

The Ambassador considers that the reported exchange of forces between Syria and Iraq would have no significant influence on the course of military events in Kurdistan nor would it permit the Iraqis to move large forces toward the Kuwait border.

CC: Mr. Talcott Seelye - NEA NE - Dept. of State
Baghdad
Basra

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Authority NND 938522

By SC-NARA Date 11/18/05

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 939522
By SC NARA Date 11/18/08

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Page 1, Enclosure 1
Airgram No. A-291
Baghdad, Iraq.

President of the United States of America

His Excellency President John Kennedy

For two years out peace-loving Kurdish people have been involved in Iraqi Kurdistan in a dirty all-out war forced upon them by an enemy armed with the best weapons of destruction and annihilation, although they have committed no crime other than to demand the least which any principle of the rights of peoples would grant them, self-determination, that is, autonomy within the Iraqi state.

Despite the fact that the country rid itself of the dictatorial, one-man rule of Qasim, and despite all our efforts to reach a peaceful solution which would guarantee to our people certain of their rights, end the war, and restore peace to the country and stability to the region, the fascist Ba'thi gang which has come to rule alone following the 8 February coup, by means of its tyrannical, terrorist policies, has not responded to the voice of reason, has ignored the lessons of history, and has given the negotiations which took place between them and our delegation no importance except insofar as they gave them the opportunity to reorganize their exhausted forces and take us by surprise when they resumed fighting. It violated the norms of behavior by arresting our negotiating delegation, and subjecting them to many kinds of torture. They suddenly imposed a curfew in all the cities of Kurdistan under their control and authorized the shooting of violators without warning or investigation. They then exploited these circumstances and killed tens of faithful citizens in the cities, and hundreds of simple village-dwellers, who had gone to their market-places as usual on the morning of June 9. They were exposed to the fire of machine-guns and tank cannons. In Sulaimaniya alone 267 people were killed. They plundered homes and shops, and threw ^{at} least 15,000 people into prison. These were exposed to the most terrible and revolting treatment which the criminal fascist mentality could contrive. Since that date our beautiful country of Kurdistan has been subjected to air raids in which various types of aircraft have spread death, fire and destruction, killing faithful old men, women, and children, burning fields and threshing floors, and destroying houses and cottages over the heads of their occupants, defenseless and innocent, killing their animals. It is a war of extermination launched by the forces of death and destruction represented in the Ba'thi gang ruling in Baghdad against Kurdistan, giving no quarter. Despite these results of this Hitlerian campaign of murder, deprivation, and destruction, the government has not attained any military victories worth mentioning.

Silence in the face of this human slaughter and war of organized extermination is absolutely inconsistent with the spirit of our age, replete with humane, progressive ideas. It is inconsistent with the duties and missions which lie on the shoulders of the United Nations, its Charter, and on those member states which have agreed to it, thus promising to respect the text of the Declaration of Human Rights, and to work to protect safety and stability.

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Authority <u>NND 932522</u>
By <u>SE</u> NARA Date <u>11/18/08</u>

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Page 2, Enclosure 1
Airgram No. A-291
Baghdad, Iraq

Our Kurdish people are suffering from the terrible racist policy being applied against them by the Ba'thi gang with fire and iron. If they still lag behind the government of South Africa in organizing a policy of racial discrimination, they have nevertheless exceeded it with regard to the extremity of their measures. For example, they destroyed whole districts of Kirkuk, depriving their inhabitants in the amount of 40,000 of their homes, only because they were Kurds, differing from them in race and language. All along the border between the Arabic areas and Iraqi Kurdistan the government has expelled the faithful Kurdish inhabitants and forced them to flee to save themselves, leaving all their possessions behind, exposed to raiding and plundering. The government has formed an official committee to settle Arab tribes in their place, distributing their (the Kurds') property and money to them. In the same way thousands of Kurdish employees have been thrown out of their positions, and a fascist policy of Arabization has been initiated toward all Kurds and Kurdistanis.

The claim of the government that our case is an internal affair is a flimsy claim clearly invalid, which tyranny and oppression unavailingly cling to in order to prevent the United Nations from undertaking the most important of its tasks. Despite all the desperate attempts by the government of South Africa and the imperialist countries in the United Nations to prevent the debate of its policy of racial discrimination, on the pretext that this would constitute interference in her internal affairs, the UN rejected this pretext and considered the policy which the government of South Africa was pursuing against a portion of its citizens as violating the rights of man. It therefore found it the duty (of South Africa) to put an end to this policy and protect its oppressed citizens. It adopted a decision to impose a complete boycott on this government. The policy which the fascist Ba'thi government is pursuing against the Kurdish people in Iraq is in its essence a policy of racial discrimination preventing the Kurds from enjoying their national rights, preparatory to fusing them by force, by barbaric means, in the melting pot of Arab nationalism.

Then, too, the policy which the Ba'thi Baghdad government is pursuing in Kurdistan is an imperialist, oppressive policy which does not differ in kind or motive from those policies by certain imperialist states against which certain colonial peoples protested. Does the fact that the rulers over Kurdistan are non-Europeans or that the country is backward economically suffice in itself to refute the charge of imperialism against these rulers, and to allow silence in the face of their crimes, at a time when it is in effect pursuing a policy of imperialism which exceeds in its savageness and inhumaneness that for which the worst and most oppressive imperialist states are known? Moreover, is their to be found in the world a colony in which the occupying army is allowed the right to kill and plunder and destroy and imprison, at any time they want, without any justification, or investigation, or trial, as the Iraqi government empowered its army of occupation in Kurdistan by the Republican Decree issued on June 9, 1963? The United Nations, in its position as successor to the League of Nations, has a special responsibility toward the case of Kurdistan in Iraq. It is known that our Southern Kurdistan, that is, what is known as Kurdistan of Iraq now, a country whose overwhelming majority

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By <u>SE</u> NARA Date <u>11/18/05</u>

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Page 3, Enclosure 1
Airgram No. A-291
Baghdad, Iraq.

is Kurdish, was not included within the Iraqi state which the English created in Mesopotamia in 1922. It was, rather, attached to that country in 1926 by decision of the League of Nations, as a result of the partial plebiscite carried out by it in careful compliance with the conditions and recommendations agreed upon by the Iraqi and British governments, the former when in 1932 it was accepted as a member of the League of Nations. Thus the violation by the Iraqi government of these conditions, and its launching of a dirty war against the Kurdish people, in order to Arabize them or induce them to emigrate or exterminate them, and make of their Kurdistan a part of what is called the Arab nation, and their violation of all (the Kurds') human rights, of democracy, and of nationalism, is a grave violation of the principles of the United Nations, and the law of the Rights of Man, and the moral principles prevailing among the sons of mankind. It is a complete violation, and a flagrant contradiction, of all the conditions of the agreement by which (Iraq) joined (the League). This requires that the United Nations intervene in order to rectify the situation so that it agrees with the spirit of the age and the development of the times, on the one hand, and on the other gives the Kurdish people the complete right and absolute freedom, not only to reconsider the matter of its union with the Arabs within a single state, but even of its continuing to live under the shadow of the present Ba'thi government, the enemy of the Arabs and the Kurds.

Based on the above, the resort by the government of the Ba'th to the worn-out record claiming that the war of extermination now going on in Kurdistan is its internal affair, and that the peace-loving peoples, and those adhering to the Charter of the Rights of Man, have no right to bring the matter up in the United Nations, will not deceive the people of the world, nor their governments, who love peace and freedom. On the contrary, we believe that if the United Nations ignores the human slaughter now going on in Kurdistan of Iraq, it would be a clear neglect and unjustified failure to live up to the duties now resting on its shoulders, to protect the peoples from suppression, terror, and oppression. Indeed, historic and humane responsibility requires every member state of the United Nations to work toward ending the war which the government of the fascist Ba'th has launched against the Kurdish people, and begin to help this oppressed people by all moral and material means.

Our people are now exposed to the most terrible and oppressive campaign of extermination which any people has been subjected to in the second half of the twentieth century. Tens of thousands of old men, children, and women are wandering about following the destruction of their homes and cottages, and the burning of their threshing grounds and their property by the enemy, and the loss of their cattle. They are in a condition never experienced except during the tortures of the air raids of the Second World War. They need all kinds of assistance, even the most simple. They need, even, mere human sympathy for their tragedy. Where are the humane rescue organizations to supply hundreds of victims of criminal air bombardments and save them from death resulting from mere lack of medicines? No, but where are the Societies for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, to save the tens of thousands of cattle and

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Authority	NND 938522
By	SC-NARA Date 11/18/05

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Page 4, Enclosure 1
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Baghdad, Iraq.

other animals from destruction? In a single air raid over Sharahzor, for example, the aircraft killed with their machine-gun fire 5 thousand head of cattle and over a thousand other animals.

We want to inform you that no force on earth can compel us to accept the conditions under which we now live, or keep us from persisting in the struggle for our legal national and democratic rights, however long the struggle, and however many the victims. Our Kurdish people will prove to the world that they, no less than other people, are zealous to defend their existence, and ready to defend their rights. Before this absolute determination of our people, and before the persistence of the fascist Ba'thi gang in its criminal policy, we call on you to intervene immediately to compel the Iraqi government to end its war of extermination, and respond to the just demands of our people, which may be summarized as: the granting of autonomy to Kurdistan of Iraq. We also call on you to issue an order forbidding the sale of arms and other war material to the Iraqi state until it ends the war, and to issue the recommendations and guidance necessary to all nations to offer all possible assistance to our struggling Kurdish people, in order to help them in their struggle for their legal rights, and to speed the end of their torture and suppression.

We call on all peoples of the world to undertake their duties toward our Kurdish people, whether by pressure on their states, or by offering the necessary aid to them, and the adoption of a cordial attitude toward them, and the offering of direct aid to them, whether moral or material.

We call on the humane organizations of the world in general, and particularly the International Red Cross, to undertake their humane duty to relieve the victims of this war by sending representatives to investigate the condition of Kurdistan, and offer the aid necessary in such a case as soon as possible.

In conclusion, the Political Office of the Kurdish Democratic Party is pleased to take this opportunity to offer its greetings and sincere best wishes.

The Political Office of the
Kurdish Democratic Party

Seal: Party Dimocrati Kurdistan
Political Office
al-Hizb al-Dimocrati al-Kurdistani

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Authority <u>NND 938522</u>
By <u>SE</u> NARA Date <u>11/18/05</u>

ACTION			DEPARTMENT OF STATE			PPV 10 NETH XRPOL 6-1 NETH XRPOL B-3 IRAA FOR RM USE ONLY		
INR-5			42 AIRGRAM					
RM/R	REP	AF	A-45			LIMITED OFFICIAL USE		
1			NO.			HANDLING INDICATOR		
ARA	EUR	FE	TO : DEPARTMENT OF STATE			INFO : THE HAGUE		
5			DATE: September 26, 1963			SUBJECT: International Society Kurdistan, Kurdish Student Society and Silvio Eugenius VAN ROOY		
NEA	CU	INB	FROM : Amconsul AMSTERDAM			REF : Amsterdam's A-72 of November 1, 1962		
4			DATE: September 26, 1963			SUBJECT: International Society Kurdistan, Kurdish Student Society and Silvio Eugenius VAN ROOY		
E	P	IO	DATE: September 26, 1963			SUBJECT: International Society Kurdistan, Kurdish Student Society and Silvio Eugenius VAN ROOY		
1			DATE: September 26, 1963			SUBJECT: International Society Kurdistan, Kurdish Student Society and Silvio Eugenius VAN ROOY		
L	FBO	AID	DATE: September 26, 1963			SUBJECT: International Society Kurdistan, Kurdish Student Society and Silvio Eugenius VAN ROOY		
			DATE: September 26, 1963			SUBJECT: International Society Kurdistan, Kurdish Student Society and Silvio Eugenius VAN ROOY		
AGR	COM	FRB	DATE: September 26, 1963			SUBJECT: International Society Kurdistan, Kurdish Student Society and Silvio Eugenius VAN ROOY		
			DATE: September 26, 1963			SUBJECT: International Society Kurdistan, Kurdish Student Society and Silvio Eugenius VAN ROOY		
INT	LAB	TAR	DATE: September 26, 1963			SUBJECT: International Society Kurdistan, Kurdish Student Society and Silvio Eugenius VAN ROOY		
			DATE: September 26, 1963			SUBJECT: International Society Kurdistan, Kurdish Student Society and Silvio Eugenius VAN ROOY		
TR	XMB	AIR	DATE: September 26, 1963			SUBJECT: International Society Kurdistan, Kurdish Student Society and Silvio Eugenius VAN ROOY		
			DATE: September 26, 1963			SUBJECT: International Society Kurdistan, Kurdish Student Society and Silvio Eugenius VAN ROOY		
ARMY	CIA	NAVY	DATE: September 26, 1963			SUBJECT: International Society Kurdistan, Kurdish Student Society and Silvio Eugenius VAN ROOY		
5	10	5	DATE: September 26, 1963			SUBJECT: International Society Kurdistan, Kurdish Student Society and Silvio Eugenius VAN ROOY		
DSC	USIA	NSA	DATE: September 26, 1963			SUBJECT: International Society Kurdistan, Kurdish Student Society and Silvio Eugenius VAN ROOY		
	8	3	DATE: September 26, 1963			SUBJECT: International Society Kurdistan, Kurdish Student Society and Silvio Eugenius VAN ROOY		
		3	DATE: September 26, 1963			SUBJECT: International Society Kurdistan, Kurdish Student Society and Silvio Eugenius VAN ROOY		

Enclosed is a memorandum prepared by Vice Consul Barbara F. SWEENEY who has discussed Kurdish affairs with Silvio Eugenius VAN ROOY in his home.

Byron E. Blankinship
American Consul General

Enclosure: *Att. [unclear]*

Memorandum.

Decontrolled after five years.
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Drafted By: *BEBlankinship:esr:9-24-63*

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Clearances:

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By *SE* NARA Date *11/18/05*

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Page 1 of 2
Encl. No. 1
A-45 from Amsterdam

M E M O R A N D U M

SUBJECT: International Society Kurdistan, Kurdish Student Society and
Silvio Eugenius VAN ROOY

The International Society Kurdistan (ISK) appears to be mainly the creation of Silvio Eugenius van ROOY who edits the publication of the "society," "Kurdish Facts," which appears periodically but irregularly. Approximately 25 people in the United States subscribe to this periodical. Among the American subscribers are several American University students and professors, one or two US Government employees and Supreme Court Justice William O. DOUGLAS.

At the present moment, there are no Kurdish students in Amsterdam. Consequently, the Kurdish Student Society is defunct. The International Society Kurdistan, however, is still active. Mr. van Rooy claims that its members include several people from the academic world, students and professors, and other people who sympathize with the Kurdish cause. Mr. van Rooy seems to be the activist in Amsterdam as far as ISK is concerned. He corresponds widely with Middle Eastern scholars, with Kurdish exiles and publicists of the Kurdish cause, and seems to be on good terms with the Amsterdam Jewish community. In late April early May, ISK sponsored an exhibition of pictures and books on "Unknown Kurdistan" at the Amsterdam Municipal Library. The exhibition was favorably received by the public and critics and was extended for two additional weeks.

For Mr. van Rooy, the most important function of ISK is that of achieving publicity for the Kurdish cause. "Kurdish Facts" is thus his particular interest. Mr. van Rooy, aided by his wife, some friends and a few university students interested in the Middle East, is responsible for most of its articles as well as its editing. His sources of information include major European and American periodicals and news services; letters from Middle Eastern scholars, Kurdish exiles and other Kurds; Jews and other non-Arabs living in the Middle East. Mr. van Rooy also has an extensive library of books, newspaper clippings and photographs. It is his project to obtain the photographs and personal biographies of all the important people in the Kurdish nationalist movement.

Mr. van Rooy claims that ISK has no financial sponsors other than those who subscribe to its magazine, "Kurdish Facts." In fact, he stated that many people have asked him who or what is behind ISK and that they are always surprised when he says no one. He does admit that the financial status of ISK is not always sufficient to pay for the publication of "Kurdish Facts" and as a result not as many issues appear as there is material for. At one time, Mr. van Rooy planned to ask wealthy and influential Americans interested in the Middle East for contributions to help toward the publication of the magazine. Whether or not he was successful in this endeavor is not known.

As regards to the political ideas of Mr. van Rooy, he openly espouses the cause of democracy, and feels that only the West can help the Kurds. He would like to see the US adopt a more pro-Kurd policy in Iraq. He does not trust the Baathists nor do his Israeli and European Jewish friends. As the Baathists are pan-Arabists, they cannot help but be anti-Kurd and anti-Jew. Consequently there cannot and never will be a lasting reconciliation between the Baathist regime and

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ORIGIN/ACTION

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AIRGRAM

POL 25-1 IRAQ

NO POL 13-3 IRAQ

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A-129

SECRET

HANDLING INDICATOR

TO : DEPARTMENT OF STATE
INFO: ANKARA, BAGHDAD, TABRIZ, TEHRAN, BEIRUT, LONDON

This document consists of 1 page
Copy of copies, Series

FROM : Amembassy NICOSIA

DATE: September 25, 1963

SUBJECT : Iraqi Kurdish Insurgents: Views of AP Correspondent Efthyvoulou

REF : Embtel 180
NEA

COPY NO. SERIES B

AP Correspondent Alex EFTHYVOULOU spent two months in Iraqi Kurdistan this summer, having entered and left by way of Iran. The attached memorandum of conversation reveals him as a strong partisan of Kurdish leader BARZANI, who, in his estimation, is anti-communist, together with the rest of the current Kurdish leadership. While this apparent aberration renders some of his views of dubious value, his statement is of interest as reflecting the official Kurdish line vis-a-vis the West. Efthyvoulou is generally pro-West in his journalistic activities here.

For the Ambassador:

Oliver S. Crosby
First Secretary of Embassy

Enclosure:
Memocon Efthyvoulou

Distribution:
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Drafted by:
POL/OSCrosby:lwf September 23, 1963

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By SC NARA Date 11/18/05

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Page 1 of
Enclosure No. 1
Nicosia's A-129

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Participants: Alex M. Efthymoulou, AP Correspondent
Oliver S. Crosby, Embassy Political Officer

Date: September 16, 1963

Place: Mr. Crosby's Office

Subject: Iraqi Kurdish Insurgents

Mr. EFTHYVOULOU called at my request, having postponed his visit until the AAPSO meeting had been wrapped up.

Questioned about his travels in Iraqi Kurdistan, Efthymoulou talked freely about his two months visit there this summer. He said he had entered and left by the back door, i.e., Iran, and indicated it had been via the Ruwandiz gorge. The only foreigner in that area at the time, Efthymoulou travelled and lived with the Kurds, whom he likes and believes have been neglected by the Iraqi government. He said the area is beautiful, has great hydro-electric potential and is ideal for fruit and other agricultural production. Kurds are held in backward, undeveloped state by Baghdad, which withholds schools, roads, investment, etc.

While long range goal remains Greater Kurdistan, embracing 5-10 million Kurds in Turkey, Syria, Iraq and Iran, this is plainly illusory now, and present Kurdish goal is certain amount of autonomy to educate their children and develop their natural resources.

Strongly pro-BARZANI, whom he termed a conservative landlord, Efthymoulou maintained current Kurdish leadership is anti-communist. Migratory elements to the North West are more conservative than sedentary village Kurds to the South East, who have formed the Kurdish Democratic Party. These two elements, neither of which is communist, Efthymoulou said, have submerged their differences in the face of the Iraqi army, which has pushed to the entrance of the Ruwandiz gorge and one or two other road-heads, but which is not in control of the rest of the area.

At one time Efthymoulou played down the current Iraqi effort as desultory and less effective than that of Kasim, but then he said the fighting since June 1963 had been hard, and the Iraqi army had been pursuing a scorched-earth policy, using bombing and strafing planes that shoot at anything that moves, and driving some hundreds of Kurds across the Turkish border, where they were impounded. He said in the current drive 20,000 Kurds had been killed and about 6,000 Iraqi soldiers.

Efthymoulou stated that aside from limited material assistance from the Kurds in Iran, Barzani has received no help from any quarter. Efthymoulou said he had seen some truckloads of Soviet arms brought in which were said to have been captured from the Iraqi Army. The only moral support Barzani had came from the Soviet Union, which he did not respect because it had withheld such support during the Kasim period.

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TEHRAN'S 276 TO DEPT

CONCUR WITH FINAL SENTENCE REFTEL. IRAQI MILITARY
CONFIRM MAJOR ENGAGEMENT WITH KURDS NEAR RUKUCHUK RIVER ON
WAY FROM MERGASOR TO SHIRWAN MASIN (RATHER THAN ZAKHO). ARMY
AUTHORITIES CONFIDENT MAJOR VICTORY OVER KURDS IN SIGHT.
(THIS OUTLOOK SHARED BY TURKISH AMBASSADOR WHO SAYS IRAQI
ARMY CAN BREAK BACK OF REBELLION IN THREE TO FOUR WEEKS
CFN 332 136 51 24 19-2:15 176

Pol 13-3 Iraq
Pol 26 Iraq

PAGE RUQVBD 757 SECRET
REMAINING GOOD WEATHER).

UNDER CIRCUMSTANCES IMPROBABLY GOI WOULD BE RECEPTIVE
TO IDEA NEGOTIATION WITH BARZANI DURING NEXT FEW WEEKS AT
LEAST. ONCE OUTCOME THIS SEASON'S FIGHTING BECOMES CLEARER
WE MAY BE IN BETTER POSITION ASSESS FUTURE PROSPECTS FOR
CEASE-FIRE. SEEMS CLEAR BARZANI DESIRES USE US FOR HIS
PURPOSES RATHER THAN SEEK NEGOTIATIONS DIRECTLY WITH GOI, AND HE
CREDITS USG WITH FAR GREATER CAPABILITY IN IRAQ THAN WE
POSSESS. THIRD PARTY ROLE CAN BE EFFECTIVE ONLY WHEN BOTH
DISPUTANTS AGREEABLE. GOI NO WHERE NEAR THAT POINT NOW NOR
WILL GOI BE LIKELY ACCEPT USG INTERVENTION.

GP-3. STRONG
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American Consulate,
Tabriz, Iran,
September 18, 1963.

OFFICIAL-INFORMAL

Dear John:

I had originally intended to send the attached memo on along as an enclosure to my A-12 on the Kurdish situation, which you have either seen by now or will be seeing very shortly. On second thought, however, I decided that the line Mr. Izmirli had fed me was so preposterous that including it as part of an otherwise serious message would simply muddy the waters. As an alternative, I am sending it on to you, with a copy to Dan Newberry, on the theory that at least you may find it amusing.

Incidentally, Izmirli served with our old friend Alaeddin Gulen in Hamburg. You might remember him - and me - to Gulen at some suitable opportunity. What a combination that must have been!

These are interesting times, and I am enjoying myself mightily here in Tabriz. Best regards to one and all in GTI.

Sincerely,

Earl
Carleton S. Coon, Jr.
American Consul

cc: Mr. Newberry, AmEmbassy, Tehran

John W. Bowling, Esquire,
Deputy Director,
Office of Greek, Turkish, and Iranian Affairs,
Department of State,
Washington, D. C.

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By **SE** NARA Date **11/18/05**

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

DATE: September 18, 1963

SUBJECT: Barzani and the Kurds
PLACE AND TIME: Mr. Izmirli's Office, Rezaiyeh, September 1, 1963
PARTICIPANTS: Mr. Izmirli, Consul General of Turkey in Rezaiyeh, Western
Azerbaijan
Mr. C. S. Coon, U.S. Consul, Tabriz
Mr. Cyrus Habibi, U.S. Consulate, Tabriz

I brought Habibi along on what was supposed to be a courtesy call since I was not sure but what his services as an interpreter might be required. But since Izmirli immediately launched the conversation in a remarkably fluent patois consisting of more or less equal parts of English, French, and German, leaving Habibi at even more of a loss than me, I presently sent him off on an errand. Soon Izmirli steered the conversation around to the Kurds.

Izmirli said he was in the best position of anyone to know what was going on in Iraqi Kurdistan. He knew the people and the area, was on the best of terms with local Kurds, Azerbaijani Turks and Iranian authorities, and could go over to Turkey in an hour whenever he felt like checking up on the situation on that side. For example, when 800 Kurds crossed the Turkish border a couple of days earlier he had gone over and ascertained that they were Hakkiari tribesmen complete with women, children, and sheep. He had positive information that Barzani's general staff consisted of 35 Russians and five Russian-trained Kurds. "Nicht thirty-four, nicht thirty-six, mais thirty-five precisement." The Soviets had been sending Barzani arms, including anti-aircraft and other heavy equipment, overland through Iran. With these arms Barzani had "injured" seventeen Iraqi aircraft and twenty tanks. Three weeks ago Barzani had sent word back that he had all such arms he could use, and an important shipment that was in transit at the time was left in Iran, the Iranian authorities, of course, being too incompetent and corrupt to control these matters. Incidentally, the Iranian Army still could not fight any better than in the days of Hajji Baba of Isfahan. "If they have division mit automatisch weapons and you have nur revolvers then peut-etre they fight." If Barzani now chooses to go back to Russia through Iran he will have no trouble. But Barzani's men have plenty of food and ammunition. On the other hand the Iraqi Army will soon control the entire frontier with Iran, and then the situation will change.

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Page 2

Then Izmirli made his key point: All along he had been getting positive reports that Barzani was alive from sources that had seen him, but no such report had been received more recent than twenty days earlier, and he strongly suspected Barzani was dead. If so, the truth would be out very soon and the movement would crumble.

At this point Habibi returned. I had explained to Izmirli during Habibi's absence that Habibi was half-Kurdish and I expected his return to restrict the flow of Izmirli's intelligence revelations. But it seemed to have the opposite effect. Izmirli greeted Habibi warmly and as nearly as I could tell, recapitulated most of what he had already told me, this time in a mixture of English and Turkish, stressing his conviction that Barzani was dead. Evidently he did not, however, mention the 35 Russian officers and the arms shipments through Iran.

Then Izmirli, speaking more to Habibi than to me, but using mostly English, etc., and only a little Turkish, said his maternal grandfather might have been a Kurd — he wasn't sure. "We must recognize the Kurdish problem if we are to deal with it," he said (sic!). The Turks and Kurds have much in common, both are Sunnis, with similar customs, so Turk-Kurd amity should be easy to achieve. The Iranians, being Shi'a, were less well placed. And amity between Kurds and Iraqi Arabs was now impossible. He told Habibi the Iraqi Kurds showed an abysmal lack of talent for bargaining last spring when negotiating with the Ba'athi Government -- they demanded everything at once whereas they should have sought to achieve their objective of autonomy by stages.

Turning back to me, he reiterated that things were moving very fast, that the next few days would be critical. I said I would certainly consult him again when I next visited Rezaieyeh. He replied that he would be away on vacation from September 5 to mid-October. That did it: I made some polite noises and left.

Comment: A valiant if indiscriminating effort at a double-barreled snow job.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

POL 13-3 IRAQ

23

DATE: September 16, 1963

SUBJECT: Kurds Dismissed from Official Positions

PARTICIPANTS: Akram Jaf, Director General, Tobacco Monopoly, Iraq

(1) NEA - Lee F. Dinsmore

COPIES TO: NE (2cc)
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AmEmbassy, Baghdad (1)

In response to a request, Mr. Akram Jaf (protect source) brought in a list of Iraqi Kurds who, for various reasons, had been arrested and/or dismissed from prominent official positions as civil servants and Army officers by the Ba'ath Government since February, 1963. He said the list was not complete, but he hoped it was sufficient to illustrate how the Government of Iraq had treated Kurdish officials. The GOI's claims are untrue that it has not taken repressive steps against any Kurds except known supporters of Mulla Mustafa Barzani, Jaf asserted.

There are no Kurdish governors (mutasarrif) of provinces nor sub-governors (qaimmaqam) left in the Ministry of Interior. A few Kurdish Directors of local districts (mudir nahiya) remain on duty, but all of these have been transferred to the southern provinces. "Scores" of middle and lower class officials have been dismissed.

Names given, along with former position or title:

Hadi Chawishli - former Deputy Minister of Interior during Qasim regime

Fawzi Saib - Governor of Nasseriya

Araf al-Talibani - Governor of Hilla

Burhan Jaf - Member of Civil Service Board

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Hasan Rif'at - former Minister of Works and Housing under Qasim

Nur al-Din Muhi al-Din - Director General of Buildings,
Ministry of Works and Housing

Faiq Hosh Yar - Director General of Agrarian Reform under Qasim

Falah Shali (Ghali?) - General, Army

Abd al-Rahman al-Mufti - General, Army

Ali Sharif - Brigadier, Army

Aziz Abdullah - Brigadier, Army

Ata Muhammad - Brigadier, Army

Muhammad Abdullah - Major General, Army

Muhammad Said Afrasiali - Director General, Cigarette Factory

Dr. Jamal Rashid, M.D. - Ministry of Health

Dr. Abd al-Rahman, M.D. - Ministry of Health

Dr. Kamal Abdullah, M.D. - Ministry of Health

Dr. Qadir Ghali, M.D. - Ministry of Health

Ahmad Rafiq - Director, Capitol Public Grounds

Dr. Khalid Dabegy - University Professor

Sadiq Atrushi - formerly in University, formerly D.G. of Education

(Of the above, some were known during Qasim's administration to be supporters of Communist activities, i.e., Sadiq Atrushi and Faiq Hosh Yar. Aziz Abdullah may be an officer in the Army known to be a supporter of Mulla Mustafa.)

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AGR COM FRB

FROM : AmConsulate TABRIZ

DATE: September 18, 1963

INT LAB TAR

SUBJECT : Some Tentative Conclusions Regarding the Implications for Iran
of the Kurdish Revolt in Iraq

TR XMB AIR

REF : (A) Consulate's A-9, August 19, 1963, (B) Contel 3, September
6, 1963, (C) Consulate's Memcon with General Jam, September
9, 1963.

ARMY CIA NAVY

OSO USA NSA

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS:

What are the current and potential implications for Iran of the Barzani insurrection in Iraq? Firm evidence is hard to come by in this consular district, but a review of available opinion, rumor, and other information points to the following tentative conclusions:

1) Iranian Kurds are concerned over events across the border. This concern is closest to the surface around Mahabad, less noticeable in Kurdish regions farther south. Most Kurds in both areas, however, are generally disaffected with the Iranian Government, and resent what they consider shabby and neglectful treatment by the authorities. Only in the far south, around Kermanshah, has the prospect of genuine assimilation yet appeared over the horizon.

2) The Democratic Party of Kurdistan (DPK) is a disciplined covert organization that has been developing under leftist influence since 1946. It is the primary organizational mechanism for illegal movement of personnel to and from Iraq. It is continuing to recruit on a selective basis in Iranian Kurdish areas and in Tehran. Meanwhile old tribal lines of authority are crumbling rapidly and no overt institutional patterns are emerging which can express or channel Kurdish nationalist sentiment in Iran.

3) Barzani is unlikely to be crushed militarily this year. Meanwhile the transformation of the insurrection from a traditional tribal affair to a modern nationalist movement is proceeding rapidly.

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Page 2, A-12 from Tabriz

4) Political leadership of the Barzani revolt is sharply polarized: the pro-Western Part Party still exerts influence in the southern part of Iraqi Kurdistan but is rapidly losing out, in terms of control of the movement as a whole, to the DPIK (Iraqi affiliate of the DPK), which is pro-Soviet and is by now infiltrated by Iraqi communists and Soviet personnel. The USSR has probably supplied some equipment by airdrop. This help, plus Soviet international political support, combined with the absence of support from the West, is responsible for the growing ascendancy of the pro-Soviet faction. Most Kurds would still prefer to deal with the West but the logic of the situation is compelling them to move in the opposite direction. The recent Barzani appeal to the US to help achieve a cease-fire may have been engineered by the pro-West faction as part of a last-ditch effort to preserve its position.

5) Serious trouble in Iranian Kurdistan is not imminent. The Iranian military is in a stronger position than ever before and no rational Iranian Kurd is thinking seriously about insurrection at this time. But if present trends on both sides of the border continue for another couple of years, the Soviets may well be able to foster and exploit serious unrest in Iranian Kurdish areas through the DPK organization. This Consulate is in no position to judge whether or how vigorously the USSR might pursue such a tack. But the initiative could rest with the Soviets; their other regional interests would probably, in the long run, constitute less of a restraint in a CENTO area than in Arab territory; and they would have the advantage, and temptation, of a common frontier.

If these hypotheses have any validity, it would appear desirable to look for whatever steps we might take that could be reconciled with our other regional interests that might impede the communization of Iraqi Kurdish leadership; maintain lines of communication with Kurdish leaders on both sides of the border; and encourage and assist the Iranian Government toward more vigorous implementation of policies and actions leading to genuine assimilation of its own Kurdish groups.

Introduction: A Note on Sources:

The primary source of information for this report is Cyrus Habibi, the Consulate's half-Kurdish, half-American local employee.* Habibi, an intelligent and reflective person, is loyal to the United States though he no longer has a claim to US citizenship. He is equally loyal to his Iranian Kurdish brethren, amongst whom he occupies a position of considerable respect and about whom he is exceedingly well informed.

* Habibi worked for the Consulate several years, then resigned about a year ago to look for employment with more of a future. This summer he was persuaded to resume his old job for two months temporary duty; he is leaving in a few days to take over as principal of the high school in Mahabad, where his parents live.

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Page 3, A-12 from Tabriz

Other sources are civilian government officials, Iranian Army officers, Savak representatives, US military advisers and AID representatives to whom I talked during a recent trip through the provinces of Western Azerbaijan and Kurdistan. The most informative of these sources was Major General JAM, Deputy CO of the First Army, IIA, stationed in Mahabad. (See Ref. C.)

Barzani's Capabilities:

For some time now local Iranian military units have been feverishly gearing up to receive a fleeing Barzani together with his hard-core fighters, and give him a hot welcome if he tries to fight his way to the USSR. In Western Azerbaijan civic action programs have been temporarily suspended, the military being loath to divert trucks and other resources to such secondary pursuits during this critical period. Until very recently I was constantly being given the impression that local IIA units had firm intelligence indicating Barzani was as good as beaten in Iraq and was just about to flee across the border. I now suspect, however, that local IIA personnel were actually operating only on the basis of contingency planning, and had proceeded from the concept of contingency planning to the assumption that a good scrap was necessarily just around the corner through a process akin to wishful thinking. (Regardless of whether such rationalization showed much political acumen, it evidently had a useful galvanizing effect on morale.)

As noted in the Consulate's A-9, the picture Barzani's emissary gave me last month about the military situation on the Iraqi side was quite the reverse: Barzani's forces allegedly were holding their own very handily. This, by and large, has been Habibi's impression as gleaned from Iranian Kurdish sources.

It now seems likely that Barzani has in fact been holding his own, at least to the extent that he is unlikely to be defeated and expelled from Iraq before winter imposes a hiatus on the fighting. Major General Jam, Deputy CO of the IIA's First Army, gave me such an estimate September 3 (Ref. C). Furthermore, the fighting season is drawing to a close and with each passing week Barzani's chances of outlasting the Iraqis until winter improve, all else being equal. Lastly, information the Consulate has recently received from other posts, including Baghdad's telegram 279 dated September 8 and Beirut's 224 of September 9, has tended to reinforce the view that Barzani will hold out.

Smuggling Across the Iran-Iraq Border:

In Ref. A, I estimated that Barzani was suffering from a food shortage as a result of steps the Iranians took in July to seal the border, and that this was the main reason for the note of urgency in Barzani's appeal for US help in arranging a cease-fire. Now that I have had more opportunity to check into the matter I am inclined to downgrade the importance of the food shortage factor and look elsewhere for the principal reason for the Barzani appeal's note of urgency.

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Page 4, A-12 from Tabriz

(see next section).

Firm information on illegal border traffic is hard to come by. Semi-informed opinion I have heard ranges all the way from the flat assertion that the border is still wide open to the estimate that illegal traffic in commodities has been reduced to 10% of its former level since mid-July. An obvious reason for this confusion is the understandable reluctance of the smugglers themselves to advertise the details of their business. Another reason seems to be that the situation varies from one part of the border to another. My best guess at present is that aggressive Iranian army patrolling since mid-July has sharply reduced, though not eliminated, smuggling along the northern part of the border, from the Khaneh area north. In the southern region west of Sanandaj smuggling has also been reduced though probably to a lesser degree. A fairly substantial amount of smuggling still goes on from the Sardasht-Baneh area adjoining the central sector of the border, between the other two.

Both from the foregoing and from other indicators it would seem that Barzani is not getting all the food he needs at present but that he is getting enough to keep on fighting. Some food shortage is possibly indicated by rumors that he has been turning back young Iranian Kurds who have been crossing the border to join his forces, and that he has released substantial numbers of Iraqi Army prisoners. Perhaps the Western journalist mentioned in Ref. B can cast some light on how tightly this particular shoe is binding.

By way of background Habibi has given me the following description of the border situation when Barzani was fighting the Qassim regime: At first only about thirty of the richest Iranian Kurdish landlord-tribal chieftains were sending supplies to Barzani. After the Iranian land reform program started, many smaller landlords joined in, on the theory that Tehran would proceed slowly with land reform in their area as long as Barzani remained an active force across the border. (This type of landlord typically owned one or two small villages, lived and worked on the land, without education for himself or his children, and without any outside interests to which he could turn once dispossessed.) Supplies were packed into Iraq by donkey, horse, and mule. (Smuggling by truck never was feasible.) The commodities smuggled in included bread, wheat, tea, sugar, material for uniforms, gasoline, rice, and medicine. Most of these supplies were offered gratis, without payment. (At one point Barzani sent someone to Tabriz for sugar; what with local contributions from resident Kurds and funds contributed by Iranian Kurds elsewhere he was able to purchase and ship 150 bales of sugar back to Barzani, each bale containing about 100 kilograms). As to the reverse flow, wool was smuggled out of Iraq and introduced into Iranian commercial channels by Iranian Kurds. All of this traffic went on without appreciable interference from the Iranian authorities even though the authorities were presumably well aware of what was going on and the principal routes employed.

While most of the supplies to Iraq came from Iranian landowners as described above, an appreciable minority portion of it, perhaps a third, was purchased and shipped by the DPK.

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Page 5, A-12 from Tabriz

Iraqi Kurdish Leadership - Soviet Influence:

As General Jam pointed out (Ref. C), the question of who is actually in the driver's seat as far as Iraqi Kurdish leadership is concerned is central to any assessment of the problem as a whole. I have found no solid evidence locally that helps very much to indicate an answer; but Habibi has certain recollections and impressions about the past development of Kurdish nationalism, and the Soviet role therein, that provide some interesting suggestions as to what may actually be going on at present. I would suggest that these thoughts be checked against other available information by persons more knowledgeable than myself.

According to Habibi, a non-leftist, largely non-tribal Kurdish nationalist political organization already existed in Iraq in the era before World War II. It was called the "Hewa" ("hope") party, and most of the prominent non-tribal Kurds of the Nuri Sa'id era, both before and after the war, were associated with it. The Kurds assimilated the English word "Party," and gradually came amongst themselves to refer to the Hewa party simply as "Party." Gradually the terminal "y" was dropped. This is Habibi's explanation of the etymological derivation of the term "Part Party", used by General Jam and others to refer to the non-leftist political element of the Kurdish nationalist movement in Iraq today. It is simply the lineal descendant of the old nationalist "Hewa" movement.

Meanwhile, parallel but inter-related developments were occurring on the Iranian side of the border. The Komala party, started in Mahabad in 1942, was at first untainted by communism or Soviet influence. But when the independent Kurdish republic of Mahabad was established in 1946 the Komala party in effect was placed in a position of partnership with the USSR in keeping this fragile new state afloat, and many of the party members came under Soviet influence. During this period the party changed its name to the Democratic Party of Kurdistan, (DPK) at Soviet suggestion. When Iranian forces crushed the young republic at the end of the year the leftist or Soviet-influenced element of the DPK preserved the party structure and went underground. The others simply washed their hands of politics and went back to traditional pursuits.

In post-war Iraq the Kurdish nationalist movement per se was not significantly penetrated by the communists for over a decade, although some Iraqi Kurds may have joined the CPI. In 1958, when Qassim came to power and CPI fortunes rose, more Kurds joined the CPI. Shortly thereafter (possibly on instructions), the Kurdish contingent of the CPI broke away from the parent organization and founded the Democratic Party of Iraqi Kurdistan (DPIK). Thus Habibi believes the DPIK's leadership has been fronting for the communists ever since the party's beginning. And the DPK, on the Iranian side, was apparently working with the DPIK at an early date: Habibi recalls that about 1959, Savak arrested eighty-odd Iranian Kurds, members of DPK, for clandestine political activities involving illegal traffic across the Iraqi border. Many of these arrestees had Tudeh party connections and to the best of Habibi's knowledge these latter are still in jail. Habibi also has the impression that three to three and a half years ago the Tudeh

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Page 6, A-12 from Tabriz

party abruptly stopped recruiting Kurdish students in Tehran, while the DPK accelerated its efforts in this field.

Meanwhile, early in the Qassim era, Mullah Mustafa Barzani returned to Iraqi Kurdistan from exile in the USSR. Habibi still finds Barzani an enigma; he has not been able to find any evidence to show whether Barzani remains a pure Kurdish nationalist, or was seduced by the Russians to the point where he had become their willing instrument, or something in between. He recognizes, however, that the Soviets would not have released Barzani had they not intended to use him.

The "Part" Party and the DPIK joined forces when the fighting first broke out between Qassim's army and Kurdish forces under Barzani. Habibi believes that the "Part" Party leadership continued to preserve its separate identity although formally or terminologically it accepted the DPIK label as applying to the political organization of the entire nationalist movement. Evidently in so doing the "Part" Party leaders recognized Barzani as their natural military leader, though they remained pro-Western and anti-communist, and must have had reservations regarding the compatibility of their ultimate aims with those of the original DPIK - and perhaps of Barzani himself.

So much for Habibi's history. I would infer, and Habibi agrees, that as the fighting proceeded and the bulk of Iraqi Kurdish opinion solidified behind Barzani and in opposition to the Qassim regime, traditional tribal leaders that had hitherto remained apolitical tended to throw their weight behind the "Part" party element of the movement's political leadership. Meanwhile the pro-Soviet DPIK element found it expedient to behave like good Kurdish nationalists and to refrain from actively pushing for pro-Soviet policies, since the USSR was supporting Qassim and Soviet arms were being used against the Kurds. Covertly, presumably, they continued to strengthen their organization, coordinating with parallel efforts by the DPK in Iran.

This year the situation is quite different. The USSR is openly opposed to the new Iraqi regime and actively supporting the Kurdish cause in the international political arena. Soviet-inspired Kurdish-language radio broadcasts daily hammer home the theme that the USSR is the Kurds' best, in fact only, friend. And I am reasonably well persuaded the Soviets have airdropped some supplies to Barzani's forces.* Meanwhile the West, particularly the US, remains aloof, is on noticeably better terms with the Ba'ath regime than it was with Qassim, and even is supplying the Iraqi Government with limited arms. Against this background it seems inevitable that the pro-Soviet "sleepers" around Barzani should raise their heads and convincingly argue for the policies they have secretly

* Habibi has passed me rumors that Soviet aircraft have recently overflowed Western Azerbaijan; General Jam's remarks (Ref C) tend to confirm this; and I also have it on good authority that Iranian radar here has been operating on a 40 hour/week basis.

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Page 7, A-12 from Tabriz

been favoring all along; and that the pro-Western elements should be muted, disturbed, and in disarray.

Several semi-informed sources have assured me that Barzani's entourage includes numbers of Iraqi Arab communists who fled the Ba'ath regime and also Soviet advisers. The former seems probable, the latter quite possible. After Kamali gave me the recent Barzani appeal (Ref. A), he mentioned to Habibi that Barzani's entourage included a TASS representative. Considering the background of the source this can be taken as an authoritative estimate of the minimum representation on the spot of outright Soviet personnel. And I would presume that the Soviet Government selected the man for this job with some care. The point is that we can be fairly certain (a) that there are enough well-trained and indoctrinated communist organizers within the Barzani movement to mount a fairly wide-scale proselytizing effort among the ranks, now that conditions are comparatively propitious, and (b) Moscow has a direct, quasi-diplomatic pipeline to Barzani, whereas we are virtually incommunicado.

It was against this background that I speculated (Ref. B) that the Barzani appeal Kamali delivered to me on August 16 was engineered by pro-Western elements and that the appeal's note of urgency (especially the phrase "We are like a drowning man grasping at straws") was more a reflection of fear at losing all influence in the movement than fear the movement itself would be crushed. To speculate further, I might guess that some "Part" Party leader or leaders approached Barzani and counseled him not to give up on the U.S.; he expressed strong skepticism that the U.S. would ever be any help, but agreed in principle to "one last try"; and the pro-Western element then formulated the specific wording of the appeal on its own. It is also possible, though I believe less likely, that certain pro-Western elements sent the appeal without Barzani's knowledge.

One further note: General Jam told me (Ref. C) that the Part Party elements were concentrated in the south, physically separated from Barzani and his pro-Soviet entourage in the northern part of Iraqi Kurdistan. Habibi has had similar reports from his sources. This geographical separation is presumably (if our understanding is accurate,) facilitating the capture of the titular leadership of the movement by the pro-Soviet elements. But this separation might conceivably also provide opportunities for the Iraqi Government to split the movement - e.g. through a relatively magnanimous approach to the pro-Western element only -- although such opportunities have probably been minimized by the bitterness of recent fighting.

Iranian Kurdish Attitudes toward the Iranian Government:

Habibi has given me the following appraisal of Iranian Kurdish attitudes toward the Iranian Government: Many southern Kurds, in the area south of Sanandaj and particularly in Kermanshah, are Shi'a Moslems. The Sunni Kurds to the north regard them as somehow different from themselves, not really hundred per cent Kurds, too close to the Persians, too soft. (Cf. the historic distinction

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between highland and lowland Scots.) Such assimilation as has occurred has almost all been in the south: Kurdish officials in the Iranian Government, Kurdish students abroad, etc., are most probably from Kermanshah or environs. What Habibi has to say applies primarily to the Northern Kurds, to a lesser degree to the Sanandaj area, and hardly at all to Kermanshah.


In the past the Iranian Government left the Kurds pretty much to themselves except to put down major disturbances, relying on landlords and tribal chiefs to keep order under normal circumstances. This situation is changing rapidly, but not, in Habibi's opinion, for the better. Kurds with a vested interest in the old order of things are unhappy at the changes -- particularly land reform -- appearing on the horizon. The peasants are unhappy that land reform has not yet been implemented in their areas. More basic, however, is a feeling common to all elements of the Sunni Kurdish population of being unwanted stepchildren, of being regarded by Tehran as a problem, of being, in short, second class citizens. The fact that the Sunni Kurds constitute a religious minority in Shi'a Iran accentuates this feeling, although it is by no means the only, or even primary, cause.

This undercurrent of resentment is compounded by contempt and disgust for most Iranian officials the Kurds have dealt with, whom as a rule they have found venal, corrupt, and thoroughly untrustworthy. The central government's well publicized program to improve living conditions in Kurdish areas has produced little by way of tangible results, and most Kurds regard it as a cynical and largely propagandistic reaction by the regime to the troubles on the Iraqi side of the border.

Almost all of these Kurds, in Habibi's opinion, want their own country; they are not attracted by the alternative goal of first class status in a modern and progressive Iranian empire. The reaction to the sense of being a problem has gone too far for the latter goal to be psychologically satisfying. An emotional climate is forming in which Iranian Kurds will be quite prepared to cooperate with other "outs" -- i.e. the communists -- if it will help them toward their basic goal of independence. Even the tribal leaders will not oppose cooperation with the leftists.

There is at present no overt organization on the Iranian side of the border capable of focusing and coordinating the aspirations of the Iranian Kurds as a whole. The great tribal leaders who died in the past decade have not been replaced, and in another five or six years Habibi estimates that the old tribal lines will have lost almost all meaning. The DPK (see below), for the time being at least, is still covert, underground, biding its time. The Iranian Army is deployed in force and is obviously much more capable of handling any disturbance than it was a few years ago -- no Iranian Kurd in his right mind is thinking seriously of insurrection under present circumstances, i.e. without substantial external support.

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Page 9, A-12 from Tabriz

The Democratic Party of Kurdistan, (DPK):

Habibi believes the DPK in Mahabad is continuing to recruit carefully and selectively, concentrating on quality and reliability rather than on building a mass following. The people of Mahabad are generally aware the party exists and has leftist connections; the latter does not disturb them particularly. The DPK does not indulge in overt propaganda or otherwise advertise its existence; insofar as it does give non-member Kurds some idea of its policies it concentrates on nationalist rather than pro-Soviet themes - extolling Barzani, and advocating independence for Iraqi Kurdistan. Evidently it is not pushing the concept of independence for Iranian Kurdistan at this time. On a more practical or operational level, it constitutes the primary organizational mechanism for illegal transfer of personnel across the border to and from Iraqi Kurdistan. Habibi does not know how large the DPK's membership is, even in Mahabad, but has the impression that it is not numerically large in Mahabad, and each member there knows who the others are -- i.e., the cellular pattern is not followed.

Habibi estimates there are thirty to forty Mahabad Kurdish students in Tehran and almost all are DPK members. A much smaller percentage of Sanandaj Kurds studying in Tehran are also members; the DPK generally avoids such students, some of whom it believes to be Savak agents. Students from Kermanshah are generally left alone.

Iranian Kurdish Attitudes toward Foreign Powers:


Habibi appraises Kurdish attitudes in the areas he knows best as follows:
The USSR: Most Iranian Kurds think the USSR will be the first major power to help their cause significantly and welcome the prospect of such help. They doubt whether long-term dependence on the Soviet Union would be in their interest, but this would not stop them from accepting Soviet help if and when offered. Nor would their other reservation, their fear that Soviet aid would bring the U.S. into a role of active opposition. The U.S.: Generalized pro-U.S. sentiment is still fairly widespread; most Iranian Kurds would choose dependence on America to dependence on any other major power if they had a choice. But chagrin at U.S. aloofness is giving way to a feeling that the U.S. will never support their cause, and may even embark on anti-Kurdish policies fairly soon. The U.K.: Iranian Kurds generally feel that the British have been actively opposing Kurdish nationalism and must be regarded as adversaries. Israel: Regarded with favor as a minor potential source of aid and as a country that might recognize an independent Kurdistan at an early stage.

* * * * *

As this analysis is already exceedingly lengthy, the conclusions drawn at its beginning will not be restated here. As a final note, however, I should like to recognize the obvious fact that the thrust of much of the analysis rests

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Page 10, A-12 from Tabriz

on value judgements of a single individual, Habibi, and that other viewpoints, and other information, need to be brought to bear on the subject before we can be confident in the accuracy of our appraisal. I shall be searching for such other viewpoints and information during the remainder of my tour here. I was tempted to defer any such analysis as this one until I had been here longer and was more certain of my ground. But Habibi is probably as good a source as any, and unless he has sorely misled me, history in this area may not wait on my convenience. If in fact there is a possibility that we might face a Viet Nam type situation in Iranian Kurdistan two or three years from now, we may have little time left to head it off.



Carleton S. Coon, Jr.
American Consul

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FROM: Baghdad

SS

TO: Secretary of State

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NO: 303, September 13, noon.

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ACTION DEPARTMENT 303, INFORMATION BEIRUT 103.

Department telegram 153. 106133

Concur in Department's views and should like to add that there is good deal of room for friendly open contacts with Kurdish representatives without compromising our relations with GOI.

While GOI may not like such contacts, scarcely worthwhile to GOI to create an issue. What would create real and overt antagonism would be public support for or active private advocacy of Kurdish nationalist movement, or failure take position favoring GOI in any public forum.

GP-3.

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11:31 a.m.

1963 SEP 12 PM 4 49

FROM: Tehran

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 255, September 12, 5 p.m. 13-3. Drag

ACTION BAGHDAD 27 INFORMATION DEPARTMENT 225 ANKARA 22
LONDON 42 USUN 18

URTEL 46 (297 TO DEPT). WE HOPE IT HAS BEEN CLEAR FROM OUR 16 (166 TO DEPT) THAT AS FAR AS BARZANI IS CONCERNED, HE HAS ALREADY CLEARLY MADE APPEAL FOR CEASE FIRE. HE HAS NEVER ASKED US TO ACT AS POST OFFICE OR INDICATED THAT HE HAS ANOTHER MESSAGE TO SEND ONCE WE HAVE ESTABLISHED OURSELVES IN THAT ROLE.

ON OTHER HAND (EMBTTEL 179 TO DEPT NOT RPTD BAGHDAD), BARZANI HAS DESIGNATED SOMEONE TO REPRESENT HIM IN EVENT THERE ARE FOLLOW-UP TALKS. IN ACCORDANCE DEPTTEL 131 (123 TO BAGHDAD) WE PASSED WORD TO BARZANI THAT WE HAVE CONVEYED HIS MESSAGE TO IRAQIS AND THAT WE ARE AVAILABLE FOR ANY FURTHER MESSAGE HE MAY WISH TO HAVE CONVEYED.

IT SEEMS TO US, HOWEVER, THAT BALL IS SQUARELY IN IRAQI COURT. SINCE WE HAVE CHOSEN ROLE OF POST OFFICE, CONVEYING ONE MESSAGE FROM BARZANI TO IRAQI GOVT, IT IS ONLY REASONABLE TO SUPPOSE THAT IT IS NOW RPT NOW UP TO IRAQIS TO SIGNIFY WHETHER THEY WISH TO TALK ABOUT A CEASE FIRE WITH BARZANI. IF SO, WE KNOW HOW TO CONTACT BARZANI'S INTERMEDIARY.

WISH TO CAUTION, HOWEVER, IN LINE WITH VIEWS EXPRESSED IN EMBTELS 18 AND 20 (183 AND 185 TO DEPT). THAT IRANIANN GOVT WILL HAVE TO BE BROUGHT INTO PICTURE IF TALKS BETWEEN IRAQIS AND KURDS WERE TO EVENTUATE HERE. BUT IF ANYTHING IS TO COME OF BARZANI'S APPEAL, IRAQIS WILL HAVE TO GIVE SOME REACTION THAT WE CAN PASS BACK TO HIM. GP-3

HOLMES

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CTI

"We told him to acknowledge receipt and say letter passed to Washington and return noncommittal reply" Komer.

(above notation found on WH memo by Polly Bates, implying that Mr. Komer has spoken to someone in the Dept).

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This document consists of 1 page. No. 3 of 12 copies. Series 13855

PAR

FILE

SEP 12 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. McGEORGE BUNDY
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Letter to the President from
Mullah Mustafa Barzani

Enclosed is a letter to the President from Mullah Mustafa Barzani, leader of the Iraqi Kurdish tribes who are at war with the Iraqi Government. This letter, dated July 18, 1963, was delivered on August 27, 1963, to the American Embassy at Tehran by an Iranian Kurdish chief who was attending a Tehran convention in connection with the forthcoming Iranian parliamentary elections. The letter was written in Persian, and the enclosed is a translation by the American Embassy, Tehran. There was no explanation as to why the letter was so long in transit.

The enclosed letter parallels quite closely a previous letter dated July 12, 1963, a translation of which was forwarded under cover of Tehran's Airgram 67, July 30, 1963. In accordance with the suggestion in Airgram 67, the Department concurred, with White House approval, that Consulate Tabriz should be instructed to give an oral answer to the letter of July 12 (Department's Telegram 91, August 7, 1963, to Tehran).

In view of the action already taken on the letter of July 12, it is recommended that no action be taken on the letter of July 18.

J. W. DAVIS
Benjamin H. Read FOR
Executive Secretary

Enclosure:

Translation of letter
dated July 18, 1963

Reviewed by RM/P

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GROUP 3

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NEA - Mr. Jernegan
S/S -

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COPY

Informal Translation from Persian

Through the US Embassy to President Kennedy with Highest Regards

July 18, 1963

At this difficult time through which the much-suffering Kurdish nation passes, while the entire world stands by as witnesses, the Fascist Iraqi Government, most cruelly and with all intensity, uses its armed forces equipped with the most modern arms to wipe out the poor Kurdish nation. It has launched the most destructive operations, and hardly a day passes when hundreds of women, children, old, young and innocent Kurds are not killed; also scores of Kurdish villages with their farms and cattle are daily burned down by napalm bombs. These savage atrocities occur because the Kurds of Iraq wish to live in their ancient and ancestral homeland in tranquility and avail themselves of human rights, thus pursuing their livelihood and raising their children. The Baathist Iraqi fascists want to take our lives, given by the Almighty, and they intend to annihilate our race. This happens in the civilized Twentieth Century and before the eyes of the democratic nations and the United Nations. The Kurds consider themselves human beings and want to benefit from the Human Rights Charter which is one of the fundamental laws of the United Nations.

As is

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As is obvious to all, the Kurdish nation, without receiving assistance from any government or nation, is defending its right to life and its just cause, by use of weapons wrested from the aggressors.

That is why, at this time, we apply to the great and just government and nation of America so that it may stop the Iraqi Baathist Fascists from annihilating poor Kurds, and taking away the God-given right of life itself.

We seriously ask Your Excellency and the American nation to use every influence in this matter and to use your influence to prevent this bloodshed and fratricide in Iraq and bring about the salvation of life of a million and a half innocent Kurds by taking humanitarian steps; and to solve this matter with that spirit of democracy and altruism which is an old and prominent tradition of the American people. All that we want is security and peace in our homeland.

I want to declare categorically again, to eliminate any doubts, that all we want is the right to live and benefit from the Human Rights Charter. We do not advocate any political affiliation and grouping. Our self-defense movement does not contradict the political and economic interests of any government, either large or small and, is not and shall not be detrimental to the interests of any government.

Please allow me to express respects on behalf of myself and the

long-suffering

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long-suffering Kurdish people and present friendly compliments to
Your Excellency and the freedom-loving American people.

(signed) Mostafa Barzani

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2 pages, No. 1 of
copies, Series 4.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation POL 13-3 IRAQ

DATE: September 12, 1963

SUBJECT: Kurdish Developments

PARTICIPANTS: Ali Haidar Sulaiman, Ambassador of Iraq

NEA - Mr. Talbot

NEA - Mr. Jernegan

NE - Mr. Kinsolving

COPIES TO:

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NE (2) 5-4

INR (8) 5-12

AmEmbassy, Baghdad (1) -13

USUN (1) 4

SEP 19 1963

15, 16, 17

Although Ambassador Sulaiman had stated that he wished to make a courtesy call on his return to the United States, the conversation remained centered almost entirely on Kurdish developments. Ambassador Sulaiman expressed his personal sorrow at not having succeeded in his efforts to promote mediation between the Iraqi Government and the Barzani Kurds, attributing the failure of the talks primarily to arrogance and intractability on both sides, including the Iraqi Army. He stated that Ba'athi reserve about the Kurds began as soon as the Ba'ath seized power, since the two prominent Kurds called to the Baghdad Radio Station to broadcast their support of the new regime did so on the condition of a promise of Kurdish autonomy. The Government thereafter took no serious steps to win Kurdish confidence by releasing Kurdish prisoners, lifting the blockade, or transferring Iraqi officials who had caused trouble between Kurds and the Government. The Kurds for their part remained suspicious and did not accept some of the Government moves in good faith; furthermore, the Kurds had refused to phrase their demands in moderate terms.

Ambassador Sulaiman continued that the instability caused by the Kurdish hostilities had weakened the Government; however, the Ba'ath, though a minority Government, remains strong because it has penetrated and dominates many sectors of Iraqi society through its organizations, and also because there is no organized opposition. With regard to the latter, he stated that the National Democratic Party consists of a small group of intellectuals, the Istiqlal

has "only

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has "only 2 or 3" leading members left, and the Harakat Qawmiyyiin al-Arab is also very small.

With regard to the immediate future, Ambassador Sulaiman warned of the imminent danger of famine and epidemics among the Kurds as the fighting continues into the fall and winter, and the Government blockade remains in effect. He hoped that in "a second phase" the United States would be able to help restore the damage through material and medical assistance. He thought that "some organization such as the Red Cross" might help.

Ambassador Sulaiman then asked if we had heard of any prospect for negotiations. Mr. Talbot replied that we had heard rumored or unconfirmed reports of a desire to reach a compromise. When Ambassador Sulaiman asked him where from, Mr. Talbot replied that he was not sure.

Ambassador Sulaiman then asked if the Kurdish issue would be placed on the agenda of the UN General Assembly. Mr. Jernegan replied that it had been proposed but that no one appeared to be taking the proposal very seriously. Ambassador Sulaiman noted that several Kurdish representatives are on their way to the General Assembly, but stated that he thought that "quiet attempts" to recommence negotiations would bear more fruit than public discussion in the UN. In the latter respect, he thought we should at least try to keep burning a "pilot light" which could be expanded.

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(Drafting Office and Officer)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Memorandum of Conversation

POL 13-3 IRAQ

DATE: September 11, 1963

SUBJECT: Kurdish Situation in Iraq

PARTICIPANTS: Akram Jaf, Director General, Tobacco Monopoly, Iraq

(2) NEA - Lee F. Dinsmore

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NEA (1)

Mr. Akram Jaf (protect source), an Iraqi Kurd who is in the United States on a mission to arrange for the supply of PL 480 wheat to Iraq, called at his request. For an hour and a half he had little to talk about aside from the Kurdish dilemma.

1. The morale of Kurdish fighting men is high; the Iraqi Army has systematically leveled villages wherever it has passed, its vengeance particularly after a Kurdish raid or after a defeat in action has been indiscriminate and vicious; there is considerable sympathy throughout the country for the Kurds, particularly among the Shi'a Arabs; rations in the north of Iraq are tight, bread normally costing 2-1/2 cents to 4 cents has risen on occasion to over 16 cents in Sulaimaniya; there will be only spotty planting of wheat and barley this fall in the north owing to Army harassment, shortage of cash for seed, shortage of men, and loss of confidence in the GOI. The Government of Iraq has learned it cannot finally crush the Kurds, and it wants a settlement.

2. Mr. Jaf had discussed with Ambassador Ali Haidar Sulaiman (a Kurd) the Ambassador's thoughts about continuing to act as a middle-man between the Kurds and the GOI. The Ambassador is pondering whether and how to attempt to bring together in New York the Iraqi Foreign Minister (who will be attending the UNGA) and representatives of the Kurds, some of whom are already in New York (Kamuran Badrkhan and Ismet Sharif) and others who are expected (Jalal Talibani and Shawqat Aqrawi). His objective would be to revive the contact and the dialogue which stopped on June, 1963. Sulaiman

is aware

FORM DS-1254
3-61

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Authority NND 938522
By SP-NARA Date 11/18/05

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1967 SEP 16 PM 2 16

ANALYSIS & DISTRIBUTION
BRANCH

TO: DIRECTOR, DEPARTMENT OF STATE
FROM: [illegible]
SUBJECT: [illegible]

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- 1. [illegible]
- 2. [illegible]
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Authority NND 938522
By SP NARA Date 11/18/05

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-2-

is aware that probably neither Foreign Minister Shabib nor the Kurdish representatives could speak definitively for their principals in Iraq, and is sensitive to his own delicate position as Ambassador. Without directly encouraging such an initiative on the part of the Ambassador, the reporting officer admitted the touchiness of the matter, but commented that the New York setting, away from the distractions of Baghdad, might contribute to making such a meeting possible, and indicated that the Department would be interested in learning whether such a meeting had taken place and what were its results. Mr. Jaf said that he personally respected Foreign Minister Shabib's judgment, and added that they were close acquaintances. The reporting officer remarked that a positive solution should probably not be anticipated from such a meeting, but that a conference could be considered a useful effort if it resulted in recommendations and an agreement on further contact and exploration. Mr. Jaf volunteered to keep the Department informed.

3. Mr. Jaf described a number of situations in illustration of events in the Iraq Kurdish situation. He spoke calmly and in a matter-of-fact tone, but did not disguise his bitterness.

A. The Army loaded hundreds of Kurdish citizens of the city of Kirkuk in trucks, transported them to nearby hills in the direction of Sulaimaniya, set them free and told them not to return. These people wandered toward Sulaimaniya and were finally given refuge in villages in the province of Sulaimaniya. Kurdish children were later seen begging for food on the streets of Kirkuk, having lost their parents. Many Turkomans have fed and sheltered these children. X

B. Known Kurdish communists have been disarmed by the Kurds themselves and are kept under surveillance by their neighbors.

C. Many men of the Dizai Kurdish tribe (living largely on the plain to the west of the Altun Kupri-Erbil road) joined the government-sponsored, anti-Mulla Mustafa fighting forces. During their absence the government allowed or arranged for neighboring Arabs to move in to farm the lands of Dizai villages. When Dizai, pro-government fighters heard this they were incensed, but the Arabs have refused to date to move off the usurped land.

D. The GOI is endeavoring to "brainwash" representatives of foreign Embassies in Baghdad by giving permission for trips to Kirkuk which is virtually an Army camp and headquarters where

the security

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Authority <u>NND 938522</u>
By <u>SE</u> NARA Date <u>11/18/05</u>

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-3-

the security situation is under control and where life is near normal. He hoped the United States would not be deceived by this limited type of guided tour.

E. Kaka Ziad (politically socialist-minded and not a "feudalist" landlord) has fled Koi Sanjak where his home was smashed, and has joined Mulla Mustafa's resistance group. Koi Sanjak is half in ruins.

F. Kaka Hama Khanaqa (moderate Kirkuk Kurdish lawyer) was killed as a result of a helicopter crash near Rania. The helicopter was carrying his brother, Shaikh Hussain Khanaqa, and others on the mission to Abbas Mamand Agha which was to have tried to woo Abbas away from supporting Mulla Mustafa. Abbas, who is living in his village of Sarkhabkhan, refused to support the government or conclude a truce.

G. Pizhdar Kurds (Qal'a Diza area) are behaving as neutralists, neither encouraging their men to fight with Mulla Mustafa nor joining anti-Mulla efforts. (Obviously, their territory, stretching to the Iran border north of Sulaimaniya, is used by supporters of Mulla Mustafa as a safe passage).

4. There is no medical doctor in Sulaimaniya, the GOI will not allow one to reside there. (Sulaimaniya's population is believed to be around 50,000).

5. The Kurds who crossed into Turkey are not the supporters or families of the Barzanis. They come from the anti-Mulla Mustafa, government groups from around Dinarta in the Aqra area (Zibaris).

6. Very few Kurds have been left in their jobs as civil servants. In response to a blunt query for the reason he still held a responsible position in his Ministry, Mr. Jaf replied that he has been extremely careful in his contacts, that he is more "useful" in his position than were he to resign and join the dissidents. He would be of little use in the mountains. He enjoys the confidence of Kurdish activists. He turned down an offer that he become Deputy Minister of Agriculture, asserting that he could not appear to other Kurds as being a pawn of the GOI.

7. Reports that Israel is aiding the Iraqi Kurdish revolt are ridiculous.

8. During

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Authority <u>NND 938522</u>
By <u>SC</u> NARA Date <u>11/18/05</u>

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8. During Prime Minister Qasim's time of troubles with the Kurds, Iran's radio Kermanshah broadcasting in Kurdish left the impression that Iran was prepared to include Iraq's Kurdish regions in Iran.

9. In response to a question, Mr. Jaf said that although, privately, Arab nationalists (qawmiin, not Baathists) are telling Kurds they would come quickly to an agreed settlement with the Kurds were they in power, he doubts that the nationalists would be much improvement over the Ba'ath Party.

10. Recently, Mr. Jaf had occasion to check the 1957 Iraq census. He determined that the Kurdish population of Iraq is between one million, fifty thousand and one million, one hundred thousand persons.


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Authority	NND 938522
By	SE-NARA Date 11/18/05

ORIGIN/ACTION			DEPARTMENT OF STATE			50C 14-1 IRAQ X R FOR 13-3 IRAQ FOR RM USE ONLY		
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AGR	COM	FRB	FROM : AmConGen MUNICH			DATE: SEPTEMBER 10, 1963		
INT	LAB	TAR	SUBJECT : Kurdish Publication: Kurdish Facts, West-Asia					
TR	XMB	AIR	REF :					
		4						
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Attached as a publication of possible interest to the Department is a copy of Kurdish Facts, West-Asia, printed by the International Society of Kurdistan in Amsterdam. The publication, now in its fourth year, claims to be the world's only paper about the Kurds and as such is submitted to the Department for possible review by officers interested in the Kurdistan problem. Only one copy of the issue is available to the Consulate General.


 Walter K. Scott
 American Consul General

Enclosure:
As stated.

UNCLASSIFIED

FORM 4-62 DS-323

Drafted by: R.G. Shaubleton/mes

Contents and Classification Approved by: R.G. Shaubleton

Clearances:

DECLASSIFIED
 Authority: NND 938522
 By: SE-NARA Date: 11/18/05

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

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38

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Action

Control: 4736

NEA

Rec'd: SEPTEMBER 7, 1963

8:14 AM

Info

FROM: BAGHDAD

SS

TO: Secretary of State

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SP

NO: 279, SEPTEMBER 7, 2 PM

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ACTION DEPARTMENT 279, INFORMATION ANKARA 23, DAMASCUS 66,
LONDON 119., TEHRAN 40, BASRA UNNUMBERED.P
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AIR

RMR

FROM VARIETY SOURCES EMBASSY HAS RECIEVED RECENT INDICATIONS THAT DESPITE GOI'S AGGRESSIVE MILITARY TACTICS AND DRACONIAN MEASURES AGAINST KURDISH POPULATION REBELS RETAIN CAPABILITY FOR WIDESPREAD COUNTERACTION. IPC REPORTS ALMOST DAILY HARASSMENT IN KIRKUK AREA ALTHOUGH DAMAGE TO DATE HAS BEEN MINOR. KURDISH SOURCE RECENTLY DOWN FROM AREA BROUGHT REPORT THAT KURDS VERY ACTIVE THAT AREA AND EVEN CLAIMED REBELS HAVE REGAINED CONTROL OF PIRIS MOUNTAIN WHICH IS KEY TERRAIN FEATURE ON APPROACHES TO BARZAN. CHALDEAN CHRISTIAN SOURCES REPORT CONSTANT REBEL ACTIVITY IN TAL KAIF - AL-QOSH AREAS AS INDIRECT RESULT OF WHICH TWO BISHOPS AND TWO PRIESTS FROM REGION ARE UNDER ARREST IN MOSUL. SAME SOURCES QUOTE GOVERNMENT SECURITY OFFICIAL JUST DOWN FROM KHANAQIN AS REPORTING KURBS KILLED 21 PERSONS IN RAID ON KHAMAQIN WITHIN LAST THREE DAYS.

ON EVE DEPARTURE FOR U.S. AS MEMBER GOI PURCHASING MISSION DG TOBACCO MONOPOLY AKRAM JAFF (PROTECT SOURCE) TOLD EMOFF KURDS HAD FOUGHT ALL-DAY BATTLE WITH ARMY AT KIFR 60 MILES NORTHEAST OF KIRKUK, DURING LATTER PART OF AUGUST. ARMY FORCED WITHDRAW TO KIRKUK AT NIGHTFALL BUT RETURNED TO AREA IN GREATER FORCE FOLLOWING DAY AND DESTROYED NO LESS THAN 15 VILLAGES IN RETALIATION, KILLING HUNDREDS OF MEN, WOMEN AND CHILDREN IN PROCESS. JAFF ALSO REPORTED THAT FOLLOWING RECENT FIRING AT SECURITY OFFICIAL IN KOISANJAK, GOI MADE HOUSE TO HOUSE SEARCH ROUNDING UP WOMEN AND CHILDREN WHO FOUND LIVING WITHOUT MENFOLK AND EXPELLED THEM INTO OPEN

2 This copy must be returned to RM/R central files with notation of action taken. REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS PROHIBITED UNLESS UNCLASSIFIED

ACTION ASSIGNED TO	NEA/INE	ACTION TAKEN	
NAME OF OFFICER	AKK/gar	DATE OF ACTION	
OFFICE SYMBOL		DIRECTIONS TO RM/R	file

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Authority NND 938522

By SE NARA Date 11/18/05

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INCOMING TELEGRAM

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Control: 4835
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11:23 AM

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FROM: TABRIZ

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 3, SEPTEMBER 6, 10 AM

ACTION DEPARTMENT 3, INFORMATION ANKARA 2, BAGHDAD 2,
BEIRUT 1, LONDON 1, TEHRAN 18,

REFERENCE: CONSULATE'S A-9 NOT SENT BEIRUT.

RECENT INFO DEVELOPED HERE SUGGESTS POLITICAL LEADERSHIP OF
IRAQI KURDISH INSURGENTS INCREASINGLY POLARIZED BETWEEN
PRO-WESTERN AND PRO-SOVIET ELEMENTS WITH LATTER WINNING.
THOUGH FIRM EVIDENCE LACKING HERE IT APPEARS PLAUSIBLE TO
SPECULATE THAT RECENT BARZANI APPEAL'S NOTE OF URGENCY MAY
HAVE DERIVED LESS FROM BARZANI'S MILITARY AND LOGISTIC DIFFI-
CULTIES THAN FROM FACT THIS APPEAL ENGINEERED BY PRO-
WESTERN ELEMENT WHICH CONSIDERED IT LAST CHANCE PRESERVE
POSITION OF INFLUENCE IN COUNCILS OF MOVEMENT. ANALYSIS WILL
BE POUCHED.

PRIVATE US CITIZEN HAS JUST TOLD ME THAT ON AUGUST 26 IN TEHRAN
HE TALKED TO AP CORRESPONDENT NAMED EFTESOULOS (PRIOR
ORIGIN, POSSIBLY BRITISH SUBJECT) WHO HAD JUST EMERGED FROM
IRAQI KURDISTAN AFTER BEING WITH BARZANI FORCES SINCE JUNE.
SOURCE THOUGHT EFTESOULOS LEFT SHORTLY THEREAFTER FOR BEIRUT.
IF NOT ALREADY BEING DONE, RECOMMEND EFFORT CONFIRM THIS
REPORT AND IF POSSIBLE ARRANGE DETAILED BRIEFING EFTESOULOS
WITH PARTICULAR EMPHASIS ON SUBJECT OF PRECEDING PARAGRAPH.

RELATED SUBJECT:

CONSULATE LOCAL EMPLOYEE REPORTS BEGINNING SEPTEMBER 2 HE
AND OTHERS HAVE HEARD SCATTERED REFERENCES OVER RADIO ISRAEL,
RADIO BAGHDAD, AND BBC (FARSI LANGUAGE) NEWSCASTS THAT IRAQ

2 • This copy must be returned to RM/R serial files with notation of ACTION TAKEN

ACTION ASSIGNED TO: NEA/NE	ACTION TAKEN	DATE OF ACTION	DIRECTIONS TO RM/R
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XR PL 13-3 1849

EZR-6

AIRGRAM

POL 13-3 IRAQ

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A-76

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AIR POUCH

HANDLING INDICATOR

TO : Department of State
INFO : USUN, PARIS, BAGHDAD

1963 SEP 8 ~~11~~ 07

OUR INDEX

RM/AN
ANALYSIS & DISTRIBUTION
BRANCH

FROM : AmEmbassy DUBLIN

DATE: September 6, 1963

SUBJECT: Iraqi Kurds Seek Irish Support at UN

REF :

Emir Dr. Kamuran Aali Bedir-Khan, head of Iraqi Kurds in Paris, arrived in Dublin on September 5 to enlist Irish support for a resolution which will come before the UN General Assembly calling for Kurdish Self-Government within Iraq. He reportedly plans to spend a week in Dublin and hopes to see President de Valera and Foreign Minister Aiken.

The Emir, who is Professor of Kurd Language and Traditions in the Sorbonne, told the press that he had been instructed to come to Ireland by General Mustapha Barazani, Commander-in-Chief of the Kurds and President of the Kurdish Democratic Party. He reviewed the history of the Kurdish struggle for self-government, and said, "my mission is to make Ireland aware of what amounts to genocide. We know we have your moral support but we want your support in the General Assembly as well."

COMMENT: The Irish Government had no advance knowledge of the Emir's arrival and is not likely to commit itself on the issue at this time. It is likely, however, to be somewhat leery of the resolution's Outer Mongolian sponsorship.

For the Ambassador:

Irving G. Cheslaw
Second Secretary of Embassy

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Drafted by:

IGCheslaw/dag

Contents and Classification Approved by:

DCM:JSweeney

Clearances:

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Authority **NND 938522**

By SC NARA Date 11/18/05

OFFICE
OF EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
MESSAGE CENTER

1963 SEP 9 AM 11 05

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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FROM: [illegible]

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Authority: NND 938522
By: SE NARA Date: 11/18/05

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Department of State

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Action

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Info

SECRET

Control:

24274

Rec'd:

AUGUST 29, 1963

10:11 AM

FROM: TEHRAN

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 211, AUGUST 29, 1 PM

ACTION DEPARTMENT 211, INFORMATION BAGHDAD 25,

FOL TEL FROM TABRIZ RPTD FOR YOUR INFO QTE:

TABRIZ 15, AUGUST 27, 3PM

LIMIT DISTRIBUTION

REF CONSULATE TELEGRAM 14

HABIBI REPORTS MISSION ACCOMPLISHED MONDAY NOON. NO RPT NO APPARENT SURVEILLANCE. GILANI APPEARED RELIEVED AND ENCOURAGED THAT WE HAD RESPONDED, OFFERED NO RPT NO COMMENT ON SUBSTANCE REPLY, NOTED FOLLOWING IN CONFIDENCE:

(1) IRAQI GOVT RECENTLY OFFERED BARZANI FIVE MILLION IRAQI DINAR BRIBE TO LEAVE COUNTRY.

(2) BARZANI HAS ORDERED GENERAL WITHDRAWAL FROM ZAKHO-BARZANI FRONT TOWARD RAWANDUZ AS FIRST STAGE OF TRAP AGAINST MAJOR IRAQI ARMY ELEMENTS IN NORTH. (GILANI NOTED IN THIS CONTEXT BARZANI HAD BEEN AWAITING OUR REPLY, IMPLYING OUR REPLY A FACTOR IN BARZANI STATICAL PLANS).

(3) OUR MESSAGE WOULD REACH BARZANI AUGUST 28.

DETAILS POUCHED TOMORROW. SIGNED COON UNQTE.

GP-3

JTC

HOLMES

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ASSIGNED TO:		DIRECTIONS	
NAME OF OFFICER		TO RM/R	
OFFICE SYMBOL			

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Authority NND 938522

By SC-NARA Date 11/18/05

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TR	XMB	AIR
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAM

POL 13-3 IRAQ
POL IRAQ-TUR
POL 17 USSR-TUR
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A-184
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AIR POUCH

HANDLING INDICATOR

TO : DEPARTMENT OF STATE

1963 SEP 1 PM 12 12

INFO : BAGHDAD, DAMASCUS, LONDON, MOSCOW, TEHRAN, USUN,
ISTANBUL, IZMIR, ADANARM/AN
ANALYSIS & DISTRIBUTION
BRANCH

FROM : AmEmbassy ANKARA

DATE: August 28, 1963

SUBJECT : Soviet Ambassador's Efforts Disassociate Himself From Soviet
Communication Warning Turkey Against Interference in Iraqi
Affairs

REF : Embassy Telegrams 45, 54, 80; A-50

Mr. Sadi CORUK, Director of the Third Section (USSR and Eastern Europe) in the Foreign Office, informs the Embassy that prior to home leave Ambassador RIJOV (Embassy Telegram 121) sought unsuccessfully to disassociate himself from the Soviet communication of July 9 (Embassy Airgram 50), wherein the Soviets warned certain states, including Turkey, against interference in Iraqi affairs through activities against the Kurds. Rijov claimed that he had not been consulted by his government and that this communication obviously made more difficult his mission of fostering Turkish-Soviet relations. He argued at length that the Soviet communication of July 9 was not a note, not a letter, simply a "statement" couched in general terms. Coruk commented that Rijov's presentation made no impression and was not believed.

For the Charge d'Affaires ad interim

Philip Clock
Philip Clock
Counselor of Embassy

GROUP 3- Downgraded at 12-year intervals,
not automatically declassified.

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FORM
4-62 DS-323

Drafted by:

Content and Classification Approved by:

Clearances:

POL:PClock:mmm

P. Clock

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Authority NND 938522

By SC-NARA Date 11/18/05

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Department of State

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Action

Control: 7394

Rec'd: September 11, 1963

9:05 a.m.

NEA

FROM: Baghdad

Info

SS

TO: Secretary of State

G

NO: 297, September 11, 3 p.m.

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ACTION DEPARTMENT 297 INFORMATION ANKARA 27 LONDON 124
TEHRAN 46 USUN 19

EMTEL 241.

IN TALK WITH FONMIN SHABIB ON SEPT 10 I RECOUNTED MY MEETING WITH PRIMIN BAKR AUGUST 25, FINDING HIM FAMILIAR WITH IT. I STATED BARZANI HAD AS YET SENT NO MESSAGE FOR DELIVERY AND WE WERE STILL UNCERTAIN OF HIS INTENTIONS. IN VIEW OF DEEP CONCERN OF U.S. OVER KURDISH PROBLEM AND INTERNATIONAL RAMIFICATIONS USC OBLIGED ACT AS POST OFFICE THOUGH WISHED MAKE CLEAR WE ESCHEWING ROLE OF MEDIATOR OR CONCILIATOR. SHABIB REMARKED BAKR'S QUERY WHY BARZANI SENT MESSAGE TO USC WAS GOOD ONE AND WENT ON SAY BARZANI OBVIOUSLY TRYING DRIVE WEDGE BETWEEN USC AND GOI. HE THEN EXPRESSED CURIOSITY WHY I INFORMED GOI BEFORE MESSAGE ACTUALLY IN HAND FROM BARZANI FOR DELIVERY TO GOI.

I REPLIED WE CONSIDERED PRESS LEAK QUITE POSSIBLE, FROM WHATEVER THE SOURCE, AND BELIEVED IT BETTER FOR GOI TO HEAR FIRST OFFICIALLY FROM USC THAN TO READ SOMETHING IN PRESS AND BE EVEN MORE SUSPICIOUS OF U.S. MOTIVES. ABSENCE OF PRESS STORY WAS HELPFUL, BUT ABSENCE OF MESSAGE FROM BARZANI DEEPENED QUESTION OF WHAT HE UP TO.

SHABIB THEN INQUIRED WHETHER I HAD INFORMATION ABOUT ESTABLISHMENT OF KURDISH GOVERNMENT-IN-EXILE TO WHICH I REPLIED IN NEGATIVE. HAD NOT YET SEEN DEPTTEL 146, BUT SHABIB APPARENTLY HAS SAME RADIO REPORT.

COMMENT: SHABIB SEEMED MORE AMUSED THAN CONCERNED AT USC ROLE. IF KURDISH PROVISIONAL GOVT IN FACT ESTABLISHED IN KURDISTAN OR IN SOVBLOC, USC COULD HARDLY CONTINUE TO ACT AS MESSENGER TO GOI FOR BARZANI OR TAKE ANY

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ACTION ASSIGNED TO: NEA/NE	ACTION TAKEN: [initials]	DIRECTIONS TO RM/R: file
NAME OF OFFICER: [signature]	DATE OF ACTION: [initials]	
OFFICE SYMBOL: [initials]		

GPO 9 30 500

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Authority NND 938522

By [signature] NARA Date 11/18/05

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-2- 297, September 11, 3 p.m. from Baghdad

OTHER ACTION IMPLYING SUPPORT HIS REGIME. IF ESTABLISHMENT OF PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT OR GOVERNMENT-IN-EXILE SHOULD BE CONFIRMED, RELIEVE ISSUANCE OF PUBLIC STATEMENT SHOULD BE CONSIDERED IN CONSULTATION WITH INTERESTED GOVERNMENTS, REMINDING TO SOVIETS AS PREVIOUSLY USING KURDS AS Pawns FOR OWN PURPOSES TO DETRIMENT OF KURDS, URGING KURDS TO BE GOOD CITIZENS OF COUNTRIES OF RESIDENCE, AND URGING GOI DEAL IN STATESMANLIKE MANNER WITH KURDS, LATTER LIKELY CAUSE SOME PAIN AND STRAIN HERE, BUT IF SOVIETS BACKING A KURDISH GOVERNMENT GOI NOT IN VERY GOOD POSITION MAKE SERIOUS DIFFICULTIES WITH USG.

GP-3.

STRONG

DMB

CONFIDENTIAL

ORIGIN/ACTION			DEPARTMENT OF STATE		POL 13-3 IRAQ	
<div style="display: flex; justify-content: space-between;"> NEA-5 20 </div> <h1 style="margin: 0;">AIRGRAM</h1>			SECRET		FOR RM USE ONLY	
RM/R	REP	AF	<div style="display: flex; justify-content: space-between;"> NEA MESSAGE CENTER </div>		HANDLING INDICATOR	
ARA	EUR	FE	<div style="display: flex; justify-content: space-between;"> 1963 SEP 4 DEPARTMENT OF STATE </div>		This document consists of 5 pages no 1 of 14 Copies. Series A.	
NEA	CU	INR	<div style="display: flex; justify-content: space-between;"> AM 9 43 INFO : ANKARA, BASRA, DAMASCUS, TABRIZ, TEHRAN. </div>			
E	P	IO	<div style="display: flex; justify-content: space-between;"> 2 ANALYSIS & DISTRIBUTION </div>			
L	FBO	AIO	<div style="display: flex; justify-content: space-between;"> 12 AK </div>			
	S/P		<div style="display: flex; justify-content: space-between;"> AGR COM </div>		<div style="display: flex; justify-content: space-between;"> FROM : Amembassy, BAGHDAD DATE: August 27, 1963 </div>	
INT	LAB	TAR	<div style="display: flex; justify-content: space-between;"> SUBJECT : Transmitting Translation of Letter Purportedly from Barzani to Embassy Officer. REF : </div>		COPY NO. 1 - SERIES A	
TR	XMB	AIR	<p>The British and American Embassies in Baghdad recently received two hand-written letters each, in Arabic, purporting to be from Mulla Mustafa al-Barzani and a Christian general in the Barzani Armies, Isama'il Hormuz.</p> <p>The letters were delivered by the daughter of this general, who on several visits to the reporting officer prior to delivering the letter had stressed that GOI claims to victory against the Kurds are all lies, that the Christian population stands with Barzani and will fight to the last with his forces, and that the Christians and Kurds have certain men placed in the Iraqi Army and Air Force who will be able to work with other elements in the overthrow of the present regime, which she described as unpopular among all the people, Christian and Muslim. She repeatedly called for Western and particularly American aid, and vigorously denied that the Kurdish movement had any relations with the Communists.</p> <p>The letters are unsigned. The two addressed to the British Embassy bore the date of July 5, 1963, while those addressed to this Embassy were undated. Presumably, as the letters are all almost identical, they are of that date. Their delivery was delayed by the fact that the daughter was out of the country on a visit to Lebanon when they arrived in Baghdad, she said.</p> <p>The British Embassy believes that the letters are the work of an <u>agent provocateur</u>. They have destroyed their copies of the letters, and are no</p>			
ARMY	CIA	NAVY				
OSD	USIA	NSA				
15		3				
		NSC	<div style="display: flex; justify-content: space-between;"> GROUP 1 SECRET </div>			
<div style="display: flex; justify-content: space-between;"> FORM 4-62 DS-323 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification. </div>			<div style="display: flex; justify-content: space-between;"> FOR DEPT. USE ONLY <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> In <input type="checkbox"/> Out </div>		SECRET	
Drafted by: <i>AV</i> JMLord:mlh:08/20/63			Contents and Classification Approved by:			
Clearances: <i>RCStrong</i>			<i>NEA/NE/akillgall</i> <i>reaction necessary</i>			

 THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS 15 PAGES
 NUMBER 1 of 15 copies, Series A.

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 DECLASSIFIED
 Authority *NND 938522*
 By *SC* NARA Date *11/18/05*

SECRET

Page 2, Airgram No. A-178
Baghdad, Iraq.

reporting them to London, nor will officers of the Embassy see the girl further. British Embassy officers point to the poor literary quality of the letter and observe that as a piece of propaganda or plea for help it is much too shoddy and amateurish to be from Barzani. This Embassy agrees, although the daughter had as identification the military papers of her father, who served in the British Levy Force in Iraq in the 1920's, and Kurdish sources have said that a Christian general of that name is fighting with al-Barzani. The girl states that her father is now in a village near 'Amadiya, and that she has regular written contact with him via a route from Baghdad to Sulaimiya to points in the northern mountain regions. The specific reference to the Christians in the letter may indicate Christian authorship of both letters.

In any event, the Embassy has made no reply whatsoever to the letters, written or verbal, and the reporting officer made no comment at all to her verbal requests for American help for the Barzani Kurds. The Embassy has had no further contact with her.

For the Ambassador:

William C. Lakeland
William C. Lakeland

First Secretary of Embassy

Enclosure: *att. by m.*

Translation of Letter Purported to
Be From General Mustafa al-Barzani
to Embassy Officer

SECRET

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Authority	NND 938522
By	SC NARA Date 11/18/05

SECRET

Enclosure 1, Page 1
Airgram No. A-178
Baghdad, Iraq.

Translation of Letter Purported to
Be From General Mustafa al-Barzani
to Embassy Officer
From General Mustafa al-Barzani to
John Lord:

(A Second Letter is Headed: From
the Old Eastern Church from Ibrahim
the Representative of the Kurdish Party)

The leaders of the Iraqi Republic have said that al-Barzani is a greedy person unsatisfied with the assistance which the Iraqi Republic offered him. On the contrary, they said, he wanted to take over the entire petroleum output of Northern Iraq. However, all the world knows that al-Barzani has been trying to liberate his people since over forty years ago. At that time where was the oil and the oil products which the corrupt gang now ruling over the Iraqi people talks about? The revolutions which Barzani has been undertaking for the past forty years up to the present have been struggles for a people deprived of their human rights.

There is a difference between Kurdish nationalism and Arab nationalism with regard to language and tradition. The Kurdish language differs from the Arabic language. Also, the Kurdish region differs from the Arabic region. The region in which the Kurdish people live is mountainous. The Kurdish people have inhabited this region since ancient times, and have been affected by this environment. We believe that the Kurdish people differ from the Arabs even as regards way of life and physical environment. The regime now ruling in Iraq is confined to a corrupt gang of the Ba'th Party. Most of the people are dissatisfied with this type of regime, which is now oppressing the people by use of armed force. This ruling gang is small proportionally to the size of the Iraqi people. If there were complete freedom enabling the Iraqis to conduct elections, we would find this small gang no longer in existence, and having no influence in the government. This regime would not last long whatever tactics it resorted to against the Kurdish people including torture. The Kurdish people will win inevitably, despite these tortures, burning of villages, and hanging of our youth. The Kurdish revolutionaries will fight with all their faith and honor to liberate the Kurdish people.

The savage acts which the corrupt Ba'th government is perpetrating against the Kurdish people.

A German woman who is the wife of a person working for the UN says that she was in the Northern region in recent years. "I saw and I say now to all the world what the Iraqi armies did in the way of savage and dishonorable acts. In the campaign I saw the troops gather women and children and old men in great numbers and put them into small rooms. They were overcrowded and deprived of food. The troops treated them badly and inhumanely". This woman says also that the troops had entered into her house and plundered all the household furnishings dishonorably. "These household furnishings are now in the house of the officer responsible for the Salah al-Din region where I was living". Orders came to the troops from the leadership that they should

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Authority <u>NND 938522</u>
By <u>SC</u> NARA Date <u>11/18/05</u>

S E C R E T

Enclosure 1, Page 2
Airgram No. A-178
Baghdad, Iraq.

commit evil and inhumane acts including torture. Also among the criminal acts which the government has committed was the issuance of orders to hang Kurdish young men before the people in their own villages and before the eyes of their families. Besides this, they are not satisfied with these criminal acts but want the families of the young men whom they dangle from the gallows to applaud these savage acts.

Also, from the point of view of education and culture, most of the Kurdish and the youth of other non-Arabic sects are deprived of any future or any advanced government employment, since they know that anything more is impossible despite their moral character. A large number of students who graduate from the high schools and colleges are deprived of employment or positions and their future. Moreover, all positions and posts are given to Arabs. The corrupt gang is now undertaking in Iraq to differentiate between the sons of the people and is undertaking now to antagonize the non-Arab youth in Iraq of various national minorities and particularly the Kurdish youth. Thus when the Kurdish youth or the youth of the other sects living in Iraq present their documents in order to obtain any post in the state, their lot is failure. They say to them that they are non-Arabs and have no right to work with us. They say vicious things to them openly. How then can we accept this oppression and this discrimination? How can we be sincere toward this corrupt gang?

The Iraqi people have undertaken many times to do away with the present regime after the Ramadhan Revolution and the crushing of the corrupt ruling gang. The people are still trying to get rid of the present regime. However, the corrupt gang has undertaken to spread rumors to the effect that this revolutionary movement is a communist movement. We see and hear what the Baghdad broadcasting station gives out in the way of untrue evil words against the people. It attacks the people and claims they are local communists and obtaining aid from other communist countries. Also, the corrupt gang now ruling in Iraq attacks Mustafa al-Barzani as a communist. However, all these attacks are lies because al-Barzani is not a communist and the whole world knows that Barzani is not a communist but rather is a Kurdish leader struggling always to liberate the Kurdish people and restore all their national rights. The Kurdish revolutionaries until now have injured no one. On the contrary they are revolutionaries fighting and struggling with all faith and sincerity for their Kurdish people. They are causing severe damage to the Iraqi Army. The Kurds are winning every position and location. They dominate most of the Iraqi military units, which are trying to do away with the Kurdish revolutionaries. Also, aside from this, we see that a large number of the Iraqi Army units have tried to revolt and disobey the laws issued for them by the government. A large section of the Army have joined the Kurdish revolutionaries in the North. Most of the Kurdish weapons are of the new type which the Iraqi Army is using. These weapons were captured as a result of determined fighting to the last minute to secure their rights.

S E C R E T

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Authority	NND 938522
By	SC NARA Date 11/18/08

S E C R E T

Enclosure 1, Page 3
Airgram No. A-178
Baghdad, Iraq.

Recently the corrupt gang have summoned a Kurdish person called Mahmud al-Zibari, a corrupt person who would obey any government in power for his personal ends. Mahmud al-Zibari met with the corrupt gang on TV. This corrupted traitor undertook to broadcast expressions against the Kurdish leader al-Barzani and say that he is an ambitious man who wants to claim leadership, and that he is undertaking these movements for personal ends.

However, this is untrue, for all the world knows that al-Barzani is an honorable man who wants the interests of his people. This is a real truth which all circles know, for Barzani's condition of life was very good at the time of the rule of Abd al-Karim Qasim. However, he saw that his Kurdish people remained deprived of their rights. Al-Barzani was not content with this situation and joined his Kurdish people and led them in order to obtain their complete freedom. As for the corrupt Mahmud al-Zibari, he was unknown until Barzani took his daughter for a wife. During the Qasim regime he supported Qasim. During the Abd al-Salam regime he supports Abd al-Salam. He disowns his Kurdish nationality.

Barzani says that the Christian people are now with the Kurdish people in all their revolutionary struggles. Barzani welcomes greatly the Christian people. There is no great difference between the Christians and the Kurds in the North. Rather they are in the same struggle side by side for their liberties.

Barzani says that my people have worked with the American People. The Americans have helped us and we will not forget this assistance. We still ask this assistance, particularly at this time. The American people will not believe the communists' broadcasts which are now attacking Barzani because the whole Kurdish people have not accepted communism. Barzani asks from John Lord an official letter in which it is stated that America will offer us aid. We now want American aid because we cannot agree with other countries than America. For this reason al-Barzani says that is is necessary for the American Embassy to offer aide to the people of Barzani now in Baghdad. These people have no one to offer them assistance, and the government has seized most of their property. They now need assistance.

And I would now like to request of John Lord that he write me an official letter in which he assures me of all that has been presented in this letter. If the reactionary government accuses me of being an American spy, then (word indistinct) this accusation and now request aid from America. We remain and will continue our struggle for the liberation of the Kurdish people from domination by the corrupt reactionary group now ruling over the people of Iraq.

Thank you and respects."

S E C R E T

0 7 2 3

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Authority <u>NRD 938522</u>
By <u>SC</u> NARA Date <u>11/18/05</u>

(10)
INCOMING TELEGRAM

104
Department of State

ACTION COPY

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SECRET

36
Action

NEA

Info

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RMR

FROM: Tehran

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 200, August 27, 5 p.m.

ACTION DEPARTMENT 200, INFORMATION BAGHDAD 24, LONDON 35,
ANKARA 18, USUN 15, TABRIZ UNNUMBERED.

EMBTTEL 187.

My interview with Aram, after he returned from seeing
Shah about Barzani cease fire offer, was inconclusive
and produced nothing worth reporting. Meanwhile I have
informed him of Ambassador Strong's action as reported Baghdad's
241 to Department. Accordingly, I emphasized that we have
not let Iraq Government know that Barzani message was received
in Iran.

GP-3.

REE

HOLMES

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By SP-NARA Date 11/18/05

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Department of State

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30-39

SECRET

Action

Control: 20837

Rec'd: August 26, 1963
9:19 a.m.

NEA

FROM: Baghdad

Info

SS

TO: Secretary of State

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NO: 244, August 26, 1 p.m.

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ACTION DEPARTMENT 244, INFORMATION LONDON 112, TEHRAN 37

EMBTEL 241 to Department.

Gave British Charge substance reference telegram August 26.

GP-3.

STRONG

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1963 AUG 26 PM 1 16

MESSAGE CENTER

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By SC NARA Date 11/18/05

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Department of State

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37-1

SECRET

Action

Control: 20550

Rec'd: AUGUST 25, 1963

11:39 AM

NEA

FROM: TEHRAN

Info

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TO: Secretary of State

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NO: 189, AUGUST 25, 6 PM.

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PRIORITY

ACTION DEPARTMENT 189, BAGHDAD PRIORITY 23, LONDON 30,
ANKARA 17, USUN 13.

IN LIGHT LAST PARAGRAPH DEPTTEL 135 WE HAVE INSTRUCTED
CONSUL TABRIZ TO GET WORD TO BARZANI, IN LINE WITH FIFTH
PARAGRAPH DEPTTEL 131, INFORMING HIM THAT WE HAVE PASSED HIS
MESSAGE TO IRAQIS.

REF EMBTEL 187, I AM SEEING ARAM AGAIN TOMORROW MORNING AND
WILL TELL HIM THEN THAT EMBASSY BAGHDAD HAS PASSED BARZANI
MESSAGE TO IRAQ GOVERNMENT.

GP-3

HOLMES

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NAME OF OFFICER	GTI - E. H. Thomas			
OFFICE SYMBOL				

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Authority NND 938522

By SC NARA Date 11/18/05

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Department of State

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37-32

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FROM: BAGHDAD

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 241, AUGUST 25, 4 PM.

OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

ACTION DEPARTMENT 241, INFORMATION ANKARA 21, LONDON 111, TEHRAN 36, USUN 13.

REF: DEPTELS 123 AND 126 TO BAGHDAD

SAW PRIMIN (ACTING FORMIN) SHORTLY AFTER 2 PM. INFORMED HIM UNDER INSTRUCTIONS AND IN CONFIDENCE THAT BARZANI HAD SENT MESSAGE TO USG SAYING HE DESIRED CEASEFIRE AND USG HAD SENT MESSAGE TO BARZANI USG WILLING TO TRANSMIT MESSAGE TO GOI IF HE WISHED. (INTERPRETER LEFT SOMETHING TO BE DESIRED BUT SINCE MY STATEMENT WAS REPEATED TWICE, BELIEVE PRIMIN UNDERSTOOD.)

PRIMIN SAID HE HAD BEEN TO CENTRAL BANK TODAY AND FOUND "MARKET" MUCH IMPROVED BECAUSE CONFIDENCE ENGENDERED BY SUCCESS IN NORTH. WHY I WAS DELIVERING SUCH MESSAGE? HE WENT ON THAT BARZANI IS AN IRAQI SUBJECT, IS IN REBELLION, HAS DISTURBED PEACE OF NORTH AND IS IN COLLABORATION WITH COMMUNISTS. WHY DIDN'T BARZANI SEND HIS MESSAGE THROUGH RUSSIANS? IN FACT RECENT IRAQI MILITARY GAINS, INCLUDING CAPTURE OF VITAL SERPIRAN, HAD PUT BARZANI IN IMPOSSIBLE POSITION AND HE WAS EXPECTED RETREAT INTO IRAN IN NEXT TWO DAYS. PRIMIN EXPRESSED ASTONISHMENT AT USG ROLE.

I REPLIED THAT ON THIS OCCASION USG WAS NOT REPEAT NOT DEALING WITH SUBSTANCE OF KURDISH PROBLEM I WAS ACTING AS A TRANSMITTER OF INFORMATION. USG WAS SERVING IN EFFECT AS POST OFFICE. HE SEEMED TO COMPREHEND THIS AFTER I REPEATED IT.

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NAME OF OFFICER	McKillop	DATE OF ACTION	2
OFFICE SYMBOL		DIRECTIONS TO RM/R	file

GPO 930 500

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NND 938522

By SC NARA Date 11/18/05

SECRET

2-241, AUGUST 25, 4 PM. FROM BAGHDAD

PRIMIN THEN ASKED MY MESSAGE BE REPEATED AND WROTE IT
IN A NOTEBOOK. I THANKED HIM FOR SEEING ME ON SUCH SHORT
NOTICE AND SAID I WOULD REPORT HIS REMARKS.

COMMENT: PRIMIN'S REACTION PREDICTABLE. OUR POSITION
AT LEAST A BIT BETTER IF THERE IS LEAK (STILL HOPE ONE CAN
BE PREVENTED). I AVOIDED ANY INDICATION OF CHANNEL THROUGH
WHICH BARZANI MESSAGE RECEIVED.

SP-3.

STRONG

WTC

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Authority	NND 938522
By	SE-NARA Date 11/18/05

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INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

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43
Action

Control: 20076
Rec'd: August 24, 1963
5:10 a.m.

NEA

FROM: Tehran

Info

SS

TO: Secretary of State

G

SP

NO: 184, August 24, 11 a.m.

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ACTION OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE BAGHDAD 19; INFORMATION
DEPARTMENT 184

In view fourth paragraph Department telegram 123 to Baghdad
we assume you will withhold action pending consideration of
further message which we will send today.

HOLMES

MM/6

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Authority NND 938522

By SC NARA Date 11/18/05

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INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

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37

SECRET

Action
NEA

Control: 20264
Rec'd: AUGUST 24, 1963
9:53 AM

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RMK

FROM: TEHRAN

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 185, AUGUST 24, 4 PM

OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

ACTION DEPARTMENT 185, INFORMATION BAGHDAD OPERATIONAL
IMMEDIATE 20, LONDON 27, USUN 11, ANKARA 15

REFERENCE DEPTTEL 131.

ASSUME DEPT HAS NOW RPT NOW HAD OPPORTUNITY CONSIDER ADDITIONAL
REASONS ADDUCED IN LAST PARA EMBTEL 183 WHY IRANIAN GOVT SHOULD
BE ASSOCIATED IN TRANSMITTING BARZANI MESSAGE. IT SEEMS TO ME THAT
YET ANOTHER REASON, AND NOT RPT NOT THE LEAST WEIGHTY ONE,
IS THAT IF WE FAILED TO DO THIS IRAQI GOVT MIGHT REALLY FEEL
THAT WE CAN DO WHAT WE PLEASE IN IRAN. IT WOULD BE HARDLY
CONDUCTIVE TO IMAGE OF US RPT US TREATING IRAN ON BASIS OF EQUALITY
IF WE RECEIVED MESSAGES FROM KURDS IN IRAN AND TRANSMITTED THEM
OVER THE HEAD OF IRANIANS WHOSE DIRECT INTEREST IN OUTCOME OF
KURDISH FIGHTING IS FAR GREATER THAN OUR OWN.

I AM NOT RPT NOT PERSUADED THAT MAKING HELPFUL SUGGESTIONS ON
COURSE IRAQIS SHOULD FOLLOW WOULD BE INCONSISTENT WITH OUR ROLE
AS MESSENGER. AN OPPORTUNITY TO DO SO TACTFULLY SHOULD SURELY
ARISE IN COURSE OF CONVERSATION. WE HAVE ALREADY RELAYED TO
BARZANI THRU CONSUL TABRIZ THE US RPT US POSITION (DEPCIRTEL
104) THAT "WE WILL REMAIN ALERT FOR ANY OPPORTUNITY TO INDUCE
TWO SIDES ACCEPT NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT, WHICH IN OUR VIEW
CONSTITUTES BEST LONG-TERM SOLUTION KURDISH PROBLEM." IF WE NOW
RPT NOW SEEM LESS CONCERNED WITH BRINGING ABOUT AGREEMENT THAN
WE WERE THEN, AND THAN WE WERE LAST SPRING, WE RISK BEING
MISUNDERSTOOD BY BOTH IRAQIS AND BARZANI.

WHATEVER WE DO -- WHETHER WE TRANSMIT MESSAGE ALONE OR WITH

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ASSIGNED TO: NEA		TAKEN: Noted		TO RM/R: File	
NAME OF OFFICER: GTI - E. H. Thomas		DATE OF ACTION: 8/26/63			
OFFICE SYMBOL		ACTION		DIRECTIONS	

GPO 930 500

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Authority NND 938522

By SE NARA Date 11/18/05

SECRET

-2- 185, AUGUST 24, 4 PM FROM TEHRAN

IRANIANS, AND WHETHER WE SIMPLY TRANSMIT IT OR LEND OUR SUPPORT TO IDEA OF CEASEFIRE -- IT SEEMS HARDLY ADMISSIBLE THAT WE SPEAK OF BARZANI "CLAIMING TO DESIRE" CEASEFIRE. BARZANI MESSAGE STATED CATEGORICALLY HE WANTS CEASEFIRE, AND USED PHRASE "WE ARE LIKE DROWNING PERSON GRASPING AT STRAWS." EMBASSY BAGHDAD WILL BE MORE ACCURATE, AND CERTAINLY MORE NEUTRAL, IF IT TELLS IRAQIS THAT BARZANI MESSAGE SAID CLEARLY HE WANTS A CEASEFIRE.

GP-3

HOLMES

DT

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By	SC-NARA Date 11/18/05

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INCOMING TELEGRAM

104
Department of State

ACTION COPY

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37

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Action
NEA

Control: 20303
Rec'd: AUGUST 24, 1963
10:35 AM

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FROM: TEHRAN

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 187, AUGUST 24, 5 PM

OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

ACTION DEPARTMENT 187, INFORMATION BAGHDAD OPERATION IMMEDIATE
21, LONDON 28, USUN 12, TABRIZ UNNUMBERED

EMBTEL 185.

ARAM, WHO HAS JUST RETURNED FROM NOWSHAHR AFTER TRANSMITTING
TO SHAH INFO ABOUT BARZANI REQUEST FOR CEASE-FIRE, HAS ASKED
ME TO SEE HIM THIS EVENING. WILL REPORT AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

GP-3.

HOLMES

HMR

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OFFICE SYMBOL		

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By SC-NARA Date 11/18/05

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25

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Action

Control: 20243

NEA

Rec'd: AUGUST 24, 1963

Info

FROM: LONDON

9:02 AM

SS

TO: Secretary of State

G

SP

NO: 922, AUGUST 24, 1 PM

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ACTION DEPARTMENT 922, INFORMATION BAGHDAD 18, TEHRAN 10
ANKARA 9DEPTEL 1256 *gal 13-3 Iran*
the off 26 Iran

SUBSTANCE REFTEL CONVEYED TODAY TO FONOFF AS INSTRUCTED. UK EMBASSY WASHINGTON REPORT ALREADY AT HAND. FONOFF (CHEVALIER) SAID HMG OF COURSE INTERESTED IN US INITIATIVE, BUT HAD NO PARTICULAR COMMENT TO MAKE ON IT, HMG SHARES HOPE SOME CEASE-FIRE LEADING TO SERIOUS NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN GOI AND KURDS CAN BE WORKED OUT AND THAT US INITIATIVE MAY CONTRIBUTE TO THIS END. HAS SOME DOUBTS HOWEVER THAT GOI WILLING AGREE TO CEASE-FIRE ON ANYTHING OTHER THAN ITS OWN TERMS. WHILE NOTING HMG NOT ASKED PARTICIPATE, FONOFF MADE IT CLEAR HMG WOULD BE RELUCTANT BECOME DIRECTLY INVOLVED IN EXERCISE LEST THIS GIVE OFFENSE TO GOI. US, FONOFF SUGGESTED, HAS CONSIDERABLY GREATER LATITUDE IN ITS RELATIONS WITH GOI THAN DOES HMG. ALSO CAUTIONED THAT GOI MAY VIEW FACT BARZANI MESSAGE BEING PASSED THROUGH AMCONSUL TABRIZ AS SUGGESTING US-IRANIAN CONNIVANCE IN SUPPORT KURDISH CAUSE AND AS CONFIRMING GOI'S KNOWN SUSPICIONS IRANIANS SYMPATHETIC BARZANI. APART FROM FOREGOING, FONOFF MERELY ASKED BE KEPT INFORMED PROGRESS US INITIATIVE.

GP-3

JONES

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Authority NND 932522

By SC-NARA Date 11/18/05

37
INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

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37

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Action
NEA

Control: 20136
Rec'd: August 24, 1963
6:34 a.m.

Info

FROM: Baghdad

SS

TO: Secretary of State

G

SP

NO: ~~237~~ 237, August 24, 1 p.m.

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ACTION OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE TEHRAN 34, INFORMATION DEPARTMENT
~~237~~ 237

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CIA

NSA

RMR

Tehran's 19 to Baghdad

Have withheld action.

GP-3.

VMT/14

Note: REFTEL is Tehran's 184 to Dept.

Baghdad 237

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POL 13-3 244

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NAME OF OFFICER: A Killgore	DATE OF ACTION: 8/29
OFFICE SYMBOL: [Blank]	DIRECTIONS TO RM/R: [Signature]

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By SC NARA Date 11/18/05

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Department of State

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35
Action

Control: 20254
Rec'd: AUGUST 24, 1963
9:30 AM

NEA
Info

FROM: BAGHDAD

SS
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SP
L

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 239, AUGUST 24, 4 PM

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OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

ACTION DEPARTMENT 239, INFORMATION OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE LONDON
110, TEHRAN 35.

DEPTEL 123 1213-3
12126

BRITISH CHARGE CAME IN AUGUST 24 TO DISCUSS BARZANI CEASE-
FIRE APPEAL ON BASIS REPORT RECEIVED FROM BRITISH EMBASSY
WASHINGTON.

AFTER DISCUSSION HE SAID HE INTENDED REPORT TO LONDON
HIS VIEWS GENERALLY AS FOLLOWS: DIFFICULT DETERMINE BARZANI
MOTIVES, WOULD NOT HARM WESTERN INTERESTS TO INFORM GOI OF
BARZANI APPEAL AND ACT AS POST OFFICE, WOULD BE UNDESIRABLE
MAKE JOINT APPROACH TO GOI WITH IRAN, WOULD BE BEST KEEP OUR
DISCUSSIONS WITH GOI REGARDING KURDS ON GENERAL PLANE AS
DONE TO DATE, WOULD BE UNLIKELY GOI AGREE AT PRESENT TO
ANYTHING BUT BARZANI SURRENDER, AND WEST COULD ONLY LOSE BY
PUTTING PRESSURE ON GMU.

GP -3.

STRONG

JTC

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2

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ACTION ASSIGNED TO: NEA/NE	ACTION TAKEN: 2	DIRECTIONS TO RM/R: file
NAME OF OFFICER: A. Kilgus	DATE OF ACTION	
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Authority NND 938522
By SC-NARA Date 11/18/05

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

SECRET

Classification

14913

AUG 24 11 51 AM '63

TEHRAN
for DCI and
1101

Origin
47
Info:

ACTION: Amembassy TEHRAN OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE 135
Amembassy BAGHDAD OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE 126

INFO: Amembassy LONDON 1275

DEPTEL 131 to Tehran, 123 to Baghdad; Tehran's 183 repeated Baghdad No. 18; Tehran's 185 repeated Baghdad No. 20; Tehran's 187 repeated Baghdad No. 21.

We recognize necessity careful attention to role Iran might play in possible negotiations. However, in light assessments ~~XXXX~~ tenuous good faith on either side at this point, we believe it desirable solely inform Iran as messages received. If Iraq's reaction favorable to Barzani feelers and Shah volunteers further involvement as result assessment his own Kurdish situation we could discuss larger role for Iran in light circumstances then existing.

FOR BAGHDAD: Your 231. You should proceed without further delay take action as instructed in DEPTEL 123.

GP-3.

END

BALL

(3)

Microfilm of ENR

Drafted by: *NEA*
NEA:GTI:KWB:ack:bmh 8/24/63
Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: NEA - James P. Grant

Cleanances:

NE - Mr. Symmes *AKB/HMS*
NE - Mr. Killgore *AK*

SECRET

Classification

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FORM DS-322
5-61

0 7 3 6

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Authority NND 938522
By SC-NARA Date 11/18/05

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RM/R: file

ACTION COPY

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

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25

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Action

Control: 19643

Rec'd: AUGUST 23, 1963

2:22 PM

Info

FROM: TEHRAN

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 183, AUGUST 23, 6 PM

OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

ACTION DEPARTMENT 183, INFORMATION OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE
BAGHDAD 18, ANKARA 14, LONDON 26, USUN 10, TABRIZ UNNUMBERED

REF: BAGHDAD'S 230 TO DEPARTMENT

IT SEEMS EMBASSY BAGHDAD AGREES WE SHOULD RELAY BARZANI MESSAGE TO IRAQIS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE, PARTICULARLY IN VIEW GROWING DANGER OF LEAK AND SERIOUS EMBARRASSMENT SHOULD SUCH LEAK OCCUR BEFORE WE HAVE ACTED. WE ALSO AGREE (AND SO INDICATED PARAGRAPH 11 EMBTEL 179) THAT THERE SHOULD BE NO NEED TO EXCHANGE VIEWS WITH BARZANI BEFORE ACTING.

RE PENULTIMATE PARAGRAPH REFTEL, IRAQI ASSUMPTION THAT WINTER WILL BE HARDER FOR BARZANI THAN FOR GOI IS INTERESTING. APPARENTLY IRAQIS EXPECT THAT, ASIDE FROM MILITARY PRESSURE (WHICH MAY BE HARD TO MAINTAIN IN WINTER), PRINCIPAL SQUEEZE ON BARZANI WILL BE FROM FOOD SHORTAGE. FROM EVIDENCE AVAILABLE HERE IT APPEARS FOOD IS ALREADY IMPORTANT PROBLEM FOR HIM. THIS SITUATION APPEARS RELATED TO INTENSIFIED IIA PARTOLLING OF IRAN-IRAQ BORDER BEGUN MID-JULY WHICH DRASTICALLY REDUCED FOOD SHIPMENTS FROM SYMPATHETIC IRANIAN KURDS. HOWEVER, AFTER MID-NOVEMBER WEATHER WILL FORCE IIA BORDER UNITS INTO CAMPS AND INCREASED FOOD SMUGGLING WILL BECOME FEASIBLE. IF FOREGOING JUDGEMENT IS CORRECT AND IRAQIS DO NOT APPRECIATE THIS FACTOR, THEY MAY BE UNDERSTIMATING BARZANI CAPABILITIES NEXT WINTER (AND SPRING) SHOULD HE BE ABLE TO HOLD OUT WITHIN IRAQ TILL THEN.

AS FOR THE KIND OF APPROACH WE MIGHT MAKE IN BAGHDAD (WHETHER WE

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Authority NND 938522
By SE NARA Date 11/18/08

SECRET

-2- 183, AUGUST 23, 6 PM, FROM TEHRAN

(WHETHER WE SIMPLY TRANSMIT CEASE-FIRE REQUEST OR ALSO CONVEY OUR OWN THOUGHTS ABOUT IT), THIS DEPENDS UPON WASHINGTON'S ASSESSMENT WHETHER IRAQIS CAN IN FACT SCORE TOTAL VICTORY OVER BARZANI FORCES THIS FALL. IF SUCH A VICTORY SEEMS LIKELY I WOULD CONCUR WE SHOULD ACT SOLELY AS MESSENGER IN PRESENT INSTANCE. MY RECOMMENDATIONS REGARDING OUR STANCE WHEN RELAYING BARZANI'S MESSAGE (PARAGRAPHS 6-8 EMBTEL ;4P# WERE BASED ON ESTIMATE THAT EARLY AND DECISIVE IRAQI VICTORY UNLIKELY. IT SEEMS TO ME SELF-EVIDENT THAT EARLY CEASE-FIRE PREFERABLE TO PROTRACTED AND BITTER HOSTILITIES, CONTINUING THROUGH WINTER AND INTO NEXT YEAR, WHICH WOULD TEND INCREASINGLY TO DRIVE BARZANI GROUP INTO TOTAL ALLIANCE WITH USSR, STRAIN IRAN GOVERNMENT'S RELATIONS WITH ITS OWN KURDS AND WITH IRAQ, AND ENDANGER SUCH DEEP-SEATED BITTERNESS AS TO REDUCE CHANCES OF ULTIMATE SETTLEMENT BY MUTUAL AGREEMENT TO ZERO POINT. IF WE DO NOT BELIEVE IRAQI FORCES ABOUT TO WIN COMPLETELY, I SEE MUCH TO GAIN AND LITTLE IF ANYTHING TO LOSE BY THROWING OUR MORAL WEIGHT BEHIND CONCEPT OF CEASE-FIRE LEADING TO NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT. SUCH EXPRESSION OF MORAL SUPPORT NEED IN NO WAY COMMIT US TO FUTURE SUBSTANTIVE INVOLVEMENT IN NEGOTIATION PROCESS.

ACTUALLY, IT SEEMS INEVITABLE THAT THERE WILL BE SOME DISCUSSION IF WE TRANSMIT BARZANI OFFER OF CEASE-FIRE. AT LEAST, WE MUST ANTICIPATE THAT THIS IS A POSSIBILITY. WE COULD THEN EASILY POINT OUT TO IRAQIS THAT THEY CAN SAY THAT THEY ARE MAGNANIMOUSLY RESPONDING TO BARZANI'S APPEAL. THIS COULD THEN LEAD TO FURTHER DISCUSSION OF WHAT WOULD FOLLOW ONCE THE CEASE-FIRE HAS BEEN DECLARED AND PROVIDE OPPORTUNITY MAKE POINTS SUGGESTED EMBTEL 179.

AT SAME TIME I AGREE WITH AMBASSADOR STRONG THAT WE SHOULD AVOID ANY IMPLICATION THAT WE ARE VOUCHING FOR BARZANI'S GOOD FAITH.

I CONTINUE TO BELIEVE WE SHOULD BRING IRANIAN GOVERNMENT IN WHEN WE TRANSMIT BARZANI MESSAGE. EVER SINCE FEBRUARY REVOLUTION IN IRAQ, WE HAVE ENCOURAGED SHAH TO DRAW AS CLOSE AS POSSIBLE TO THE NEW GOVERNMENT IN BAGHDAD. SOME PROGRESS HAS BEEN MADE ON THIS SCORE AND NOW WE HAVE OPPORTUNITY TO MAKE

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Authority	NND 938522
By	SC-NARA Date 11/18/05

SECRET

-3- 183, AUGUST 23, 6 PM, FROM TEHRAN

ADDITIONAL PROGRESS. BECAUSE OF IRAN'S CLOSE RELATIONS WITH IRAQ AND INVOLVEMENT IN KURDISH PROBLEM, WE BELIEVE IRAN IS ENTITLED TO PLAY A ROLE IN THIS MATTER. FURTHERMORE, SINCE BARZANI'S MESSAGE WAS RECEIVED IN IRAN AND IN VIEW OUR CLOSE WORKING RELATIONSHIP IN THESE MATTERS WITH SHAH AND IRANIAN SECURITY FORCES, IT IS DIFFICULT TO SEE HOW WE COULD GO AHEAD WITHOUT AT LEAST GIVING GOI OPPORTUNITY TO PARTICIPATE. IMPORTANCE GOI ATTACHES TO KURDISH PROBLEM IS EVIDENCED BY FACT THAT FORMIN ARAM, RATHER THAN USING MESSENGER TO CONVEY THE INFORMATION ABOUT CEASE-FIRE REQUEST, HAS FLOWN TO NOWSHAHR THIS MORNING TO BRING IT PERSONALLY TO THE SHAH'S ATTENTION. GP-3
HOLMES

HOLMES

HLW

ADVANCE DELIVERY TO S/S-O AT 2:37 PM AUGUST 23.

#AS RECEIVED. WILL BE SERVICED UPON REQUEST.

NOTE: Handled LD/SS per SSO.

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Authority <u>NND 938522</u>
By <u>SC</u> NARA Date <u>11/18/05</u>

OUTGOING TELEGRAM **Department of State**

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

SECRET

Classification

14287

AUG 23 5 04 PM '63

Origin
Info:

ACTION: Amembassy BAGHDAD

PRIORITY 123

~~INFO: Amembassy ANKARA~~

" LONDON 1256

" TEHRAN - 131

INFO: USUN NEW YORK 523
Amembassy, ANKARA 174

PRIORITY

TEHRAN REPEAT TABRIZ

Tehran's 166 and 179 to Dept; Deptel 112 to Baghdad (119 to Tehran);
Baghdad's 219, 227 and 230 to Dept.

In view urgency of matter as stressed by Tehran, and Baghdad's well-

taken apprehensions about risk of security leak if further long delay
contemplated, Department recommends that Baghdad, as put forward to Department
for consideration, promptly and unilaterally inform Iraqi Government in
confidence that Barzani claims to desire cease fire and that USG expressing
willingness transmit to GOI any Barzani message. We prepared adopt strict
medium
circumscribed role as ~~XXXXXX~~ of communications in view our interest in
reasonable Kurdish settlement. Department fully concurs that we should avoid
any intimation that we ~~XXX~~ vouch for Barzani's good faith, just as we would
wish to eschew vouching for Iraqi good intentions later. We agree that
making specific suggestions on course GOI should follow would be inconsistent
with our role as messenger.

FOR TEHRAN: Department accepts necessity of informing Iranians without
awaiting instructions. Would appreciate Embassy's urging on Iranians,
however, importance of handling in strictest confidence.

Drafted by:
NEA:NE:AIKillgore:rmv:8/22/63

Telegraphic transmission and
classification approved by:

Governor Harriman

~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~

Clearances:

BNA - Mr. Judd (sub) *ak*

UNP - Mr. Buffum (sub) *ak*

S/S - Mr. Hilliker

GTI - Mr. Thomas (draft) *ak*

NE - Mr. Symmes *ms*

NEA - Mr. Grand *ak*

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FORM
5-61 DS-322

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Authority NND 938522
By SC-NARA Date 11/18/05

Page 2 of telegram to Amembassy BAGHDAD

SECRET
Classification

We concur with Baghdad's reasoning that USG should act alone as messenger rather than in concert with Iran. It is clear Iraqi Government is attempting make USG responsible for Iranian actions in X Kurdish issue (Baghdad's 227). In addition, joint approach might be taken by Iraqis/ as inconsistent with USG insistence circumscribe its role strictly to channel of communications.

We presume Iran will interpose no objections to USG as communications ~~channel~~ ~~XXXXXX~~ on unilateral basis. However, if serious objections are perceived we would be prepared to consider ~~them~~ ~~them~~ before proceeding. We would hope ~~Embassy~~ ~~Embassy~~ Baghdad could apprise ~~Government~~ ~~Government~~ Iraq/without delay if after reasonable period of time Tehran has not interposed objections.

Embassy requested instruct Consul Tabriz to inform Barzani intermediary of USG action in Baghdad and express our willingness transmit to Iraqi Government any specific message Barzani wishes passed. Should stress repeat stress our role as solely messenger, and that USG cannot repeat not become intermediary.

You authorized inform your ~~British~~ ~~XXXXXX~~ colleague present status of matter and US intentions.

FOR LONDON: Embassy requested X inform Foreign Office of USG intentions and report reactions. British Embassy Washington has been informed.

FOR ANKARA: You may inform GOT of USG intentions if you deem important to do so. However, in interests of guarding against leak fewer Governments that know lessens chances of leak. We would of course make GOT privy at later stage, particularly if USG role appears to show real promise of progress in Kurdish issue.

GP-3

END
ACTING

BALL

SECRET
Classification

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Authority <u>NND 938522</u>
By <u>SC</u> NARA Date <u>11/18/05</u>

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RG: 059
ENTRY: 1963

BOX: 3944

TAB #: 13
1 / 3 / S

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Folder Title: POL 13 NON-PARTY BLOCS IRAQ
Document Date: 22/08/63

TEL 179 FR TEHRAN TO SECSTATE

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NND: 939536

WITHDRAWN: 01/25/94 by: HOSKINS

FOIA RETRIEVAL #: 939536 03944 00013


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WITHDRAWAL NOTICE

RG: 59

Box: 03944 Folder: 0001 Document: 4

Series:

Copies: 1 Pages: 1

ACCESS RESTRICTED

The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:

Folder Title: POL 13 Non Party Blocs 2/1/63

Document Date: 08-22-1963

Document Type: Telegram

From: Tehran

To: Sec State


Subject:

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NND: 32376

Withdrawn: 01-22-2003 by: David Fort

FOIA RETRIEVAL #: 32376 03944 0001 4



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Classification

10741

AUG 18 1 55 PM '63

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Origin ACTION: Amembassy BAGHDAD PRIORITY 112

Info: INFO: Amembassy ANKARA 147
" LONDON 1143
" TEHRAN 119
USUN NEW YORK 472
✓ 10-13-3 X RAG
Tehran 166 to Department

Barzani Appeal to USG

Department continues believe feasibility cease-fire or mediation Kurdish War largely dependent on present disposition GOI. Department also continues inclined favor non-Arab Muslim figure as potential mediator in belief USG should avoid direct involvement. In light foregoing request Embassy's comments latest Barzani appeal.

Talabani and Akrawi expected arrive US sometime after eighteenth. Should they seek contacts USG officials, they will be received informally at Desk Officer level. In response any press queries stimulated by presence Talabani and Akrawi in US, Department will continue state problem entirely Iraqi internal matter, and that while US sympathizes with legitimate Kurdish aspirations, these latter cannot ~~infringe~~ upon Iraqi sovereignty.

FOR TEHRAN: Request Consul Tabriz be instructed that if approached again he respond he has reported latest Barzani approach to Department and pending reply he unable to add to position reported his Tel 02 to Department.

GP-3

END

RUSK

Drafted by: NEA:NE:HMSymmes:rmv:8/18/63

Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by:

NEA - James P. Grant

Clearances:

GTI - Mr. Thomas *EST*

NE - Mr. Kinsolving *4K*

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34-32
Action "

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Control: 18399
Rec'd: AUGUST 22, 1963
1:57 PM

SS
NEA
Info

FROM: BAGHDAD

001

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 230, AUGUST 22, 8 PM

OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

ACTION DEPARTMENT 230, TEHRAN 30, INFORMATION ANKARA 18,
LONDON 105, USUN 12, BASRA, TABRIZ UNNUMBERED

LIMIT DISTRIBUTION S/S

TEHRANS 179 TO DEPT

1. MUST CAUTION THAT DESPITE IMPOSING LIST OF
FACTORS WHICH IRAQIS MIGHT CONSIDER AS FAVORING CEASEFIRE,
INTENTION BAGHDADS 219 TO DEPT WAS, IN PART, TO
CAST DOUBT ON WILLINGNESS GOI ACTUALLY UNDERTAKE CEASEFIRE
EXCEPT IN RESPONSE BARZANI SURRENDER. THIS VIEW REINFORCED
BY REMARKS MIN DEFENSE AMMASH REPORTED AS BAGHDAD 227
TO DEPT.

2. CONTINUE BELIEVE USG SHOULD AT MOST ACT AS
MESSENGER BETWEEN PARTIES TO CONFLICT. IF THEY WANT TO
NEGOTIATE CEASEFIRE, THEY CAN MEET AND TALK ABOUT IT,
WHATEVER THE VENUE.

3. BELIEVE USG SHOULD ACT ALONE AS MESSENGER RATHER
THAN IN CONCERT WITH IRAN. BARZANI MESSAGE WAS TO USG.
IRAQIS ARE TRYING MAKE USG RESPONSIBLE FOR IRANIAN ACTIONS
IN KURDISH ISSUE. TO LINK UP WITH IRAN IN OUR APPROACH
WOULD GIVE IRAQIS CONVENIENT WEAPONS THIS PURPOSE.

4. BELIEVE SYRO-ISRAEL PROBLEM UNLIKELY HAVE ANY
BEARING ON GOI ATTITUDE BARZANI.

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Authority NND 938522
By SC-NARA Date 11/18/08

SECRET

-2- 230, AUGUST 22, 8 PM FROM BAGHDAD

5. AS MORE COUNTRIES AND INDIVIDUALS COME TO KNOW OF BARZANI'S CEASE FIRE APPEAL, RISK OF SECURITY BREACH GROWS RAPIDLY. LEAKAGE PRIOR TO COMMUNICATION OF BARZANI'S MESSAGE TO GOI WOULD SCARCELY BE HELPFUL EITHER IN DEALING WITH GOI OR IN FURTHERING A SETTLEMENT. THUS TO TAKE TIME TO SEND MESSAGE TO BARZANI SAYING WE PREPARED DELIVER MESSAGE FROM HIM TO GOI HAS LARGE ELEMENT OF RISK. NEVERTHELESS, SIMPLY TO TELL GOI BARZANI WANTS CEASEFIRE AND WE SUPPORT HIS DESIRE, LEAVING IT TO GOI TO SEND MESSAGE ASKING WHAT HE HAS IN MIND OR LAYING DOWN CONDITIONS, OR RESULTING IN A RESPONSE FROM GOI THAT GOI SEES NO REASON PARLEY WITH OR ABOUT BARZANI, WOULD NOT ADVANCE CHANCES OF CEASE FIRE. GOI LIKELY REACT ADVERSELY BECAUSE IT THINKS IT HAS WHIPHAND.

WE MIGHT CONSIDER INFORMING GOI PROMPTLY, IN CONFIDENCE, THAT BARZANI CLAIMS DESIRE CEASEFIRE; WE EXPRESSING TO HIM WILLINGNESS TRANSMIT MESSAGE TO GOI IN VIEW OUR INTEREST IN REASONABLE SETTLEMENT KURDISH ISSUE. WE SHOULD AVOID SAYING ANYTHING TO GOI THAT WOULD IN ANY WAY INDICATE WE VOUCH FOR BARZANI'S GOOD FAITH, JUST AS WE SHOULD AVOID IN ANY WAY VOUCHING FOR GOI INTENTIONS LATER. THUS RECOMMEND WE REFRAIN FROM MAKING SPECIFIC SUGGESTIONS TO GOI AS TO COURSE IT SHOULD FOLLOW.

JUST WHAT BASIS THERE IS AT PRESENT FOR CEASEFIRE IS HARD TO SEE. NEITHER SIDE TRUSTS OTHER. BARZANI UNLIKELY SURRENDER UNCONDITIONALLY. GOI HAS MILITARY MOMENTUM AND BELIEVES WINTER WILL BE HARDER FOR BARZANI THAN FOR GOI. IF BARZANI DECLARES HIMSELF WILLING ACCEPT GOI TERMS OF LAST JUNE, PERHAPS THERE WOULD BE GROUNDS FOR PLACING GENERAL WESTERN PRESSURE ON GOI.

AGAIN, MAINTENANCE OF SECURITY IS ESSENTIAL. LEAK FROM WESTERN SOURCE LIKELY LEAD GOI THINK WE PLAYING

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-3- 230, AUGUST 22, 8 PM FROM BAGHDAD

TRICKS AGAINST THEM AND TRYING PUT THEM IN BAD LIGHT IN
WORLD PRESS.

GP-3.

STRONG

DT

NOTE: ADVANCE DELIVERY TO S/S-O 2 PM AUG. 22ND

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38
Action

SECRET

Control: 15802
Rec'd: AUGUST 20, 1963
9:54 AM

SS
Info

FROM: BAGHDAD

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 219, AUGUST 20, 3 PM

001

Baghdad 219

PRIORITY

ACTION DEPARTMENT 219, INFORMATION ANKARA 14, LONDON 98,
TEHRAN 26, USUN 10.

LIMIT DISTRIBUTION S/S

DEPTEL 112

AGREE WITH DEPT'S OBSERVATION THAT FEASIBILITY CEASE-
FIRE OR MEDIATION KURDISH WAR DEPENDS PRIMARILY ON DISPOS-
ITION GOI. WHILE THERE IS SOME REASON QUESTION WHETHER GOI
WOULD PRESENTLY BE INTERESTED IN CONDITIONAL CEASE-FIRE, WE
SEE NUMBER OF REASONS GOI WOULD BE INTERESTED IN EARLY END
TO FIGHTING IN NORTH:

Pol 13-3 IRAG

(1) ALTHOUGH PERFORMANCE NOT BRILLIANT BY WESTERN
STANDARDS, ARMY HAS DEMONSTRATED TO OWN SATISFACTION THESIS
THAT POOR SHOWING IN PREVIOUS ROUND WITH KURDS WAS DUE PRIN-
CIPALLY TO QASIM'S MISHANDLING.

(2) ANY REAL THREAT OF KURDISH "SEPARATISM" HAS PRO-
BABLY BEEN BLUNTED FOR SEVERAL YEARS AS RESULT MILITARY
ACTION TO DATE.

(3) PROLONGATION OF WAR THROUGH COMING WINTER WOULD
BE COSTLY AND DIFFICULT FOR ARMED FORCES AND WOULD GREATLY
INCREASE BURDEN OF CARING FOR CIVILIAN POPULATION IN NORTH-
ERN AREAS.

(4) CEASEFIRE, PARTICULARLY AS RESULT BARZANI INI-

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Authority NND 938522
By SC-NARA Date 11/18/05

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-2- 219, AUGUST 20, 3 PM; FROM BAGHDAD

TIATIVE, COULD BE SOLD TO ARAB PUBLIC AS VIRTUALLY TANTAMOUNT TO VICTORY (PROVIDING KURDS ACCEPT IRAQI TERMS).

(5) SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION KURDISH WAR COULD HAVE IMPORTANT PSYCHOLOGICAL ADVANTAGES FOR REGIME FOLLOWING COLLAPSE TRIPARTITE UNITY EFFORTS AND PROSPECT PROTRACTED COLD WAR WITH NASSER. ENSUING RECONSTRUCTION EFFORTS SHOULD ALSO BOLSTER INTERNAL ECONOMIC ACTIVITY AND ADD TO BAATHI IMAGE AS PROMOTER OF DEVELOPMENT. PROSPECTS OF MENDING RELATIONS WITH SOVIETS, BADLY DESIRED BY GOI, WOULD BE ENHANCED.

(6) EXISTENCE OF DISCUSSIONS WITH BARZANI OR EFFECTIVE CEASEFIRE WOULD TAKE STEAM OUT OF KURDISH EFFORTS GET UNHEARING, ABOUT WHICH GOI OBVIOUSLY TOUCHY.

ON OTHER HAND, GOI LIKELY OPT FOR CONTINUING WAR IF IT CONVINCED KURDISH RESISTANCE ON VERGE OF TOTAL COLLAPSE (THOUGH WE THINK HARD CORE KURDISH FORCES CAN HOLD OUT INDEFINITELY IN RUGGED MOUNTAIN BORDER AREA ASSUMING SOME SUPPLY FROM IRAN AND TURKEY) OR, CONVERSELY, IF KURDS HOLD OUT FOR UNREALISTIC TERMS. ANOTHER STUMBLING BLOCK TO NEGOTIATED TRUCE IS FACT GOI PROPAGANDA HAS CONSISTENTLY CONCENTRATED ON PERSON OF BARZANI, PORTRAYING HIM AS CUTHROAT, BANDIT AND AGENT OF BOTH IMPERIALISM AND COMMUNISM. GOI TACTIC OF TRYING SPLIT OTHER KURDS FROM BARZANI HAS APPARENTLY BEEN HAVING SOME SUCCESS AND GOVERNMENT MAY BE UNWILLING RECOGNIZE BARZANI AS SPOKESMAN. (SUCH VIEW WOULD, HOWEVER, IGNORE ADVANTAGES OF UNDERMINING KDP BY DEAL WITH BARZANI WHO AS AGING TRIBAL LEADER POSES LESS OF LONG RANGE THREAT IRAQ'S INTEGRITY THAN ORGANIZED PARTY.)

IN LIGHT THIS BACKGROUND, HAVE FOLLOWING COMMENTS REGARDING LATEST BARZANI APPEAL:

A) BY NO MEANS CLEAR THAT IT IS BORN OF DESPERATION. CONCEIVABLY COULD BE POLITICAL PLOY IN ANTICIPATION OF GENERAL ASSEMBLY FOUR WEEKS HENCE.

B) DO NOT BELIEVE USG PROPER AGENCY OR GOI DISPOSED TO ACCEPT ANYTHING IN NATURE FORMAL MEDIATION KURDISH DISPUTE.

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DECLASSIFIED
Authority <u>NND 938522</u>
By <u>SC</u> NARA Date <u>11/18/05</u>

SECRET

-3- 219, AUGUST 20, 3 PM; FROM BAGHDAD

US INTERESTS WOULD SEEM BEST SERVED BY AGREEING ACT AS PRELIMINARY CHANNEL OF COMMUNICATION BETWEEN BARZANI AND GOI IN SEEKING ASCERTAIN WHETHER BASIS EXISTS FOR ENDING BLOODSHED AND MOVING TOWARD ARAB-KURDISH RECONCILIATION IN IRAQ. DOUBT US POSITION WITH GOI WOULD BE DAMAGED IF WE ACT AS BARZANI MESSENGER.

C) SUGGEST THEREFORE THAT DEPT CONSIDER INFORMING BARZANI THAT US WILLING SERVE AS CHANNEL COMMUNICATION TO EXTENT OF TRANSMITTING ANY SPECIFIC KURDISH MESSAGE TO GOI AND ANY REPLY GOI MIGHT BE PREPARED MAKE. CONTINUATION OF ARRANGEMENT WOULD DEPEND NOT ONLY UPON OUR ACCEPTABILITY TO BOTH PARTIES AS CHANNEL BUT ALSO ON OUR OWN ESTIMATE OF GOOD FAITH OF BOTH PARTIES.

WAY
D) WE SHOULD REMEMBER IRAQI LEADERS ARE RUTHLESS AND SLIPPERY. FOR EXAMPLE, NO MATTER WHAT PROMISES GIVEN BY GOI FOR HUMANE TREATMENT OF KURDISH REBEL LEADERS, CANNOT RULE OUT POSSIBILITY LEADERS REMAINING IN IRAQ AFTER CEASE-FIRE WOULD BE ARRESTED AND EXECUTED. USG SHOULD AVOID ASSOCIATING ITSELF IN ANY WITH GOI TERMS. THIS MEANS COMPLETE ESCHEWAL OF MEDIATORY ROLE.

E) WE UNQUALIFIED DISCUSS EXTENT TO WHICH WE SHOULD INFORM AND/OR COORDINATE WITH IRANIANS AND TURKS ALTHOUGH ASSUME THEY WOULD HAVE TO BE BROUGHT INTO PICTURE EVENTUALLY, IF MATTERS PROCEED.

F) DEPT MAY WISH CONSULT "UNOFFICIALLY" WITH AMBASSADOR SULAIMAN. ASSUME DEPARTMENT SEEKING BRITISH VIEWS.

GP-2.

STRONG

JTC

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DECLASSIFIED	
Authority	NND 938522
By	SE NARA Date 11/18/05

ORIGIN/ACTION

NEA-5

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAM

POL 13-3 Aug

FOR RM USE ONLY

RM/R	REP	AF
1		
ARA	EUR	FE
NEA	CU	INR
		5
E	P	IO
L	FBO	AIO
		12
		27
AGR	COM	FRB
INT	LAB	TAR
TR	XMB	AIR
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ARMY	CIA	NAVY
5	10	5
OSD	USIA	NSA
15	8	3
		NSC
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A-9

SECRET

PRIORITY

HANDLING INDICATOR

TO : Department of State

1963 AUG 22 AM 7 47

INFO : TEHRAN, BAGHDAD, LONDON, ANKARA

RIS/AN
ANALYSIS & DISTRIBUTION
BRANCH

FROM : AmConsulate TABRIZ

DATE: August 19, 1963

SUBJECT: Oral Message from Iraqi Kurdish Leader Barzani to US Government

REF :

COPY NO. 1 SERIES A

Early in the morning of August 16 an Iraqi Kurd named KAMALI passed me an oral message from Mullah Mustafa BARZANI. The message itself and my subsequent discussion with Kamali are recorded in detail in the attached memorandum of conversation.

I found the message rather different from previous Barzani appeals in that (a) it constituted a specific request for US intervention to arrange a cease-fire, rather than a generalized plea for US aid; and (b) it seemed to reflect a "back to the wall" feeling approaching desperation, in contrast to the usual Kurdish expressions of bravado, of confidence that Kurds can cope militarily with any conceivable threat from the Arabs. Much of my subsequent questioning of Kamali was designed to confirm and if possible quantify this note of desperation.

The results were inconclusive. Kamali's description of the fighting added up to a picture of military stalemate, with the Iraqi Army unable to break the Kurdish front and suffering heavy losses every time it raised its head, with the Kurdish forces intact and morale high. Hardly a military situation which would force a proud fighting man like Barzani to beg us to help arrange a cease-fire. And yet Kamali's words had the ring of truth, and his information is not entirely inconsistent with other information we have from non-Arab sources. (I understand the present Iraqi Government is making a good start toward establishing as solid a reputation for prevarication in describing military victories against the Kurds as the Qassim regime that preceded it.)

Enclosure: *att*
Memorandum of
Conversation

GROUP 3
Downgraded at 12-year intervals,
not automatically declassified.

SECRET

FORM 4-62 DS-323

FOR DEPT. USE ONLY

☒ In ☐ Out

Drafted by:

CSCoon/jmp

8/19/63

Contents and Classification Approved by:

CSCoon

Clearances:

NEA/NEA/Killgore
No action necessary
file

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DECLASSIFIED

Authority NND 938522

By SC NARA Date 11/18/05

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Page 2, A-9 from Tabriz

Iraqi air strikes against Kurdish villages are taking quite a toll, particularly against women and children, and against Kurdish crops. I did not sense, however, that this form of pressure by itself was the factor that the Kurdish forces feared would ultimately bring them to their knees.

Kamali may have provided a clue to the missing element in the picture when he referred to the serious risks involved in sending an emissary like himself across the Iranian border. Later on I discussed this point with Cyrus Habibi, my half-Kurdish, half-American local employee who is well informed regarding Iranian Kurdish affairs. Habibi said that recent Iranian military steps to seal the Iraqi border have in fact been highly effective (more so than I had previously understood to be the case.) The Turks, moreover, have sealed their border almost hermetically. As a result, very little food is getting across the border to the Iraqi Kurds. This factor combined with air attacks on Iraqi Kurdish crops could result in starving out the Barzani forces this winter.

But Habibi also said the Iranian Kurds are becoming acutely unhappy at their inability to send supplies to their brethren across the border, with their discontent increasingly focused against the Iranian Government and military. I am not as yet well informed on this point but I should judge that continuation of the present situation toward winter might involve increasingly severe security risks on the Iranian side of the border. I hope to have more information on this subject soon.



Carleton S. Coon, Jr.
American Consul

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DECLASSIFIED
Authority <i>NND 938522</i>
By <i>SC</i> NARA Date <i>11/18/05</i>

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Page 1 of 5
Encl. No. 1
A-9 from Tabriz

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

DATE: August 19, 1963

SUBJECT : Message to US Government from Mullah Mustafa BARZANI; Iraqi
Kurd Policies; Status of Hostilities

TIME AND PLACE: August 16, 1963, at the Consular Residence

PARTICIPANTS : Mr. (fnu) KAMALI, Iraqi Kurdish Nationalist, Mr. Carleton S.
Coon, US Consul, Tabriz, and Mr. Cyrus Habibi, Consular In-
terpreter

Kamali arrived unannounced and unexpected, early on Friday, August 16. He informed Habibi he had a message for the American Consul from Mullah Mustafa Barzani. Habibi knew Kamali's family* and was able to vouch for Kamali's authenticity. I agreed to see Kamali at my residence, with Habibi interpreting.

The Barzani Message: At the beginning of our meeting Kamali delivered the following message, obviously more or less memorized.

(a) This message comes from Mullah Mustafa Barzani (Kamali then shifted to the first person, as though he were Barzani himself)

(b) This movement has nothing to do with and has never been influenced by the USSR. It is true that I lived there for about 15 years but I have never hesitated to make known my refusal to cooperate with the Soviets.

(c) We have appealed to the USA in the past and still appeal to you because yours is a democratic government. We have asked for aid, but we do not believe this should be limited to, or even necessarily include, material aid. We do not want to spoil your good relations with the governments of the

*Kamali is evidently one of five or six sons of Sheikh OBEIDULLAH, an Iraqi Kurdish sheikh with a long history of participation in the Kurdish nationalist movement. Sheikh Obeidullah's village, near Hajj Umrán, was destroyed by Qassim's bombers and he has been a refugee in Iran since then. His son Kamali, however, has been with Barzani and evidently crossed the Iranian border illegally to talk to the Consul in Tabriz.

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DECLASSIFIED
Authority <u>NNO 938522</u>
By <u>SC</u> NARA Date <u>11/18/08</u>

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Page 2 of 5
Encl. No. 1
A-9 from Tabriz

Middle East. All we ask now is that our women and children who are being shelled and massacred by Arif's government be saved and that a cease fire or truce be brought about.

(d) You have heard Moscow's open support announced over the radio. But every child knows their support does not derive from their interest in us as a people, but because their influence and interests in the Middle East have almost become nonexistent, and they are trying to give us a color that will somehow save the lost situation for them in Iraq. Before the coup they had nothing to do with the Kurds and they gave the Iraqi Army the arms that the Iraqis were destroying and bombing us with. This color is something that does not stick to the Kurdish people and not a single soul is willing to accept it.

(e) This will be the last time we shall appeal to the U.S. You will have to reach your decision on the basis of your own laws and principles.* As far as we are concerned we are like a drowning person grasping at straws. End of message.

Basic U.S. and Kurdish Positions: I understood that Barzani was not aware of our recent statement of the U.S. position on the Iraqi Kurdish issue (Consulate's A-8) at the time he sent Kamali off to convey the above message. Nor was Kamali himself aware of it. I therefore restated this position, pointing out that while this was our current position it should not be construed as a response to the message Kamali had just brought me, since any such response would require a good deal of thought and could not be provided at once.

After hearing me state our position, Kamali picked up my reference to the desirability of a negotiated settlement, said his people strongly supported this idea, and that this was the prime reason for Barzani's present appeal. "We want the US to take a leading role in getting these negotiations started and particularly in bringing about a truce or cease-fire in the first place -- who else can we turn to, to act as mediator or intermediary?" (Quotes from my notes).

I said I could not address myself to this point officially at this time, but privately I doubted whether my government would show much interest in

* Habibi has subsequently explained to me that the way Kamali phrased this point in Kurdish clearly implied that if we did follow our own laws and principles we would respond affirmatively.

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DECLASSIFIED
Authority <u>NND 938522</u>
By <u>SC</u> NARA Date <u>11/18/05</u>

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Page 3 of 5
Encl. No. 1
A-9 from Tabriz

participating in or supporting any action if the circumstances were such that we were forced to conclude such action was foredoomed to failure. A willingness to negotiate, even if shared by both parties, was not enough to ensure a successful outcome. A willingness to make concessions was more important. Kamali got the point at once, but said he was just a messenger and not qualified to say how far the Kurds would go.

Later on in the conversation I asked Kamali to describe his movement's objectives. He said emphatically that all the Iraqi Kurds wanted was autonomy within Iraq, not independence. The movement was no longer a tribal one, he stressed, but one with a steering committee and other appurtenances of a modern political organization. Many of its leaders were educated, had held important positions in the past, and were well informed about international affairs. Their assessment was that in terms of international factors autonomy within Iraq was feasible, but independence was not. I noted that the concept of autonomy was somewhat flexible; he agreed but declined despite my encouragement to hazard any estimate as to just what the Kurds might be willing to settle for within the general concept of autonomy.

Status of Fighting: Kamali told me that Iraqi claims of victories in the fighting were completely untrue. At present the Kurdish fighting forces were intact and at full strength. (At another point in the conversation he said that 60,000 - 70,000 young Kurds had taken up arms and were prepared to die for the cause). All Iraqi attacks had been repulsed. The fighting took two forms, partisan hit and run raids on the plains, and fighting along the main front, which currently stretched from near Qasr-i-Shirin in the south-east to the Zakho and Aqra mountain areas in the northwest. Kamali vigorously denied that the enemy now held Barzan village or indeed had ever held it. He said an Iraqi Army offensive launched June 28 in the Aqra-Barzan area initially succeeded in taking eight villages within Barzani territory. However, the Kurds counter-attacked July 2 in the Rania-Koi-Sanjaq area farther south and forced the enemy in that area to retire to Suleimaniya, whereupon the Iraqi Army also withdrew from Barzan territory.

Along the front line, Kamali continued, the Kurds were inflicting casualties on the Iraqi army at a ratio of about 50 for every Kurdish casualty. The Arabs, he said, weren't used to the mountains - afraid to fight, they were being forced into combat. The Kurds, he said, were not pleased at all this killing but were forced to continue it.

The Iraqi Air Force, Kamali continued, is quite active, both along the front and against villages as far as 100 km behind the front, where there are no Kurdish fighters. Ten to twenty planes are generally active daily along the front. Kamali could not provide any overall estimate of the number

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DECLASSIFIED	
Authority	NND 938522
By	SC-NARA Date 11/18/05

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Page 4 of 5
Encl. No. 1
A-9 from Tabriz

and intensity of strikes against villages, but said he understood a total of about 150 villages had been bombed since the fighting resumed in June in the area with which he was most familiar (the Zakho-Balakhan-Rawanduz area). He said the bombers try to avoid any particular pattern - they wait until the villagers return, then strike early in the morning. Whole villages have been destroyed by single bombs. In addition, the Iraqi Air Force uses three types of machine guns against the villages and drops barrels on the fields (napalm?) to burn up the crops.

In sum, Kamali concluded, the present military situation was pretty much a sanguinary stalemate.

Other Points Made By Kamali During the Discussion:

- (1) The US response to this latest plea would hopefully be brief and emphatic - yes or no - would we or wouldn't we help create a situation in which a cease fire could be arranged and negotiations started. Kamali did not try to set a deadline but his whole presentation was characterized by a sense of urgency and impatience - including impatience with what he evidently considered the noncommittal nature of previous US responses (including the statement I had just given him).
- (2) If we were willing to work for a cease-fire and gave an appropriate signal, Barzani would designate two individuals to represent him in discussions with the USG, to meet with us in Tehran, Washington, or wherever we wanted. (I did not react one way or the other to this suggestion).
- (3) Barzani's reference to "this is the last time we'll appeal to you" seems to tie in with certain of Kamali's later observations viz (a) sending emissaries here was a risky business, given the border situation, that could in each instance endanger as many as 20 good men; (b) US responses to appeals so far had been pretty routine. Apparently there was no specific reference in anything Kamali said that would indicate that this "last time" reference meant the Kurds were planning to turn to the Soviets as their next step, if we failed to respond to their present appeal. On the contrary, Kamali misconstrued one of my questions as bearing on this possibility and specifically denied it.
- (4) Kamali made various rather veiled remarks to the effect that the Kurdish national movement would have to stand on its own feet and make its own political decisions - therefore he couldn't predict what its future policies might be - but it would be better for both of us if it came within the US "sphere of influence" now as the Kurds wanted. He seemed to be trying to convey that if we helped his people now they would always be on our side. If the Iraqi Kurds, on the other hand, fought through to victory without our help, they would owe us nothing and be free to take any side they wished

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Authority <u>NND 938522</u>
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Page 5 of 5
Encl. No. 1
A-9 from Tabriz

thereafter.

(5) Kamali said his people though Arif and Bitar were incapable of maintaining their regimes over the long run, and Nasser might well emerge as the area strongman, who could not easily be dislodged. He opined that if events took this course America might ultimately find it useful to have the Kurds on its side.

(6) During an exposition of how the Kurds would ultimately triumph despite the fact they were facing all kinds of modern weapons, Kamali noted in passing he understood the USG had recently sold "some arms" to the Iraqi Government. Slight barb, no major display of rancor. I said I wasn't informed.


CSGoon/jmp

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DECLASSIFIED	
Authority	NND 938522
By	SC-NARA Date 11/18/05

ORIGIN/ACTION			DEPARTMENT OF STATE		POL 13-3 IRAQ	
NEA-5			AIRGRAM		FOR RM USE ONLY	
RM/R	REP	AF	A-144		UNCLASSIFIED	
1			NO.		HANDLING INDICATOR	
ARA	EUR	FE	TO : DEPARTMENT OF STATE		JMS	
NEA	CU	INR	INFO : BASRA		AK	
E	P	IO			ANALYSIS & DISTRIBUTION BRANCH	
L	FBO	AID	FROM : Amembassy, BAGHDAD		DATE: August 17, 1963	
2			SUBJECT : Impounded Property of Kurds Released			
AGR	COM	FRB	REF :			
INT	LAB	TAR				
TR	XMB	AIR				
ARMY	CIA	NAVY				
5	10	5				
OSO	USIA	NSA				
15	8	3				

The impounded property of almost 200 Kurds residing in Qosh and Koi Sanjak has been released by Notification No. 81 published on August 15, 1963, signed by the Military Governor General for the Northern Region. The move seems to be designed to conciliate Kurds and attract them to support of the government against Barzani, in line with GOI's current Kurdish policy.

The government continues, however, to impound the property of certain Kurds. Notification No. 80, issued on the same date as the above, impounds the property of four persons, all believed to be Kurds.

For the Ambassador:

William C. Lakeland
 William C. Lakeland
 First Secretary of Embassy

1963 AUG 20 PM 3 26
 MESSAGE CENTER
 NEA

FORM 4-62 DS-323 UNCLASSIFIED FOR DEPT. USE ONLY

Drafted by: JMLord:mlh:08/17/63 Contents and Classification Approved by: NEH/NE/ARKeelgore

Clearances: RCStrong BM No action necessary file

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DECLASSIFIED
 Authority NND 938522
 By SC NARA Date 11/18/05

ORIGIN/ACTION			DEPARTMENT OF STATE		POL 13-3 IRAQ	
NEA-5			AIRGRAM		FOR RM USE ONLY	
RM/R	REP	AF	A-149		UNCLASSIFIED	
ARA	EUR	FE	NO.		HANDLING INDICATOR	
NEA	CU	INR	TO : DEPARTMENT OF STATE		1963 AUG 20 AM 10 35	
E	P	IO	INFO : BASRA		RM/AN ANALYSIS & DISTRIBUTION BRANCH	
L	FBO	AID	FROM : Amembassy, BAGHDAD		DATE: August 17, 1963	
	RMS	S/P	SUBJECT : Statement of the Mutasarrif of Sulaimaniya to Kurds			
AGR	COM	FRB	REF : A-124, A-38, A-08			
INT	LAB	TAR				
TR	XMB	AIR				
ARMY	CIA	NAVY				
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OSD	USIA	NSA				
15	8	3				

On August 13 Brigadier Abd al-Razzaq al-Sayid Mahmud, Mutasarrif of the Liwa of Sulaimaniya, issued a statement to the Kurds of the Liwa in which he promised full civil liberties for the Kurds and absolute equality of treatment of Kurds and Arabs. He insisted that the government is very much concerned with the welfare of the Kurds and that all the resources of the government are being used to bring peace and order to the Liwa.

Brigadier Mahmud listed several measures being taken and several ends activity being sought to insure an end to hostilities in the Liwa. They include:

- 1) A strongly worded promise to crush the remaining separatists, communist and imperialist stooges in the area.
- 2) A promise of protection to farmers and peasants proceeding with their normal work.
- 3) Promises of protection to loyal families and amnesties to persons laying down arms, repenting and declaring loyalty to the government.
- 4) Assurances that lines of communication within the boundaries of the Liwa will remain open.
- 5) Assurances that there will be adequate food and other supplies at moderate prices.
- 6) Jobs will be provided at government projects and factories.
- 7) Damaged towns and facilities will be rebuilt and restored.
- 8) Detainees of Barzani loyal to the government will be set free.
- 9) Protecting the freedoms guaranteed by the Revolution which includes equal treatment of Arabs and Kurds.

UNCLASSIFIED

FORM 4-62 DS-323

Drafted by: RWBogossian:mlh:08/17/63 **RWB**

Clearances: RCStrong *[Signature]*

Contents and Classification Approved by: *[Signature]*

NEA/NE/AKilgore
No action necessary
file

1963 AUG 20 PM 10 35
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DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 938522
By SC-NARA Date 11/18/05

UNCLASSIFIED

Page 2, Airgram No. A-149
Baghdad, Iraq.

COMMENT: The statement is the latest of many such speeches and statements by local and national officials. It is an example of a developing pattern in the propaganda battle between Arabs and Kurds. It expresses four themes of GOI on the Kurdish question often found in such statements.

The four ideas which GOI officials are trying to put across are that:

- 1) Arabs and Kurds are brothers and the Arabs and the GOI do not discriminate against the Kurds but are keenly interested in the welfare of the Kurds;
- 2) Once fighting stops all the people with the support of the local and national governments can get to the important task of rebuilding the damaged areas.
- 3) The rebels are a small minority of the people who are causing trouble for the vast majority of Kurds who are loyal and want peace.
- 4) Those who give up and declare themselves loyal to GOI will receive an amnesty (NB the amnesty deadline was to have been July 31; see ref Airgrams). Those who continue to fight will be mercilessly crushed finally and completely.

The officials in their speeches thus picture the government as determined but fair, willing to go far to forgive and eager to help the Kurds. The rebellion is dealt with as the irritating work of a few who are being misled by communists and others. The effect of such an approach upon the Kurds is not clear at this time, but it may cause some Kurds to defect from Barzani more quickly than if GOI promised only punishment.

For the Ambassador:

William C. Lakeland

William C. Lakeland
First Secretary of Embassy

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Authority <u>NND 938522</u>
By <u>SE</u> NARA Date <u>11/18/05</u>

27
INCOMING TELEGRAM

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Department of State

ACTION COPY

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Action

Control:

14306

Rec'd:

AUGUST 17, 1963

12:04 P.M.

NEA

Info

FROM: TEHRAN

SS

TO: Secretary of State

GT

NO: 166, AUGUST 17, 6 P.M.

SP

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PRIORITY

ACTION DEPARTMENT 166; INFORMATION ANKARA 12, BAGHDAD PRIORITY 61, LONDON 24

REF: TABRIZ TEL 02 TO DEPT; DEPTEL 91 TO TEHRAN

CONSUL COON REPORTS FROM TABRIZ ANOTHER APPEAL TO USG FROM BARZANI AS SUMMARIZED BELOW. THIS NEW APPEAL, BROUGHT BY NEW CHANNEL, WAS CLEARLY INITIATED BEFORE WASHINGTON REACTION (DEPTEL 91) TO FIRST MESSAGE COULD REACH BARZANI (INTERMEDIARY COULD MAKE CONTACT FOR FIRST REPLY NO SOONER THAN AUG 17).

NEW APPEAL -- NOT ADDRESSED TO PRESIDENT THIS TIME -- WAS CONVEYED ORALLY TO COON AUGUST 16 BY KAMALI, SON OF SHEIKH OBEIDULLAH, VETERAN KURDISH NATIONALIST. KAMALI, WHO HAD APPARENTLY MEMORIZED THIS NEW BARZANI MESSAGE, MADE FOLLOWING POINTS:

(1) BARZANI HAS NEVER BEEN INFLUENCED BY USSR DESPITE HIS LONG RESIDENCE THERE.

(2) PAST AND PRESENT APPEALS MADE TO US BECAUSE OURS IS DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT. BARZANI DOES NOT EXPECT US TO SPOIL OUR GOOD RELATIONS WITH MIDDLE EAST GOVERNMENTS.

(3) ALL HE IS ASKING NOW IS THAT KURDISH WOMEN AND CHILDREN, WHO ARE BEING SHELLED AND MASSACRED BY BAGHDAD GOVERNMENT, BE SAVED AND THAT CEASE-FIRE OR TRUCE BE BROUGHT ABOUT.

SECRET

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• This copy must be returned to RM/R central files with notation of action taken

ACTION ASSIGNED TO: NEA/NE	ACTION TAKEN
NAME OF OFFICER: J. Killgore	DATE OF ACTION: telegram sent 8/18
OFFICE SYMBOL	DIRECTIONS TO RM/R: file

GPO 9 30 500

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NND 938522

By SE-NARA Date 11/18/05

SECRET

-2- 166, AUGUST 17, 6 P.M., FROM TEHRAN

(4) KURDS HAVE NO ILLUSION ABOUT OBJECTIVES OF ANNOUNCED SOVIET SUPPORT.

(5) "THIS WILL BE THE LAST TIME WE SHALL APPEAL TO THE US." KURDS, HE SAYS, ARE LIKE "A DROWNING PERSON GRASPING AT STRAWS."

COON REITERATED OUR POSITION AS REPORTED HIS TELEGRAM Ø2 TO DEPARTMENT. KAMALI REPLIED THAT KURDS WANT US TO TAKE LEADING ROLE IN GETTING NEGOTIATIONS STARTED AND PARTICULARLY IN BRINGING ABOUT TRUCE OR CEASE-FIRE. HE INQUIRED RHETORICALLY AS TO WHO ELSE COULD ACT AS MEDIATOR. IN ENSUING CONVERSATION KAMALI REFUSED TO BE DRAWN OUT ON WHAT CONCESSIONS KURDS MIGHT BE WILLING TO MAKE. HE SAID THEY DO NOT THINK INDEPENDENCE POLITICALLY FEASIBLE BUT DECLINED TO GIVE AN ESTIMATE AS TO WHAT KURDS MIGHT BE WILLING TO SETTLE FOR WITHIN GENERAL CONCEPT OF AUTONOMY.

KAMALI INDICATED IF USG WILLING TO WORK FOR CEASE FIRE AND WOULD GIVE APPROPRIATE SIGNAL, BARZANI WOULD DESIGNATE TWO PERSONS TO REPRESENT HIM IN DISCUSSIONS WITH US, TO MEET IN TEHRAN, WASHINGTON OR WHEREVER WE INDICATED. COON GAVE NO REACTION TO THIS PROPOSAL. COON NOTES THAT REFERENCE TO "LAST TIME" APPEAL TO US CARRIED NO SPECIFIC INFERENCE THAT KURDS' NEXT STEP IS TO TURN TO USSR. KAMALI'S WHOLE PRESENTATION CHARACTERIZED BY SENSE OF URGENCY AND IMPATIENCE WITH ROUTINE AND NON-COMMITTAL NATURE OF PREVIOUS USG STATEMENTS.

KAMALI SAID WAR "PRETTY BLOODY" ON BOTH SIDES AND PRETTY MUCH STATEMATED. KURDISH VILLAGES AND CROPS TAKING BEATING FROM THE AIR AND CASUALTIES AMONG WOMEN AND CHILDREN TEND TO OFFSET ALLEGED KURDISH FIGHTING SUPERIORITY ON THE FRONT LINES.

CONSUL TABRIZ WILL POUCH FURTHER DETAILS KAMALI CONVERSATION. FOREGOING ACCOUNT BASED ON SUMMARY REPORT RUSHED TO US BY POUCH WHICH LEFT TABRIZ LAST NIGHT.

SECRET

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DECLASSIFIED	
Authority	NND 938522
By	SC-NARA Date 11/18/05

SECRET

-3- 166, AUGUST 17, 6 P.M., FROM TEHRAN

COMMENT: WE ARE UNABLE TO TELL WHETHER THIS MESSAGE FROM BARZANI IS EVIDENCE OF SERIOUS READINESS TO ENTER INTO DISCUSSION OF CEASE-FIRE WITH IRAQI GOVERNMENT BUT WOULD WELCOME COMMENTS FROM EMBASSY BAGHDAD AND PRELIMINARY INDICATIONS OF DEPARTMENT'S REACTION.

HOLMES

LFS

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Authority	NND 938522
By	SC-NARA Date 11/18/05

WITHDRAWAL NOTICE

RG: 59

Box: 03944 Folder: 0001 Document: 5

Series:

Copies: 1 Pages: 1

ACCESS RESTRICTED

The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:

Folder Title: POL 13 Non-Party Blocs

Document Date: 08-15-1963

Document Type: Telegram

From: Baghdad

To: Sec State

Subject:

In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination.

NND: 32376

Withdrawn: 01-22-2003 by: David Fort

FOIA RETRIEVAL #: 32376 03944 0001 5

0 7 6 4

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Authority	NND 938522
By	SE NARA Date 11/18/05

46

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

ACTION COPY

PERMANENT RECORD COPY

42

SECRET

Action

Control: 11099

NEA

Rec'd: August 14, 1963
6:24 a.m.

Info

FROM: Tabriz

SS

TO: Secretary of State

G

SP

NO: 2, August 14, 10 a.m.

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RMR

ACTION TEHRAN 9, INFORMATION DEPARTMENT 2, BAGHDAD, ANKARA,
LONDON, MOSCOW UNNUMBERED

Reference: Department telegram 91 to Tehran

I discussed Barzani letter with intermediary August 12
along lines suggested reference telegram and previous. I
noted in reply his query I was speaking under instructions.
Details pouched.

COON

DLW

104 destroyed, May 14

GT Tabriz &
1-12

Pol 13-3 IRAQ

93 JUL 14 10 08
MESSAGE CENTER
NEA

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ACTION	ASSIGNED TO: NEA	ACTION TAKEN	Noted
NAME OF OFFICER	GTI - E. H. Thomas	DATE OF ACTION	8/14/63
OFFICE SYMBOL		DIRECTIONS TO RM/R	File

0765

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 938522
By SC NARA Date 11/18/08

gm

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

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Classification

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AUG 14 9 31 PM '63

Origin
Info

ACTION: Amembassy BAGHDAD-103
" LONDON -1055

10413-3 IRAQ
XXR POL 26 IRAQ

CODE ROOM: Please repeat Tehran's telegram 155 of August 13, 1963, Control
No. 10381 to the above posts.

Kurdish Problem

END

RUSK

BAGHDAD 103
POL 13-3 IRAQ

microfilmed by RM/R

(2)

Drafted by: NEA/NE:AIKillgore:jk:8/14/63

Telegraphic transmission and
classification approved by:

NEA/NE - Harrison M. Symmes

Clearances:

GTI - Mr. Bowling (subs)

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CONFIDENTIAL
Classification

FORM DS-322
5-61

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 938522
By SP NARA Date 11/18/05

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OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

CONFIDENTIAL
Classification

08693

AUG 14 8 55 PM '63

Origin

ACTION:

Amembassy BAGHDAD

Info:

Tehran's 155 to Department (repeated Baghdad)

Would appreciate Embassy's current assessment of course of Kurdish war.

We realize first-hand information difficult obtain.

GP-4

END

RUOK

Drafted by:

NEA/NE:AKillgore;jk:8/14/63

Telegraphic transmission and
classification approved by:

NEA - ~~Philippe Tark~~ James P. Grant

Clearances:

NE - Mr. Symmes

GTI - Mr. Bowling (subs)

FORM
5-61 DS-322

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Authority NND 938522

By SC NARA Date 11/18/05

W I T H D R A W A L N O T I C E

RG: 059

TAB #: 14

ENTRY: 1963

1 / 1 / C

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BOX: 3944

ACCESS RESTRICTED

The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:

Folder Title: POL 13 NON-PARTY BLOCS IRAQ

Document Date: 13/08/63

TEL 155

FR TEHRAN

TO SECSTATE

In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains:

X Security-Classified Information

NND: 939536

WITHDRAWN: 01/25/94 by: HOSKINS


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Department of State

PERMANENT RECORD COPY

UNCLASSIFIED

Action

Control: 9087

Rec'd: AUGUST 12, 1961
8:38 AM

NEA

FROM: ANKARA

22

TO: Secretary of State

G

NO: 183, AUGUST 12.

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RMR

ACTION DEPARTMENT 183, INFORMATION PARIS 21, LONDON 31, ROME 25,
KARACHI 11, TEHRAN 16, BAGHDAD 10.

REF: A-50

PARIS PASS SHAPE POLAD; ROME PASS CINC SOUTH POLAD

GOT AUGUST 10 GAVE SOVIET AMBASSADOR STATEMENT IN REPLY TO SOVIET
JULY 9 CHARGES THAT TURKEY AND CENTO INTERFERING IN INTERNAL AFFAIRS
IRAQ.

SUMMARY GOT REPLY:

SINCE ITS ESTABLISHMENT GOT HAS SINCERELY ADOPTED PRINCIPLE NON INTERFERENCE IN INTERNAL AFFAIRS OTHER STATES. CENTO A REGIONAL DEFENSE ORGANIZATION ESTABLISHED IN CONFORMITY UNITED NATIONS CHARTER. GOT CERTAIN CENTO MEMBERS HAVE NO INTERESTS OTHER THAN PROTECTION THEMSELVES AGAINST ATTACK AND RAISING THEIR STANDARD OF LIVING. SOVIET UNION AWARE THESE FACTS. CLAIMS MADE IN SOVIET STATEMENT CAN ONLY BE EXPLAINED AS ERRONEOUS INTERPRETATIONS MADE IN RELIANCE ON FALSE AND BIASED INFORMATION, GOT IN COMPLETE AGREEMENT WITH ONE POINT IN SOVIET STATEMENT. THIS IS NON INTERFERENCE, A BASIC PRINCIPLE OF TURK FOREIGN POLICY, FROM WHICH GOT HAS NEVER DEVIATED VIS A VIS IRAQ OR ANY OTHER COUNTRY. GOT EXPECTS OTHER STATES THINK AND ACT IN LIKE MANNER.

AS SOVIET GOVERNMENT KNOWS GOT BELIEVES IN NECESSITY DEVELOPMENT
GOOD NEIGHBORLY RELATIONS BETWEEN TWO COUNTRIES AND MAKES THOSE
EFFORTS WHICH FALL TO ITS SHARE TOWARD THIS END. BUT GOT CONSIDERS
IT USEFUL DRAW SOVIET ATTENTION TO NEGATIVE EFFECTS ON DEVELOPMENT
THESE RELATIONS OF SUCH REGRETTABLE AND WHOLLY UNTRUE CLAIMS.

• This copy must be returned to RMC Central File. **UNCLASSIFIED BARNES REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS**

ACTION		ACTION	
ASSIGNED TO. <i>WEA/GTL</i>		TAKEN <i>NAT</i>	
NAME OF OFFICER		DATE OF ACTION	
OFFICE SYMBOL <i>W A Webb</i>		<i>8-26-63</i>	
		DIRECTIONS TO RM/R <i>file</i>	

DECLASSIFIED

Authority: **NND 939522**

By SC NARA Date 11/18/05

DATE/TIME/ACTION			DEPARTMENT OF STATE			POL 13-3 IRAQ		
NEA-5			AIRGRAM			FOR RM USE ONLY		
RM/R	REP	AF	A-124 MESSAGE CENTER			LIMITED OFFICIAL USE		
ARA	EUR	FE	ND.			HANDLING INDICATOR		
NEA	CU	INR	TO : 1963 AUG 10 AM 9 15			1963 AUG 10 AM 11 23		
E	P	ID	INFO : BASRA			RM/AN ANALYSIS & DISTRIBUTION BRANCH		
L	FBO	AID	FROM : Amembassy, BAGHDAD			DATE: August 13, 1963		
AGR	CDM	FRB	SUBJECT : Ministry of Defense Statement on Kurds: Amnesty Offer Extended					
INT	LAB	TAR	Indefinitely in Effect					
TR	XMB	AIR	REF : Emb A-38, July 11, 1963.					
ARMY	CIA	NAVY	<p>The Ministry of Defense issued a statement on August 4 denying "rumors spread by the Barzanis" alleging that the Army was executing the population of every village it entered. In order to reassure the populace, the statement said, "We hereby proclaim safety to everyone proclaiming loyalty, and to everyone surrendering to the authorities." Following is the text of the statement as it appeared in the <u>Iraq Times</u> on August 5, 1963:</p> <p>"After the occupation of Barazan and Mazna, the traitorous Barazanis have been circulating rumours in the Northern villages alleging that the army was executing the population of each village it entered. The population were thereupon struck with panic and began to move in the direction of the frontiers.</p> <p>In order to spare them the dangers of crossing the frontiers as well as the sufferings resultant from this exodus, and because they are our brothers and the children of our dear homeland, we hereby proclaim the lying nature of these rumours and the falseness of this poisonous propaganda.</p> <p>"In order to assure them and all deluded countrymen from the inhabitants of the villages of the North, we hereby assure safety to</p>					
DSD	USIA	NSA						
5	10	5						
15	8	3	Decontrolled following June 30, 1965					
FORM 4-62 DS-323			LIMITED OFFICIAL USE			FOR DEPT. USE ONLY		
Drafted by: NKJMLord:mlh:08/09/63			Contents and Classification Approved by:			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> In <input type="checkbox"/> Out		
Clearances: RWD			NEA/NE/Attelegave			No action necessary		
						file		

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

Page 2, Airgram No. A-124
Baghdad, Iraq.

every one proclaiming loyalty and to every one surrendering to the
authorities."

Signed: General Saleh Mahdi Ammash,
the Minister of Defense.

COMMENT: In effect GOI thus continues the policy of amnesty for
surrendering Kurds which had expired on August 31. This is in line
with GOI's policy of luring the Kurds away from Mulla Mustafa Barzani,
while denying all charges of mistreatment of the Kurdish minority.

For the Ambassador:

William C. Lakeland
William C. Lakeland
First Secretary of Embassy

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OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

SECRET
Classification

03972

AUG 7 6 04 PM '63

TEHRAN
171

Origin
Info:

ACTION: Amembassy TEHRAN
INFO: Amembassy ANKARA
" BAGHDAD
" LONDON
" MOSCOW
" ENAB
Tehran's A-67, July 30 and Depcirtel 104

91
113
90
911
488

DO NOT FORWARD
DO NOT FORWARD
DO NOT FORWARD
DEF 4 CENTS

Department concurs your proposed instructions to Consul Tabriz. However, if Barzani's intermediary inquires whether letter forwarded, believe Consul should have contingent authorization respond orally that message forwarded to Department and he replying on behalf USG, along lines you propose. We believe such oral reply could hardly damage Iraqi-American relations and would be symbolically indicative of our sympathy with legitimate Kurdish aspirations.

White House approves foregoing method of handling.
GP-3

E ND

BALL

POL 13-3-IRAG
XN POL IRAG-45

reproduced by RM/R

Drafted by: NEA/NE:AIKillgore:jk;8/6/63		Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: NEA - Phillips Talbot
Clearances: NE - Mr. Symmes White House - Mr. Komer		S/S - Mr. Hilliker
GTI - Mr. Tiger (subs)		
SECRET		
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Authority NND 938522
By SC-NARA Date 11/18/05

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COPIES TO: Approved by Mr. Komer (White House)
Polly Yates to jmj, 8/7/63)

11596

SECRET

S/S-S
NEA Cable sent 8/7
8/17 NEA - Dinkmore and Killgore -
informed. MKK

AUG 6

FILE

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. McGEORGE BUNDY
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Letter from Mulla Mustafa Barzani to
President Kennedy

POL 13-3 IRAQ

Embassy Tehran's Airgram #67 of July 30, 1963 (copies
of which were sent to the White House) transmitted a copy
of a letter addressed to the President from Mulla Mustafa
Barzani, leader of Iraqi Kurdish fighting forces, requesting
the President's support for Kurdish autonomy within the
Republic of Iraq.

In our view, a Presidential reply to Barzani might well
damage United States relations with Iraq. We therefore pro-
pose having our Consul in Tabriz respond orally to Barzani's
intermediary along the lines of our standard guidance with
respect to the Iraqi Kurds, i.e., that the United States
sympathizes with legitimate Kurdish aspirations within the
sovereign state of Iraq, but that our sympathy will not be
permitted to prejudice the cordial relations now existing
between the United States and Iraq. We propose to go one
step further than our Ambassador in Tehran has suggested,
by having our Consul state, should he be asked if Barzani's
letter was forwarded, that the message was forwarded to the
Department and that the Consul is responding as indicated
above, on behalf of the United States Government. We

believe

SECRET

GROUP 3

Downgraded at 12 year intervals; j.w. Davis
not automatically declassified.

1/5/ John O. McKesson

Classified by NIA

(2)

NEA/NE: AI-Killgore Retyped in S/S-S NEA

POL 13-3 IRAQ

NR Pol 15-1 US/Kennedy

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 932522
By SC-NARA Date 11/18/05

SECRET

~~XXXX~~ 11596

-2-

believe that if our Consul is asked whether the letter has been forwarded, an affirmative reply will not damage United States-Iraqi relations. At the same time, such a reply will demonstrate, if only symbolically, United States concern for and interest in the Kurds.

We propose sending to Tehran the attached telegram should the White House approve.

/s/ J. A. McKesson

John A. McKesson
Acting Executive Secretary

Enclosure:

Proposed telegram
to Tehran.

Concurrence: NEA - Mr. Talbot

NEA/NE:AIKillgore:jk:8/6/63

Retyped in S/S-S:sd:8/6/63

SECRET

S/S - RO

AUG 6 1963

A true copy of signed original

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DECLASSIFIED
Authority <i>NND 938522</i>
By <i>SC</i> NARA Date <i>11/18/05</i>

COPIES TO:

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. McGEORGE BUNDY

THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Letter From Mulla Mustafa Barzani to President Kennedy

Embassy Tehran's Airgram # 67 of July 30, 1963 (a copy of which has been sent to the White House) transmitted a copy of a letter addressed to the President from Mulla Mustafa Barzani, leader of Iraqi Kurdish fighting forces, requesting the President's support for Kurdish autonomy within the Republic of Iraq. In our view, a Presidential reply to Barzani might well damage United States relations with Iraq. We therefore propose having our Consul in Tabriz respond orally to Barzani's intermediary along the lines of our standard guidance with respect to the Iraqi Kurds, i.e., that the United States sympathizes with legitimate Kurdish aspirations within the sovereign state of Iraq, but that our sympathy will not be permitted to prejudice the cordial relations now existing between the United States and Iraq. We propose to go one step further than our Ambassador in Tehran has suggested, by having our Consul state, should he be asked if Barzani's letter was forwarded, that the message was forwarded to the Department and that the Consul is responding as indicated above, on behalf of the United States Government. We believe that if our Consul is asked whether the letter has been forwarded, an affirmative reply will not damage United States-Iraqi relations. At the same time, such a reply will demonstrate, if only symbolically, United States concern for and interest in the Kurds.

We propose sending to Tehran the attached telegram.

John A. McKesson
Acting Executive Secretary


Enclosure:

Proposed telegram to Tehran.

Concurrence: NEA - Mr. Talcott

NEA/NE:AIKillgore:jk:8/6/63

SECRET



ACTION				DEPARTMENT OF STATE		POL 15-3 IRAQ POL 13-3 IRAR FOR RM USE ONLY	
AIRGRAM				A-112		CONFIDENTIAL	
<div style="display: flex; justify-content: space-between;"> <div> <div style="display: flex; justify-content: space-between;"> <div>RM/R</div> <div>REP</div> </div> <div style="display: flex; justify-content: space-between;"> <div>ARA</div> <div>EUR</div> <div>FE</div> </div> <div style="display: flex; justify-content: space-between;"> <div>NEA</div> <div>CU</div> <div>INR</div> </div> <div style="display: flex; justify-content: space-between;"> <div>E</div> <div>P</div> <div>IO</div> </div> <div style="display: flex; justify-content: space-between;"> <div>L</div> <div>FBO</div> <div>AID</div> </div> <div style="display: flex; justify-content: space-between;"> <div>AGR</div> <div>COM</div> <div>FRS</div> </div> <div style="display: flex; justify-content: space-between;"> <div>INT</div> <div>LAB</div> <div>TAR</div> </div> <div style="display: flex; justify-content: space-between;"> <div>TR</div> <div>XMB</div> <div>AIR</div> </div> <div style="display: flex; justify-content: space-between;"> <div>ARMY</div> <div>CIA</div> <div>NAVY</div> </div> <div style="display: flex; justify-content: space-between;"> <div>OSO</div> <div>USIA</div> <div>NSA</div> </div> </div> <div style="display: flex; justify-content: space-between;"> <div>15</div> <div>8</div> <div>3</div> </div> </div>				<div style="display: flex; justify-content: space-between;"> <div>TO : DEPARTMENT OF STATE</div> <div>1963 AUG 9 PM 1 32</div> </div> <div style="display: flex; justify-content: space-between;"> <div>INFO : BASRA</div> <div></div> </div> <div style="display: flex; justify-content: space-between;"> <div>FROM : Amembassy, BAGHDAD</div> <div>DATE: August 6, 1963</div> </div> <div style="display: flex; justify-content: space-between;"> <div>SUBJECT: The Secularization of Armenian Courts.</div> <div></div> </div> <div style="display: flex; justify-content: space-between;"> <div>REF :</div> <div></div> </div>		<div style="text-align: center;">RM/AN ANALYSIS & DISTRIBUTION BRANCH</div>	
<p>Recently the Council of Ministers approved the new draft law regulating the affairs of the Armenian Orthodox community. The Council also approved the abrogation of the former law promulgated in 1931.</p> <p>Under the new law the civilian courts will be competent to consider personal status cases of members of the Armenian Orthodox community. The assets, trusts, schools and other affairs of the community are to be administered by a committee of members of the community in accordance with instructions issued by the Ministry of Justice.</p> <p>According to GOI the 1931 law was promulgated before Iraqi admission to the League of Nations. "At that time the imperialists tried to exploit the prevailing conditions for obstructing the advancement and prosperity of the Iraqi people. The Iraqi government was made to promulgate certain laws with the excuse of preserving the rights of minorities in Iraq and granting them political status in the name of religion. The members of the community felt like strangers in their own homeland and isolated from the Iraqi people."</p> <p>COMMENT: The consensus among the Armenians seems to be that the Iraqis will be fair in administering the law, but that the law is a further diminution of the Armenian community's political rights. The law has caused very little excitement. There is no indication that the law will be flouted.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">GROUP 3 Downgraded at 12-year intervals, not automatically declassified.</p>							
FORM 05-323				CONFIDENTIAL		FOR DEPT. USE ONLY	
Initialed by: RMBogolian:mlh:08/06/63 <i>RMB</i>				Contents and Classification Approved by:			

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Authority **NND 938522**

By **SC-NARA** Date **11/18/05**

CONFIDENTIAL

Page 2, Airgram No. A-112
Baghdad, Iraq.

although some people expect to go to the Armenian leaders first to settle their problems. If the Armenians cannot solve their problems among themselves then they will go to the civil court.

The Armenians have no desire to become more Iraqi than they now are. They wish to remain as Armenian as possible. The Armenians prefer to stay out of Iraqi institutions (such as the courts) as much as possible. They dislike the ability GOI will now have to check into such things as church income and expenditures which could lead to further control.

Many Armenians feel that the 1931 law was particularly annoying to the Iraqis because they (the Iraqis) felt that the law was a remnant of British control. They feel that this is the real reason for changing the law. To the Armenians the law will not affect them directly very much nor will individual cases necessarily be decided differently than if the court was Armenian rather than civil, but psychologically it is unwelcome.

For the Ambassador:

William C. Lakeland

William C. Lakeland
First Secretary of Embassy

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

Authority *NND 938522*

By *SC* NARA Date *11/18/05*

ORIGIN/ACTION		
IN-R-5		
RM/R	REP	AF
1		
ARA	EUR	FE
	5	
NEA	CU	INR
4		5
E	P	IO
	1	2
L	FBO	AID
		12
AGR	COM	FRB
INT	LAB	TAR
TR	XMB	AIR
		4
ARMY	CIA	NAVY
5	16	5
OSO	USIA	NSA
15		3

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAM

POL 17-4 US-USSR
POL 13-3 IRAR
FOR RM-USE ONLY

A-103
NO. CONFIDENTIAL
HANDLING INDICATOR

TO : DEPARTMENT OF STATE 1963 AUG 9 PM 1 32

INFO : ANKARA, KARACHI, LONDON, MOSCOW, TEHRAN
ANALYSIS & DISTRIBUTION
BRANCH

FROM : Amembassy BAGHDAD DATE: August 6, 1963

SUBJECT : Conversation with Soviet Ambassador to Iraq

REF :

The Soviet Ambassador in Baghdad, Mikhail D. Yakovlev, returned the Ambassador's initial call on July 31. The conversation was concerned primarily with the Kurdish issue, as well as Iraq's possible membership in CENTO. The Soviet Ambassador stressed that his government's policy was to stop the bloodshed in Kurdistan by putting pressure on GOI to come to a peaceful settlement with the Kurds. He seemed convinced that the West was urging Iraq to rejoin CENTO and rather skeptical of the Ambassador's explanation why it would not make sense to do so.

A Memorandum of Conversation is enclosed.

Robert C. Strong
Robert C. Strong

Enclosure: *att. 2/2/63*
As stated.

Copy to:
NEA/NR: Mr. Smith

GROUP 3
Downgraded at 12-year intervals,
not automatically declassified.

FORM 4-62 DS-323

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☒ In ☐ Out

Drafted by: *JL*
JL: Lord: ems: 8/3/63

Contents and Classification Approved by:

Clearance:

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 938522
By SC NARA Date 11/18/05

CONFIDENTIAL

Page 1 of 3
Encl. No. 1
A-103 from Baghdad

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Date: July 31, 1963

SUBJECT: Return of Initial Call; Partial Nuclear Test Ban; Kurdish Affairs;
CENTO

PLACE: American Embassy, Baghdad

PARTICIPANTS: H.E. Mr. Mikhail D. Yakovlev, USSR Ambassador, Baghdad
Robert C. Strong, American Ambassador
Ambassador Yakovlev's Interpreter
John M. Lord, Second Secretary of Embassy

When Ambassador Yakovlev returned Ambassador Strong's courtesy call on July 31, 1963, Ambassador Strong began by offering his hand in honor of the partial nuclear test ban agreement. The Ambassadors agreed that it was a useful first step toward quieting cold war tensions.

Ambassador Yakovlev asked Ambassador Strong about the effect of Nasser's July 22 speech in Iraq. Ambassador Strong said that Nasser had announced that he would not unite with Ba'thi regimes. Ambassador Yakovlev wondered why Nasser had been so light on Iraq as compared with his attacks on the Syrian Ba'th. Ambassador Strong remarked that perhaps Nasser would not seem a good Arab if he publicly put pressure on Iraq while it was under great pressure from the Soviet Union on the Kurdish issue. Ambassador Yakovlev then outlined Soviet policy toward the Kurds. A peaceful solution must be found, he said. It pained the Soviet Union to see a people attacked with the object of wiping them out entirely. Bloodshed is never an acceptable policy. The Soviet Union hopes to pressure GOI into making peace with the Kurds. Ambassador Strong commented that the United States had tried to persuade both sides to moderation but its efforts had failed. However, the Soviet policy of putting extreme overt pressure on GOI had also failed. A policy of public pressure causes a reaction in the country upon which it is exerted and drives it in the opposite direction. When the Soviet Union put pressure on Nasser, he moved toward the West. Previously, when the West had put pressure on Iraq to join the Baghdad Pact, it had aroused such antagonisms in Iraq and the Arab world that the

GROUP 3
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ACTION			DEPARTMENT OF STATE			POL 13-3 IRAC		
5/5-37			AIRGRAM			FOR RM USE ONLY		
RM/R	RE	AF	A-67			SECRET		
ARA	EUR	FE	NO.			HANDLING INDICATOR		
NEA	CU	INR	TO : Department of State			1963		
E	P	IO	INFO: Amembassy ANKARA			ANALY		
L	FBO	AIO	Amembassy BAGHDAD			DISTRIBUTION		
AGR	COM	FRB	Amembassy LONDON			FILE		
INT	LAB	TAR	Amembassy MOSCOW			DATE: July 30, 1963		
TR	XMB	AIR	Amcons TABRIZ			SUBJECT: Mullah Mustafa Barzani's Letter to President Kennedy		
ARMY	CIA	NAVY	FROM : Amembassy TEHRAN			REF : Tabriz Telegram to Dept 01		
OSO	USIA	NSA	SUBJECT: Mullah Mustafa Barzani's Letter to President Kennedy			COPY NO. 1 SERIES A		
			LIMIT DISTRIBUTION					
<p>Transmitted herewith is the original and an English translation of the letter from Mullah Mustafa Barzani addressed to President Kennedy, which was reported in the referenced telegram from Tabriz.</p> <p>It will be noted that Barzani closes the letter stating that he is "impatiently awaiting" the President's reply.</p> <p>Unless the Department deems some other handling more appropriate, I propose to instruct our Consul in Tabriz not to indicate to Barzani's intermediary in any way that the letter has been forwarded. I propose to tell our Consul to reiterate orally the Department's position on the Kurdish problem as most recently stated in the Department's Circular Telegram 104 of July 18, without, of course, alluding to Embassy Baghdad's encouragement of any specific Iraqi Government initiative.</p> <p><i>J. C. Holmes</i> J. C. Holmes</p> <p>Enclosures (2): 1. Persian original of letter from Barzani 2. English translation</p> <p>Group 2 - Exempted from automatic downgrading. SECRET</p> <p>FORM 4-62 DS-323</p> <p>FOR DEPT. USE ONLY <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> In <input type="checkbox"/> Out</p>								
Drafted by: POL: DOWberry:vme			Contents and Classification Approved by:					
Clearances: 7/28/63			<p>Reviewed by Telegram</p> <p>Drafted 8/6/63</p> <p>NEA/NEA/Kilgore</p> <p>R M/R</p> <p>File</p>					

This document consists of 2 pages. Number of copies: 3

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DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 938522
By SC-NARA Date 11/18/05

SECRET

Enclosure #2
Airgram A-67
From Tehran

(Translation)

The President of the United States
Care of the American Embassy
Tehran

July 12, 1962 (sic)

Mr. President:

The United States Diplomatic authorities are certainly informed and fully aware of the question of Iraqi Kurds and our demands from former and present governments, which are entirely in harmony with the bill of human rights and the Charter of the United Nations. What we are asking is the minimum of our national rights in all justice, which consist of autonomy within the framework of the Republic of Iraq. We have neither asked for nor aspired to anything else. However, after two years of bloodshed and war with the Government of Abdul Karim Qasem which led to the revolution of February 8, 1963, as it is clearly known throughout the world, we Kurds ceased hostilities in order to stop bloodshed and fratricide and we entered into negotiations with the new Government, expecting to obtain our rights through pacific channels and in the hope that a reasonable solution might be found. We did not refrain from showing any kind of good will and tolerance in respect of this vital question. The world is also aware that the new Government of Iraq has trampled all its promises made under oath, and since July 10* it has for more than a month been engaged in extensive brutal raids against the Kurds who constitute one fourth of the population of Iraq. In a Hitlerian Fascist fashion it has adopted the policy of burnt lands and has committed outrages which are indeed a great disgrace for mankind in the twentieth century.

Two years have passed since the oppressed Kurdish nation started its sanguinary struggle to vindicate its legitimate rights, and no government, be it great or small, extended a helpful hand. The Kurds are today with hopeful eyes inviting Your Excellency and the noble freedom-loving people of the United States, due to the American heraldic democratic and humanitarian spirit, to support the Kurds of Iraq with utmost vigor in their efforts to acquire their rights, i.e., autonomy within the Republic of Iraq. (We make this request) in order to prevent bloodshed and eliminate the nightmare of cruelty which keeps down the Iraqi Kurds. We are hoping that you would exercise your own personal influence as well as the national influence of the United States as soon as possible towards this end. This may add another page to the glorious history of the democratic and noble people of your country.

We are most impatiently awaiting Your Excellency's action and are expecting to receive through the bearer of this letter an affirmative reply which would give us such assurance.

Permit me to convey to Your Excellency and to the humanitarian people of the United States the greetings and high respects of the Kurdish nation.

(signed) Mustafa Barzani

*(sic - June 10?)
(translated by Ali Pasha Saleh)

SECRET

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Authority <u>NRD 938522</u>
By <u>SE</u> NARA Date <u>11/18/08</u>

THE FOREIGN SERVICE
OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

OFFICIAL BUSINESS

Ambassy TEHRAN

S/S


Enclosure #1

Airgram A-67

From Tehran

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Authority NND 938522
By SC NARA Date 11/18/05



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Authority NND 938522
By SC-NARA Date 11/18/05

حضرت محترم جناب آقای پیرزاد دنت کندی

بازمانده
 حتماً مقامات دیپلماتیک دولت علیه ایالات متحده آمریکا بمسئله ماکرهای عراق کاملاً مسبوق و باخبر میباشند که ما چیداز حکومتی سابق
 مطالبی را خواسته که بشریعت حقوق از ۳۰۰۰ و دستور دائم سازمان ملل متحده کاملاً توافق دارد و ما بجز خدا قتل حقوق ملی
 و عادلانه خود که عبارت از اتونومی در داخل چارچوب جمهوری عراق است چیزی نخواسته و آرزو داریم . ولی بعد از دو سال
 جنگ و خونریزی با دولت عبدالکریم تا سیم که منجر به انقلاب هشتم فوریه سال ۱۹۶۳ شد . و چنانکه بر همه جهانیان
 روشن است که ما کبریا برای جلوگیری از خونریزی و برادر کشی جنگ را متوقف و با انتظار رسیدن بحقوق حقه خود
 از راه مسالمت آمیز با دولت جدید و اند مذکره شکوه شایده راه حل عادلانه ای پیدا . و از هیچ گونه من نیت و تساهلی
 راجع به این مسئله حیوی خود داری نکرده . و باز همه جهانیان گناهند که دولت تازه عراق بهر بیان و
 سوگندی که در این باره اعلام کرده بعد پشت بازده و از تاریخ دهم ژوئیه که اکنون یکماه و اندی از آن میگذرد است
 به هیچ وجه و احتیانه و دامن دار و وسیعی علیه کردها که یک چهارم جمعیت عراق را تشکیل میدهند دست
 و با سبب ناشیستای هیتلری سیاست سرزمینهای تسوخته را شعار خود قرار داده و فضایی را
 مرتکب شده اند که واقعا براس بشریت قرن بیستم ننگ بزرگی بشمار میرود .

اینک ملت مطلوب کرد که مدت دو سال از مبارزه خونین خود در راه احقاق حق مشرومش میگذرد و
 هیچگاه هیچ دولتی از دول کوچک گرفته تا بزرگ با کمک و ساعده نکرده ، (امروز با چشم پر از لیمه از جناب
 عالی و ملت شرافتمند و آزادی دوست آمریکا دعوت میکند که بخاطر روح دموکراتی و بشر دوستی که ملت
 نجیب آمریکا بنیان گذاران بوده برای رسیدن کوه های عراق بحقوق عادلانه خود که عبارت از خود مختاری
 در داخل جمهوری عراق است . و بعضی جلوگیری از خونریزی و رفع کابوس ظلمی که بر کوه های عراق وارد شده است
 با جدیت هر چه تمامتر و با روح نوع پوری طرفداری فرمایند . و نفوذ شخصی و ملی آمریکا را در این
 باره هر چه زودتر بکار ببرند . که شاید در این باره هم مانند همیشه بر تاریخ پرافتخار دموکرات خطای ملت
 نجیب آمریکا صغری از غزوه نشود .

با کمال بی صبری منتظر اقدامات آن جناب و همچنین هستیم که احاطه مثبت و اطمینان بخشی را
 توسط حامل و رفته از طرف آن حضرت دریافت نماییم .
 اجازه بفرمایید که سلام و احترامات ما فرستاد گردد را بحضور آن جناب و ملت بشردوست
 آمریکا تقدیم نمایم .

مصدق بر زبان

مصدق

ACTION			DEPARTMENT OF STATE		POL 13-3 IRAQ		
RM/R	REP	AF	AIRGRAM		TR 50C 14-1 IRAQ		
ARA	EUR	FE	MESSAGE CENTER		FOR RM USE ONLY		
NEA	CU	INRA	NO.		HANDLING INDICATOR		
E	P	IO	TO 1963 AUG DEPARTMENT OF STATE		1963 AUG 2 PM		
L	FBO	AIO	INFO : BASRA		ANALYSIS & DISTRIBUTION BRANCH		
AGR	COM	FRB	FROM : Amembassy, BAGHDAD		DATE July 30, 1963		
INT	LAB	TAR	SUBJECT : Proposals for Administration of Kurdistan by Ambassador 'Ali Haidar Sulaiman		03		
TR	XMB	AIR	REF : A-1168, June 13, 1963		03		
ARMY	CIA	NAVY	<p>Two copies of a translation of proposals for the administration of Iraqi Kurdistan submitted to GOI by Ambassador to the United States 'Ali Haidar Sulaiman are enclosed. The proposals were drawn up in early May 1963, and a handwritten draft was made available to the Charge d'Affaires in June.</p> <p>Ambassador Sulaiman's proposals are in many ways similar to those presented by GOI to the Kurds on June 10. However, the latter outlines a program of decentralization applicable to all Iraq, while Ambassador Sulaiman is concerned only with the Governate of Kurdistan. His Kurdistan Governate would include all areas where Kurds are a majority, as determined (in case of dispute) by a census. The GOI's proposed Governate (Muhafadha) of Sulaimaniya specifies which areas are to be included, and although this includes most Kurdish-speaking areas, no provision is made for a census or other determination for disputed areas. Both proposals call for a Governor appointed by the Central Government and a mixture of appointive and elective bodies under the Governor down to the village level.</p> <p>For the Ambassador:</p> <p><i>William C. Lakeland</i> William C. Lakeland First Secretary of Embassy</p> <p>Enclosures: <i>Downgraded</i></p> <p>GROUP 4 As stated Downgraded at 3-year intervals. Declassified 12 years after date of origin.</p>				
OSD	USIA	NSA					
15	8	3					
FORM 4-62 DS-323			CONFIDENTIAL		FOR DEPT. USE ONLY <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> In <input type="checkbox"/> Out		
Drafted by: <i>ML</i> JMLord:mlh:07/24/63			Contents and Classification Approved by:				
Clearances:			<p><i>No action necessary</i> RM/R</p> <p><i>NEA/NE/A/Kelly</i> File</p>				

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Authority NND 938522
By *SC* NARA Date *11/18/05*

NEA

PROPOSALS REGARDING DE-CENTRALIZED
ADMINISTRATION IN KURDISTAN

On the administrative unity of the Kurdish area

1. The Iraqi Republic is an integral entity formed of two main nationalities, the Arabs and Kurds. They enjoy equal rights and duties.
2. The State acknowledges that the Kurdish people have the right to develop their national personality. In order to achieve this, they shall be given the right to practice their affairs as a people having its own national characteristics within the political unity of Iraq.
3. Unification of the Kurdish area in an administrative unity to be called "Governorate of Kurdistan."
4. This governorate will be formed of area in which the Kurds form the majority of the population.
5. In case a dispute or doubt arises as to whether one of the areas (to be considered as Qadha for this purpose) falls within the said governorate in accordance with the wording of the preceding paragraph, a census in that area will be carried out. The decision shall be in accordance with the result of the census operation.
6. The administration of oil installations in all cases shall be within the jurisdiction of the central government. The authorities of the governorate shall render whatever services they are called upon to undertake.

ON LANGUAGE AND EDUCATION

- 7-A. The Kurdish language shall be the language of the offices and courts in the "Governorate of Kurdistan." The Arabic language will also be used when necessary. Concerning the correspondence between the governorate and the central authorities, this shall be in Arabic.

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By SC-NARA Date 11/18/05

- B. Public statements, regulations and laws shall be published in the "Governorate of Kurdistan" in both the Arabic and Kurdish languages.
- C. Kurdish representatives in the Iraqi National Assembly (upon its establishment) shall have the right to use the Kurdish language in order to express their opinions.
- 8. The officials appointed by the government in the governorate of Kurdistan should, generally, be acquainted with the Kurdish language.
- 9-A. The Kurdish language shall be considered the language of education in the governorate of Kurdistan. The governorate council shall, by resolutions passed from time to time, determine the phases of study in which teaching shall be in the said language, provided that the teaching of the Arabic language shall accompany it in all stages.
- B. The established study programs of the government shall be followed. Modifications may be made so as to suit the natural disposition and needs of the Kurdish people. Such modifications shall take place with the approval of a joint committee from the Ministry of Culture & Education and the Governorate Council.
- C. Teachers schools shall be established in the governorate, as well as certain colleges which will form a nucleus for the establishment of a university in it.
- D. Kurdish students shall be admitted to Baghdad University and scientific institutes which are unavailable in the governorate of Kurdistan; also to colleges and military training institutes of various kinds, as well as scientific missions, fellowships and study grants outside Iraq in an equitable proportions commensurate with the number of Kurdish citizens to the total population of Iraq.

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ON THE ORGANIZATIONS OF THE GOVERNORATE

10. The organizations of the governorate consist of:-
 - a. The governorate council.
 - b. The Executive Council.
 - c. Economic Council for Development.
 - d. Office of the Inspector-General.
11. Governorate Council.
 - a. The governorate council is composed of:
 1. Members to be elected by direct secret ballot within the governorate.
 2. Members elected by Liwas Administrative Councils from among their members, provided they represent all Qadhas.
 3. Members of the executive council.
 - b. The drawing up of details of the formation of the Council and the responsibilities of its members, their qualifications, method of election, period of membership, etc. shall be by special legislation.
 - c. The Council draws up its internal regulation.
 - d. The Council selects its president and members of the presidency board from among its members.
 - e. Jurisdictions of the Governorate Council:-
 1. The Council has the right to pass resolutions having the power of law in matters falling within the jurisdictions of the governorate with due consideration to the provisions of the constitution and general laws of the State. These matters are:
 - a. To pay attention to national culture, such as arts, literatures, libraries, fairs, museums, combatting illiteracy and other matters relating to the subject, as well as ensuring the means for the achievement of the said aims.
 - b. Culture and Education, with due consideration to the provisions of article 9.
 - c. Public Health


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- d. Social Services, including the affairs of workers, peasants and cooperati^{ons} societies, mother, old age and child welfare.
 - e. Agricultural Affairs, including the management, exploitation and distribution of Miri lands and taking care of agricultural stimulation, the development of agriculture and forests, the cultivation of fruitful trees, pastures and tobacco and the promotion of animal wealth, hunting and minor irrigation projects; also, the achievement of agrarian reform and all other matters connected with the improvement of agriculture and raising the standard of the agricultur^{ers}.
 - f. Municipal and village affairs, including the planning of cities and villages and the ensuring of projects and services leading to the improvement of the conditions of life in it.
 - g. Tourism and summer resorts
 - h. Local police and security
 - i. Constructional affairs, including buildings, local roads and public works of a local nature.
 - j. Economic affairs, including local trade and supply.
 - k. Local industries, including quarries and electricity power.
 - l. Awqaf (Endowment) affairs, gifts and grants.
2. In addition to the foregoing, the jurisdictions of the governorate council shall include:
- a. Studying development projects submitted by the economic development council, ratifying or submitting them to the Central authority with its recommendations.
 - b. Discussing and ratifying the governorate budget.

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- c. Discussing important affairs and problems relating to various branches of administration and services in the governorate and passing resolutions relating to their solution for execution by the executive council or submitting them to the government in case the execution of the proposals are beyond the jurisdictions of the governorate.
 - d. Taking necessary steps and resolutions to ensure that the administrations in Liwas and other administrative units shall carry out their duties in the best manner possible and in such a way as to be in harmony with the interest of the citizens and the general policy of the state.
 - e. Giving its opinion on the legislations submitted to it by the government.
 - f. Issuing instructions for the execution of the provisions of laws and regulations passed by the government in cases where the choice is left to it.
3. The resolutions passed by the governorate Council shall not contravene the provisions of the constitution and general laws in force in the state.
4. The resolutions of the governorate council shall be signed by the president of the council, the governor, the appropriate minister and prime minister within a period not exceeding 20 days.
5. If the prime minister believed that any resolution passed by the governorate council was in conflict with the provisions of the constitution or the laws in force in the state or exceeded the jurisdictions of the said council, he might return it with his remarks within a period not exceeding 20 days to the governorate council for re-consideration. If the council ratified it again the prime minister, upon a decision from the council of ministers, might submit it within 10 days to a committee composed of the president of the court of cassation, two leading judicial men, president of the governorate council and the governor. The said committee shall issue its decision within 10 days, and its decision shall be considered as binding.

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6. The President of the republic, upon a resolution passed by the council of ministers, may dissolve the governorate council if it contravenes the provisions of the constitution or violates the provisions of the laws of the state in a serious manner or has become incapable of carrying its duties owing to resignations or to the lack of a quorum.
7. The dissolution decision shall be directly followed by the election of the new governorate council, provided that its meeting shall be held within three months from the date of dissolution.

During the period of the dissolution of the council, the executive council shall undertake the functions of the governorate council, provided that the resolutions passed by the executive council during this period, for which the approval of the governorate council is necessary, shall be submitted to the new council as soon as it convenes in order to issue its approval thereof.

8. The dissolution of two governorate councils consecutively within one year is not permissible.

12. Executive Council

- a. [Is] the executive instrument of the government in the governorate. It is also the executive machinery of the governorate council. It will undertake the governmental and executive functions of the governorate, with the exception of affairs not entrusted to the governorate council.
- b. The executive council is formed of:-
 1. Governor: chosen by the government from among men of outstanding qualifications ^{for} of the governorate. He is the supreme head of the administration in the governorate and will also preside over the administrative council of the governorate.
 2. Mutasarrifs of Liwas attached to the governorate: are appointed by the government from among the sons of the governorate who possess administrative qualifications and legal conditions.

3. Heads of departments who represent the appropriate ministries at the headquarters of the governorate. They are appointed by the government with due consideration to article 8.
- c. President and members of the executive council are regular members in the governorate council. They may collectively or individually attend the meetings of the governorate council and take part in the discussions, prepare draft resolutions and note on them. They should also answer questions and give explanations whenever they are required to do so.
- d. In all cases members appointed to the governorate council shall not exceed one third of the total members of the said council.
- e. The executive council shall exercise the executive authority of the government in accordance with the laws and regulations in force in the state. It shall also undertake the execution of the resolutions passed by the governorate council. Its functions include the following:-
 1. Local administration.
 2. Fiscal administration.
 3. Health administration.
 4. Economic, local trade, supplies and tobacco affairs.
 5. Social affairs.
 6. Culture and Education.
 7. Tourism and summer resorts.
 8. Agriculture.
 9. Agrarian reform.
 10. Industry.
 11. Municipalities and village affairs.
 12. Awqaf (Endowment).
 13. Internal security.
 14. Public works and Housing.
 15. Roads and Communications.
 16. Damages sustained in all affairs within the jurisdictions of the governorate council.

- f. Members of the Executive Council are severally or individually responsible:
1. towards the government in the execution of laws, regulations, instructions and orders issued by the appropriate central authorities in all matters which are within the jurisdictions of those authorities.
 2. towards the governorate council in the execution of resolutions passed by this council in accordance with its jurisdictions.
- g. The Executive Council shall prepare the budget of the governorate and submit it to the governorate council at a fixed date.
- h. The Executive Council shall pass its resolutions by majority vote.
- i. The governor shall enjoy the powers of a minister in the implementation of service, disciplinary and pension laws within the governorate, including the right to appoint, promote, transfer, discharge and place on pension, provided that the provisions of those laws and the governorate budget be observed.
- j. The Executive Council shall nominate officials whose appointment requires a resolution from the Council of Ministers and the issuance of a republican decree. The government may return these nominations if they did not fulfil the conditions of the service law.
- k. Officials whose jurisdictions extend beyond the scope of the governorate, as well as officials whose duties do not come within the jurisdictions of the governorate authorities, they shall be appointed by the government direct.
13. Inspector - General
- The government shall appoint an inspector-general for the governorate in the headquarters of which he and his office reside. He shall be attached to the central authorities.

The inspector - general may supervise and inspect the functions of the offices and administrations in the governorate and give advice to the governor.

The inspector - general shall submit his reports to the appropriate ministries, sending copies of them to the governor.

14. Economic Development Council


a. The Council is composed of:

1. Governor who presides over the council's meetings.
2. Three members chosen by the governorate council from among its elected members.
3. Three members from the heads of departments in the governorate who are specialists in economic, constructional and social affairs.
4. Three experts to be appointed by the government upon request of the executive council of the governorate.
5. Secretary - General appointed by the government upon the nomination made by the executive council of the governorate from among specialists in economic affairs and officials of the Secretariat-General.

b. The task of the Economic Council shall be to carry out necessary studies and explorations of the natural resources and economic potentialities in the governorate, and to submit proposal and studied plans for the development of the power of production and raising the level of individual and general income of the governorate.

c. Allocation of a specified percentage of the allowances of the economic plan of the state for development projects in the governorate, which are of an internal nature. This will be placed at the disposal of the governor, provided that it shall be spent solely on productive projects which increase the general income, and which the governorate council approves upon the proposal of the Economic Development Council.

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d. The Economic Council's proposal, together with the estimates of the costs of the proposal projects, shall be submitted to the Executive Council of the governorate and the governorate council.

e. The governorate council shall give its decision on projects which fall within its financial potentialities and shall transmit them to the economic council to take necessary measures for their implementation.

Projects which fall within the jurisdictions of the central authorities, in view of their nature or scope, shall be forwarded to those authorities by the governorate council, together with its recommendations, for ratification and implementation.

f. The share of the governorate in the general economic plan of the state shall be as far as possible commensurate with the ratio of its population to that of the whole country. Attention be given in this respect to the amounts allocated for direct spending by the governorate authorities on economic development projects in accordance with para c of this article.

g. The Economic Council may engage the services of engineering consultation companies when necessary in order to complete technical studies, prepare specifications, advertise tenders and enter into contracts with companies for the implementation of the projects approved by the governorate council for their implementation, provided that the appropriate ministries and central departments are supplied with information relating to the project in all its stages.

h. The governorate council, upon the suggestion of the economic council, shall submit to the government:

1. A request for experts for specified purposes.
2. A request for economic or technical aid.

i. Unspent annual provisions allocated for economic development projects shall be carried forward from one year to another.

j. The governorate council shall, upon studies made by the economic council, draw up an economic plan for development and construction to be implemented within several years which it shall submit to the central planning council

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By <u>SC</u> NARA Date <u>11/18/05</u>

with its proposals for inclusion in the comprehensive economic plan and allocation of necessary funds for it.

Governorate Ordinary Budget

15. Revenues which consist of:

- a. Funds allocated for the governorate in the state budget for administrations, utilities and services which fall within the jurisdictions of the governorate council and the executive council of the governorate, provided that the share of the governorate in the state budget shall be in an equitable proportion, taking into consideration the ratio of the governorate to the total population in the state.
- b. Taxes, fees and revenues imposed in accordance with the provisions of laws for local purposes, or which the governorate council authorizes their imposition, as well as profit ^{accruing} ~~accruing~~ from properties and miri lands within the governorate, revenues from public services extended by local administration, grants, aids, gifts, loans, which the governorate is allowed to conclude, and any other incomes or allowances which the governorate might obtain from the government or with its approval.

16. Expenditures

- a. The governorate council shall spend its funds in the best manner possible so as to insure the management of the governorate and the like, and for other matters which necessity demands that they should be carried out.
- b. Before the beginning of every fiscal year within a reasonable period, the executive council of the governorate shall undertake the preparation of:
 1. estimates of all revenues and expenditures for that year.
 2. report on the said estimates, containing an explanation of the sections of the budget and the reasons which the estimates were based on.

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- c. Every ministry shall be given the opportunity to go over that part of the budget which relates to its functions before submitting such estimates to the governorate council.
- d. The governorate council shall submit, through the governor, the budget estimates and report, after approval, to the minister of finance for obtaining government approval thereon at least 15 days before the end of the fiscal year.
- e. The budget shall be considered as sanctioned as soon as it is approved by the government. The administrative council of the governorate shall start with its implementation as of the beginning of the fiscal year.
- f. The governorate council may submit during the course of the year suggestions in order to increase its revenues when necessity arises.
- g. The executive council shall have complete authority to implement the budget within the funds allotted. It is also authorized to make transfers in the sections of the budget when necessity arises. The executive council shall take steps to insure the keeping of methodical accounts in which all fiscal transactions appear. Accounts shall be completed as soon as possible at the end of the fiscal year and a final statement shall be submitted, copy of which will be sent to all the appropriate ministries and the controller general of accounts.

GENERAL ARTICLES

- 17. Kurdish citizens shall take part in an equitable manner in the services of the government commensurate with their number to the total population of the country.
- 18. Ministers may attend the meetings of the governorate council and take part in the discussions.
- 19. Appropriate ministries may inspect and control the functions of the departments attached to them to ascertain that they are carrying out the duties and responsibilities entrusted to them and to give advices and assistances to enable them to achieve the said aims.

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By <u>SC-NARA</u> Date <u>11/18/05</u>

20. The governor may attend the meetings of the council of ministers at the time of discussing the affairs relating to the governorate.
21. A deputy prime minister or a minister of state shall be appointed from among the Kurds ^{whose} ~~whose~~ task shall be the coordination of work between the governorate and the ministry.
22. Racial and religious minorities within the governorate shall have all the rights and duties enjoyed by the rest of the citizens of the governorate. They will also take part in all the governorate machineries in proportion to their number, and will practice their cultural and other rights in accordance with the principles under which these rights were granted to the Kurdish citizens.

* * * * *

YR:eng
7/13/63

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Authority <u>NND 938522</u>
By <u>SE</u> NARA Date <u>11/18/05</u>

NEA: NE: Akins: jk: 7-30-63
(Drafting Office and Officer)

POL 13-3 IRAQ

RM/AN

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

CONFIDENTIAL

DATE: July 26 and 27,
1963
Frankfort, Germany

SUBJECT:

PARTICIPANTS: Shawkat Aqrabi, Kurdish leader from Iraq
Saadi Amin, Kurdish leader in Germany
James Akins, FSO, Baghdad

COPIES TO: NEA Amembassies BAGHDAD FRANKFURT
NE (2) BONN TEHRAN
INR (8) CAIRO TEL AVIV
GER ANKARA MOSCOW

AUG 6 - 1963

Akins met the two Kurds in Frankfurt on July 26 and 27. Amin had come from Berlin and Aqrabi, fortuitously, from Italy. Amin, who is active in the Kurdish movement in Germany and Austria, is an engineer educated in England and now works for the Berlin Senate. He is from Erbil. The following information was given by Aqrabi:

Progress of the Kurdish War

The government of Iraq has been shaken by recent reverses and has concluded that it will not be able to defeat the Kurds this year. The Iraqi Army plans to try to contain the Kurds through this fall and winter and will launch its major offensive next spring when it expects to be at least partially reequipped with British and American weapons. The Kurds have recently learned that the USG has already supplied arms and ammunition in "large quantities" to the Iraqi government. Akins said that the Kurds have already been told that the USG might provide some equipment to the Iraqi Army for reasons completely unconnected with the Kurdish revolt, but that no major shipments had yet been made. The Kurds replied that Akins unfortunately was misinformed and the Kurds were not so naive as to believe that the arms shipments were to be used for any purpose other than killing Kurds. After Akins warned the Kurds not to believe all the propaganda the Soviets were evidently feeding them, the subject was dropped.

The Kurds have ...

FORM DS-1254
3-61

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GPO 908992

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By SC NARA Date 11/18/05

CONFIDENTIAL

- 2 -

The Kurds have definite information that the Syrian Army and Air Force are giving substantial help to Iraq in the Zakho area and recently near Kirkuk.

Future Plans

Although the Kurds have been fighting only for their rights within Iraq the Iraqis have enlarged the scope of the war through the assistance they received first from the Soviet Union and now from Syria and the West. If the Kurds are pressed badly they will not hesitate to call for support from their brothers in Iran and Turkey even if this risks disturbances in those countries. Kurds from both areas have already offered large numbers of men but the Iraqi Kurds need only money and equipment and have so far refused such assistance.

Turkey has reached an agreement with Iraq on permitting limited overflights of each country by aircraft of the other and on sealing the Turkish border. Kurdish travel to and from Turkey has been somewhat inhibited but has by no means been stopped.

The Kurds have also learned that the Iranian government has promised the Iraqis to cooperate with them against the Kurds. Fortunately the Kurds have seen no evidence of this, and they hope that Iran will maintain its policy of benevolent neutrality towards them.

The world will soon be hearing "good news" from Kurdistan. Aqrawi refused to specify what this might be but implied that the Kurds have recently received arms from (or through) Iran and that the Kurdish radio would soon be on the air.

Kurdish Talks with Nasser

Aqrawi has seen Nasser several times within the last four weeks and finds him completely sympathetic to the Kurdish cause. Nasser has said he favors granting the Kurds autonomy within the Arab world and he believes such a move would strengthen the Arabs greatly vis-a-vis Turkey and Iran. An anti-Kurdish policy could only be harmful to the Arabs. Nasser cannot make a public statement on this matter, according to Nasser himself, because of "current Arab differences" but will do so as soon as he is able.

Akins suggested that Nasser might be trying to exploit the Kurds for his own political reasons (as the Russians are doing) but the Kurds should not assume that Nasser would remain friendly to them if he or his party were to gain control of Iraq. Akins pointed out that Nasser's reputation for honesty is stained. Aqrawi

replied that ...

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replied that he knew Nasser very well and was absolutely convinced that he was being honest with the Kurds. Furthermore, Aqrawi added, "There are many people who tell me you cannot trust an American diplomat, yet I trust you and Bill (Lakeland)".

Plans for UN Approach

Aqrawi and Jalal Talabani plan to apply for visas for the United States in Bonn on July 29 or 30. They will probably be joined in New York by Emir Badr Khan and possibly by some of the Kurdish students in Europe.

The Kurdish position is being prepared by Ibrahim Ahmad and other Kurdish lawyers. It will be primarily an attempt to prove that the Kurdish problem is not an internal Iraqi one and to produce proof of broken promises to the Kurds and indications of the Iraqi policy of genocide in Kurdistan. They will say the Kurdish problem was not considered an internal Iraqi one by the Allies after the First World War, by Britain in 1922 under its mandate, or by the League of Nations in 1932 which made equitable treatment of the Kurds a condition of Iraq's entry into that body therefore insistence it is now "purely internal" is fatuous. The Iraqi constitutions of 1932 and 1958 which promised rights to the Kurds will also be quoted, as will be current Syrian intervention against the Iraqi Kurds.

The Kurds will invite the UN or the IRC to examine the charges of genocide in Iraq - particularly the massacres at Kirkuk and the current actions in and around Sulaimaniya and other Kurdish towns. (Talabani has had recent talks with the IRC in Geneva but Aqrawi did not know the outcome). They believe the GOI can also be dammed by its own announced policy of executing all Kurds who aid the revolt and destroying all villages giving shelter to the rebels.

The Kurds will point out that the major powers are never reluctant to overcome their scruples about interfering in the "internal affairs" of other countries if it suits their purposes and they will quote Laos and the Congo.

They would like to get a UN inquiry group into Kurdistan and would welcome an outside mediator. They said they thought the United States would be satisfactory to the KDP but suggested that a respected non-Arab Moslem (specifically a Pakistani) would be preferable.

Outside Assistance

Akins mentioned the Arab and foreign reports that the Kurds are being supported by 1) Israel, 2) the USSR, or 3) the oil companies. The Kurds replied that they had been approached recently by the Israelis in Europe but had decided their cause would be hurt by Arab knowledge of their involvement with Israel. They added that

they had no ...

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they had no quarrel with Israel and implied that help from that source, if it ~~x~~ could be kept secret, would be welcomed.

The USSR has given the Kurds only "moral support". While they are grateful for this it "wouldn't bring a fil: on the Sulaimaniya market". They hope that the Soviet Union will supply money and arms now that the West seemed to be ranging itself against the Kurds. (Akins denied vigorously that the West was anti-Kurd). The Kurds do not trust the Russians and know full well why the Russians would help them. They will try to maintain their independence of the Soviet Union and are fully confident they will be able to do so - but they are sure there cannot now be a question of refusing any Russian offer.

The oil companies have given the Kurds no "protection money". If the Kurds decide to blow up the oil installations they will do so only to hurt the Iraqi government, not the oil companies or the West.

Conclusion

Aqrawi seemed more reserved in his talks with Akins than he had been in Baghdad. He refused to answer some questions and may have been deliberately misleading in answers to others. His request, or more precisely plea, for renewed Western consideration of the Kurdish problem - particularly from some small Western financial assistance, led Akins to conclude that the Kurdish position may be somewhat more precarious than Aqrawi otherwise stated and that their losses may cause a desperation which could in turn lead to Kurdish acceptance of Russian terms for aid and to a dangerous extension of the revolt outside Iraq's borders.

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INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

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57-52

NEA
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Action

Control: 20091

NEA

1963 JUL 25 AM 6 28

Rec'd: July 24, 1963
1:39 PM

Info

FROM: Tabriz

SS

TO: Secretary of State

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SP

NO: 1, July 24, 6 PM

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ACTION TEHRAN 4, INFORMATION DEPARTMENT 1, BAGHDAD 1,
ANKARA 1, MOSCOW 1.

IOP

INR

RMR

July 22 former consulate advisor Cyrus Habibi came to
Tabriz for few hours to accept and pass to consulate
sealed letter given him in Tabriz by servant of Sheikh
Abdullah Gilani of Rezaieh on behalf Kurdish nationalist
party. Habibi unable remain for translation and comment.
As translated by reporting officer, text reviews Kurdish
struggles with Qasem and failure negotiations with new
government, despairs lack aid from which hers (#)

small or large nations, asks President and his
freedom-loving nation to demonstrate democracy and
humanitarianism by exerting influence to assist Kurds
to achieve autonomy within Iraqi Republic. Letter ends
with assumption other democracy-loving peoples would
come to aid of Kurds if only U.S. would begin trend.
Letter signed Barzani. Will pouch letter Friday.
Habibi indicated answer expected. Habibi expected begin
temporary employment at consulate for 2 months on July
21, assume he expects be contact.

Habibi reported that during past month he has been in
Mahabad for Kurdish democratic party recruiting and
issuing membership cards. Said agent Fatahi, son
Mahabadi and owner and related to Qazir Mohamed, had
carried blank cards to Tabriz recently. He thinks Haji
Rahman Aqa Ilkhani Zagah head KDP office Tehran. Habibi
concerned about leftist influence among Mahabad Kurds,
said they becoming more pro-Soviet recently the Russian

• This copy must be returned to RM/R central files with notation of action taken

ACTION ASSIGNED TO	ACTION TAKEN	DIRECTIONS TO RM/R
NAME OF OFFICER	DATE OF ACTION	
OFFICE SYMBOL		

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Authority NND 938522

By SC-NARA Date 11/18/05

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-2- 1, July 24, 6 PM from Tabriz

support Kurdish cause. He estimated 150 Mahabad Kurds had left for Iraq join Barzani during past 9 months, hundreds more from other areas. Said one Mahabad Kurd, Qasem Sultanian, killed in Sulamanieh fighting for Barzani. Habibi convinced aid flowing across border in steady stream, but from private Iranian Kurdish sources. Reported Iraqis had captured some gasoline sent to Barzani Kurds from Sardasht. Said fighting quiet in last 2 weeks, Barzani Kurds believe negotiations again possible. According to frequent visitors from Iraq, said Habibi, Barzanis holed up in hills, Iraqi forces unable win decisive engagements. Rumors in Mahabad say tanks may soon attack (#) directly or join forces with Iraqi troops. Consulate has received no confirmation on above reports from private or official sources.

GP-3.

BOLSTER

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(#) Omission, correction to follow.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
AIRGRAM

POL 13-3 Iraq

FOR RM USE ONLY

A-50 NO. TO : WASHINGTON INFO : BAGHDAD FROM : AmEmbassy AMMAN SUBJECT : Submission of Documents on the Kurdish Question REF : EMBTEL 25, July 17, 1963.	1963 JUL 26 AM 8 59 COPY NO. 1 This document consists of 1 pages. of 7 copies, Series A DATE: July 24, 1963
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In the event that neither the Department nor Embassy Baghdad already have copies, there are enclosed rough English translations of the Arabic originals of three documents on the Kurdish question which a recent Kurdish visitor to Jordan gave to King Hussein. The first document is an exposition of the Kurdish position, the second is a note which Mr. Talabani submitted to the Iraqi Delegation to the Cairo Talks on April 8, and the third is the substance of a note which the Kurdish Delegation presented to the Iraqi Government on April 25.

The documents were given on a confidential basis to the Embassy by the British Ambassador in Amman, who in turn was given them by King Hussein. These documents were translated by an officer of the British Embassy.

FOR THE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES AD INTERIM

Robert B. Houghton
 First Secretary of Embassy

Enclosures: As stated herein. (3)
 Department (1 copy)
 Baghdad (1 copy)

GROUP 3
 Downgraded at 12-year intervals,
 not automatically declassified.

FORM 4-62 DS-323	SECRET	FOR DEPT. USE ONLY <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> In <input type="checkbox"/> Out
Drafted by: POL/REHoughton/eal	7-23-63	Contents and Classification Approved by: GWLewis, Charge d'Affaires a.i.
Clearances:		Sela/re/Kelgare No action necessary RM/N file

NEA

What follows is the note which Talabani handed over in the name of the Kurdish Delegation to the Cairo Negotiations on April 8, 1963, addressed to the Head and Members of the Iraqi Delegation to the Cairo Talks.

On the occasion of your presence at the Cairo Talks, between the Representatives of the Iraqi Republic and the Arab Republic and the United Arab Republic, and in view of the nature of the talks which are being conducted between them and their application to the Iraqi people including the Kurdish people, their special and individual circumstances, we considered it our duty as Members of the Kurdish Delegation charged with negotiations with the Iraqi Government on the possibility of enabling the Kurdish people to enjoy their national rights on the basis of decentralisation, to enlighten the Iraqi Delegation on the views of the Kurdish people and their attitude to the form of relations which may occur between Iraq and any Arab State or States in view of the decisions which may be arrived at on that subject may in with the nature of the standard of the Kurdish people in Iraq and may not conflict with their national rights.

1. We say to begin with that the comprehensive nature of the Cairo Talks demands that the Kurdish people must be represented as one of the parties, so that they may not be taken any decisions concerning the formation of relations between the three Republics which will adversely affect adversely the Kurdish people and their rights in the Iraqi Republic. That fact extends, in our view, to the question of decentralisation as will be apparent from the rest of this note.

It may be said that the Delegation of the Iraqi Republic represents the Iraqi people as a whole in its constitutional and legal aspect. We, however, say in this respect that the national problems on the one side and the Egyptian Group at the Cairo Talks on another side, demand that the Iraqi Delegation represent fully both the two great nationalisms, Arab and Kurdish, so that decisions which taken may correspond with Iraqi reality. The Iraqi Delegation lacks an element which would make it truly representative of the Kurdish people and this was the reason for our enlightening you in this Note.

2. You know that the Kurdish people have never stood in the way of the desires of the Arab people for a sort of relationship to be formed between other regions and governments, and it is the source of pride for the Kurdish people that it has found an opportunity to win honour by sharing in making the difficult smooth in the question of the relationship which it is desired should be arrived at between all the parties of the Arab north and the free Arab states particularly whenever the nature of that relationship and its extent.
3. We wish to help with any possible formation in the future and to avoid all conflict between the desires which the Cairo meeting may express and the national rights of the Kurdish people in Iraq. To this end we have summarised what follows the views of the people based on their national position and place in Iraq, and in view of their desires and wishes throughout history for the manner of the relations between them and the Arab people in various circumstances:-

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- (a) If Iraq remains without change in status the Kurdish peoples demands are confined to the fulfillment of the Declaration issued by the Iraqi Republic on the subject of the national rights of the Kurdish people on the basis of decentralization.
- (b) If Iraq is included in a Federal Union, the Kurdish people in Iraq should be allowed self-government in its understood sense without interruption or weakening of that sense.
- (c) If Iraq is included in a comprehensive union with another Arab country the Kurdish people in Iraq shall be a region connected with the unified state on a basis which guarantees the preservation of its exigence and leaves, at the same time, semi-independence and guarantees the development of strong relations between the two peoples for a better future.

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FROM THE KURDISH DELEGATION

NOTE OF DEMANDS

What follows is the gist of the Note which the Kurdish Delegation presented to the Iraqi Government on the 25th April in accordance with its request, setting out in which its demands.

The true friend of Arab and Kurdish brotherhood ^{is} the man who works for the strengthening of the ties which have bound the Arab and Kurdish people together since the birth of Islam has its fullest expression in action in work to strengthen that brotherhood and to make firm co-existence between them on a deep-rooted basis.

Facts of history teach us that the most perfect sort of brotherhood relations between peoples is that which rests on the basis of free union between them far from blood and compulsion which do not create anything in time except problems, tragedies and conflict, and voluntary brotherly association has not a practical meaning unless it rests on the basis of recognition of rights of the nations forming it, of their co-existence together and their ability to enjoy these rights within the general entity of this association (Federation). The condition of modern states shows us that special national rule which brotherly states practice in their policies of political, economic, cultural and social co-operation within the framework of general Federal rule is the best guarantee for the preservation of voluntary association (Federation) between them. Besides being the jewel of this Federation and its firm foundation the Federations of Switzerland, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, India and Nigeria are witnesses to the benefits of voluntary association (Federation) as a basis for the security of government and a guarantee of the unity of the State.

It is clear that one of the benefits of this sort of voluntary Federation is that the countries composed of different races have, through it, found a pioneering sort of democracy which is a true expression of voluntary association, just as in the case of Federal Germany, Italy, Brazil, Britain and the United States of America and as will be the case in the United Arab Republic in the regions of Egypt and Syria and Iraq.

We found evidence in the passage of time and the present that if different races living in one State enjoy their national rights through their legal symbols and through their own special administration it is not a benefit for their inclusion in the true unity of the country and their acceptance of it alone, but it enables them to strengthen that unity to make it grow and to spread, and to make it more firm.

In the light of the considerations and rights which have been mentioned in faith and belief, the agreement of the Government of the Republic to this plan is a source of the strengthening of the true Iraqi unity and the rooting of Arab and Kurdish brotherhood and the preservation of it in the face of destructive elements and causes of weakness abroad and at home. If it approved this plan it would be its responsibility to preserve the treasure of Kurdish/Arab brotherhood handed down to it from history and to have passed it on to future generations as the clearest programme and the most fruitful path and the most promising for eternity.

We hope that the Council of the Headquarters of the Revolution which is based on a revolution with philosophical theories and a programme, and with it the era which has been announced by the lips of its leaders, respect national and legal rights of the Kurdish people, and their right of self-determination. Their decision on this will be the fulfilment of the promise which it made and swore and by which it found its new era for the historic brotherly relations
/between

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By <u>SC</u> NARA Date <u>11/18/05</u>

between the Kurdish and Arab peoples, and their blessing on a form of foundation of truth and honesty.

1. The Iraqi Republic is a unified State composed of two principal nationalists - Arab and Kurd - which enjoy equal rights and which express their wishes relying on the right of self-determination in their life together.
2. The Iraqi Constitution expressly guarantees terms of high legal machinery for the Republic and for the Chief of the Republic and for the Government as it guarantees the organisation of national government concerned with the enjoyment by the Kurdish people of their national rights in matters of legislation, administration and justice in the area of Kurdistan.
3. The following matters will be in the jurisdiction of the Central Government:
 - (a) The Presidency
 - (b) Foreign Affairs, including diplomatic, consular and commercial representation, treaties and nationality agreements, the United Nations Organisation, declaration of war and conclusion of peace.
 - (c) National Defence (Army, Navy and Air Force).
 - (d) Currency and the issue of currency.
 - (e) Petroleum Affairs.
 - (f) Customs.
 - (g) National airports and ports.
 - (h) Posts, and telegraph and telegrams.
 - (i) Railways and main roads.
 - (j) Questions of nationality.
 - (k) Preparation of the general state budget.
 - (l) Supervision of central broadcasts and television.
 - (m) Nuclear power.

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- (e) Proceeds of tobacco and forests.
- (f) Kurdistan is to be considered as taking a share proportionate to the number of her inhabitants compared with the inhabitants of Iraq in foundations, plans and projects of common benefit.
- 6. Kurdistan includes the districts of Suleimaniya, Kirkuk, Erbil and those areas in which a majority of Kurds live in the districts of Mosul and Dayaly.
- 7. The Vice-President of the Iraqi Republic should be a Kurd and the people of Kurdistan shall elect him by the same process by which the President of the Iraqi Republic is elected. The constitution of the Government organisation shall guarantee in proportion to the number of its national inhabitants to the region of Kurdistan its economy, social and cultural rights and democratic and religious freedom to the citizens of the minorities such as Turcoman, Assyrians, Chaldeans, Armenians etc. from religious sects and elements with the guarantee of their complete equality in rights and responsibilities with the people of the Kurdish and Arab nations and guarantee of their representation in the Legislative and Executive Councils and various organisations in a just proportion.

General Articles

- 1. The people of Kurdistan will be represented in the Iraq National Assembly by a number of deputies in proportion to the relative numbers of the Kurdish people and people of Iraq.
- 2. The people of Kurdistan shall have a number of Ministers in the Central Cabinet corresponding with proportion of inhabitants of Kurdistan to inhabitants of Iraq.
- 3. The proportion of Kurdish officials in the Central Ministries should correspond with the proportion of Kurdish citizens to citizens of Iraq.
- 4. (a) A number of students from Kurdistan shall be received in the Baghdad University and the Iraq institutions of higher learning corresponding in proportion with the inhabitants of Kurdistan to those of Iraq.
(b) The Government shall send annually in the missions and in groups and foreign scholarships a number of students from Kurdistan corresponding etc. with the number of inhabitants in Kurdistan proportionate to the relative numbers of the Kurdish people and people of Iraq.
- 5. One of the assistants of the Commander-in-Chief of the Army shall be a Kurd.
- 6. The Iraqi Army shall keep its name and in the event of its changing its name shall apply to the Kurdish portion of it the name of "Filti Kurdistan". Men from Kurdistan shall do their military service there and the officers and N.C.O.s who have been dispersed for political reasons shall return to the Iraqi Army.
- 7. A number of students from Kurdistan will be admitted to the military colleges, the police, the General Staff, the Air Force and the other military establishments corresponding to the proportion of inhabitants of Kurdistan and inhabitants of Iraq.

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4. (a) The Kurdish people shall enjoy their national rights through an Executive Council based on a Legislative Council elected by those living in Kurdistan by free, direct, secret ballot.
- (b) The National (Kurdish) Organisation defined in Article 2 shall concern itself with:
- Justice
 - Interior
 - Education
 - Health
 - Agriculture
 - Tobacco
 - Municipal Affairs
 - Labour and Social Affairs
 - Development
 - Expenditures
- Everything connected with raising the standard of living, social affairs and economic development and so forth i.e. matters which do not fall within the competence of the Central Government.
- (c) The Legislative Council has competence granted by all the necessary laws to act in matters mentioned in paragraph (b) above. The Legislative Council elects the Chairman of the Executive Council and has the right to withdraw confidence from him and the members of the Council.
- (d) The Executive Council enjoys executive authority within the limits of the concerns of the National (Kurdish) Organisation which are to be found in paragraph 2 above and executes the laws which the Legislative Council promulgates and so the laws and general decrees also which the Central Government issues in virtue of its relationship with Kurdistan. The Executive Council has the right to nominate the employees of the Organisation and the departments in the region and is responsible to the Legislative Council in all its work.
5. Finance of the National (Kurdish) Organisation. Derived from
- (a) Local Revenues, taxes and fees which are collected within Kurdistan.
- (b) The Kurdistan quota proportionate to the number of its inhabitants as compared with the number of inhabitants of Iraq to be taken from the oil revenue, the Customs, airports, ports, canals, Government banks, railways, and P.T.T. on condition that there be deducted from them expenditures on the Prime Minister's office, Defence, Foreign Affairs, the issuing currency, the Department of the Minister of Petroleum, the P.T.T., the Department of Canals in proportion to the number of inhabitants compared with the inhabitants of Iraq.
- (c) The Kurdistan quota of foreign aid loans and subscriptions which the Government obtains in the same proportion as stated above.
- (d) Internal loans and civil loans of assistance which Kurdistan derives.

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9. The Central Government may send additional forces to the region of Kurdistan in the event of their needing to oppose foreign invasion or existence of the continuing threat of foreign aggression on the Iraqi Republic. In other circumstances it must ask the permission of the Legislative and Executive Councils in Kurdistan.
10. Units of the Iraqi Army may undertake security actions within Kurdistan etc. with the agreement of its Legislative Council or following a request of the Executive Council.
11. Any legislative act shall be considered void whatever its origin if its intention is to limit the democratic and national rights of the Kurdish people or to confine their enjoyment of them.
12. Announcement of Iraqi laws in Kurdistan except in the case of announcement of war or of the real danger of foreign aggression shall be with the agreement of the Legislative Council.
13. One of the present Kurdish Ministers shall be charged with the formation of the temporary Executive Council to exercise the prerogatives of the Council on a temporary basis.
14. Destroying the traces of the rule of the tyrant Qasim by compensating all those who suffered as a result of the revolt of Kurdistan justly and quickly within four months.
15. In the event of change of Iraqi nationality to Arab nationality it shall be stated in birth certificates and in identity cards and passports that fact that the bearer is a Kurdistani within the United Arab Republic if he is from the region of Kurdistan and a Kurd if he is of Kurdish origin.
16. If the Iraqi flag is changed or the symbol of the Iraqi State there shall be added to it a Kurdish sign.

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By SC-NARA Date 11/18/05

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Amman

NEA

The Kurdish Case and the Ba'ath in Iraq.

Before the Revolution or the 14th of Ramadan:

"Koin Quirzed
Nai?"

(1) In April 1962, there was an exchange of letters between the Free Officers and the leaders of the Kurdistan Democratic Party concerning the setting up of co-operation between the Nationalist forces in Iraq on the one side and the Kurdish forces to sweep away the rule of the tyrant Qasim. The letters were signed by Sayid Taher Yahya, the present Chief of Staff on behalf of the Free Officers and Sayid Ibrahim Ahmed, the General Secretary of the Kurdistan Democratic Party on behalf of the Kurds. Captain "(name unintelligible)" was the bearer of the letters between the two sides. The agreement between the two sides was completed to join forces in the struggle to bring Qasim down. The Arab side recognized the right of the Kurds to self-government within the Iraqi state and Mustafa Barzani undertook to form a legal provisional government in Kurdistan until elections could be held and there would participate in the Central Government the following men: Fuad Aruf, Baba Ali, Amr Mustafa and Jalal Talabani.

(2) Continual contact was maintained between the Kurdish side and the Arab Nationalist forces in Iraq. Dr. Sadik Khushnah used to represent the Arab side, Engineer Chawkat Alkurd represented the Kurdish side. At a number of meetings before the elections Salih Yusuf and Asad Khalilani joined the Kurdish side and agreement was reached that the Kurds should enjoy all national rights short of secession.

(3) Continual contact was maintained between Brigadier Fuad Aruf and Sayid Taher Yahya and there was complete agreement on all the national rights of the Kurdish people within the Iraqi state and they were aware of all the meetings which were being conducted on this subject.

(4) At the beginning of 1962, there was a general strike in the University of Baghdad and it spread until it included all regions in Iraq. Arab Nationalist students and Kurdish supporters participated in it. Communists and their supporters did not participate. This strike had a great effect in Iraqi circles and it resulted in a herald of difficulties appearing between Arab and Kurdish national forces.

(5) On the 9th February 1962, Brigadier Fuad Aruf proposed a meeting between two leaders of the Ba'ath Party and the responsible men of the Kurdistan Democratic Party in Baghdad. From the Ba'ath, Ali Salih Saadi attended and one other. On behalf of the Kurdish side, Salih Yusuf and Asad Khalilani attended. After the negotiation, agreement was reached that the two sides undertake a common revolution to get rid of the rule of Qasim and Kurdish self-government should be recognized. Ali Salih Saadi did not merely recognize self-government but proposed the right of self-determination also. An agreement was reached to hold another meeting on Monday the 11th February, 1962. It was there decided to record the agreement on condition that each side should procure a copy of the record but the meeting did not take place since the revolution occurred on the 8th February.

(Date is throughout 1962 in text, but I think should read 1963).

in paragraph 5

At the Time of the Revolution:

(1) At 1 o'clock on the morning of 14th Ramadan, 1962, the day of the revolution, Salih Yusuf and Engineer Chawkat Alkurd met Dr. Khushnah who told them in one word that the war was ending. The day was the war they had not and they should help that and that he guaranteed the nationalist demands of the Kurds as had been agreed.

and
(2) Brigadier Fuad Araf, Sayid Yusuf, Sayid Akram went to the National Council headquarters at the broadcasting station. They found there all the members of the present government including Abdessalam Araf. After greeting them they regretted that they had not known the time of the event. Ali Salih Saadi replied that the decision had been taken the day before as a result of the plaging of 58 Nationalist officers on pension. Therefore it was difficult for them to make the coup but nevertheless they were aware of their promises and he asked the Kurdish side to broadcast appeals to the Kurdish people to help the revolution. The Kurdish side contented itself with sending a congratulatory telegram on the coup and expressing the Kurds' anticipation of positive steps to solve the Kurdish question by guaranteeing self-government within the Iraqi state. The Kurdish side also requested a reply to the telegram agreeing to it but Amarah said that the publication of the telegram implied their side's agreement with its contents. This telegram was broadcast one or twice for two consecutive days.

(3) Immediately after this telegram, the Kurdish people began to help the revolution and the Kurdish soldiers in the Iraqi Army stopped defending Qasim and openly attacked him.

(4) Barasani published an order to all revolutionary groups to come into the city immediately and to co-operate with the forces of the coup.

(5) On the day following the coup, Salih Yusuf and Shawkat Akram went to the headquarters of the National Council to congratulate them on bringing down Abdul Karim Qasim and to ask that 4,712 Kurdish prisoners whom Qasim had put in jail should be released, but they excused themselves on the grounds that they were too occupied with dealing with the communists who were opposing the revolution as they claimed.

(6) On the second day after the revolution, Fuad Araf, Salih Yusuf and Shawkat Akram went to the headquarters of the Ministry of the Interior and met Ali Salih Saadi. They asked him to release the prisoners and to make contact with the leaders of the Kurdish revolution. He, however, avoided giving them a direct answer saying that he would look after the interests of the Kurds because his nation's people, as he said, were Kurds.

(7) On the evening of the third day after the coup, the Director of Public Security issued a telegram to all the prisons in Iraq to release all the Kurdish Nationalists except the communists. Immediately after this telegram on the same night, the prisoners were released in the districts of Hakkari and Ramadi because the governors of the two districts signed with it that time Kurds Fawzi Jamil Salih and Shawkat Araf Talabani. On the morning of the following day, the Military Governor issued a telegram in which he cancelled the telegram of the Director of Public Security and those prisoners were not released in all the prisons except the two named and for the same reason. There were also released the prisoners of Shawkat Salih, thanks to the intervention of the present Minister for Social Affairs, Haidi Khattabi who was imprisoned in the same prison and had strong connections with the Kurdish prisoners. Thus also 100 prisoners were freed from the prison and a number from the prison of Hakkari Rashid on the morning after the coup when the prison was opened. The total number who were released from prison was about 1,700 out of the total of 4,712 prisoners. The rest are still in prison and their number has increased, even a month before the resumption of hostilities, to 4,000 prisoners.

After the Revolution

(8) In the 6th February, 1963, the prisoners of the Party sent a telegram to the government in which they asked for the release of the Kurds who had been in Hakkari and demanded that the government of the revolution should urgently arrange their release and put them in a basis of self-government and should open the way for the Kurds to the two sides.

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(2) On the 11th February, Salih Yusif went from Baghdad to Kurdistan by a military plane accompanied by Luqman Najj Mala Mustafa who had already escaped from Musaker Rashid prison, in order to meet Barzani and see the facts of the case.

(3) On Monday, 18th February, Jalal Talabani and Salih Yusif went to Baghdad bearing a letter for Abdessalam Aref from Barzani in which he entrusted Talabani and Yusif in his own hand to negotiate with the government for the issuing of an official proclamation in which the two governments should announce that the end of Abdul Karim Qasbi meant the end of the bloody slaughter in Kurdistan and work for the solution of the question of Kurdistan on the basis of self-government.

(4) After Yusif and Talabani had got to the Baghdad Hotel, Major General Taher Yahvi came to the hotel and told them that the National Council had agreed to issue a bulletin in which it would declare that it granted the Kurds self-government and that this would be issued on the following day. This was in the presence of Brigadier Fuad Aref and Shawkat Akrami.

(5) On the 19th February after the delegation had visited Abdessalam Aref and Ahmad Hassan Bakr, a meeting took place in the room of the Defense Ministry in the headquarters of the National Council. Present on behalf of the government side were Lt. Gen. Mahdi Amash, Ali Salih Saadi and Brigadier Jordan Takriti and on behalf of the Kurdish side Talabani and Yusif. Also present were the two Kurdish ministers Fuad Aref and Baba Ali Shadi Mahawi. Saadi opened the meeting by complaining that the Kurdish Democratic Party had co-operated with the communists and opposed the Ba'ath. Talabani replied that the Ba'ath had not made any difference on the Kurdish question and that all the Ba'ath organisations were united.

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Position

and that all organizations whether Ba'athi or nationalist has opposed the Kurdish case and Kurdish hopes and there was no doubt that that was the parties decision. After this exchange the Minister Fuad Arif considered the historic connections between the two peoples and the role of the Kurds in creating the Iraqi state. The Minister Baba Ali added something to what Fuad Arif said and after the atmosphere had got better Mahdi Ammash said as follows (not reported verbatim): "Brothers, the Kurds are not a group or a tribe or sub-tribe or a sect, they are a people with a history of heroism with all that that means. They have their land, their history and their culture, etc. There is no doubt that these people should have their right of self-determination, therefore, for the following reasons we Arabs ought to help the Kurdish people to achieve their rights so that they may be our allies and we theirs:

1. If we suppose that the present Kurdish revolt were finished immediately by our calling up all the Arab forces in Iraq against them then after two years the revolt would break out stronger than ever and if the present revolt has lasted eighteen months then the second revolt would last three years and if we supposed that we gathered all the Arab forces against it and managed to crush that revolt also then after three years a stronger and greater and deeper revolt would break out than its predecessors. The Kurds would achieve their aims at self-determination and would secede from Iraq and become our enemies having been our brothers. This is the political consideration.
2. From the economic point of view, the present revolt is confined to a limited area but the national economy is paralysed from north to south and its evil effect is great even in Nassara.
3. From the military point of view we find that Israel is on our left and it would be stupidity and shortsightedness if we made the Kurds enemies instead of our brothers on our right at a time when we call them brothers and bind them to us with such bonds. From the international point of view the assassination of the tyrant Abdul Karim Qasim has caused international disfavour. How would it be if we were to try to crush a brother people as the Kurdish people are?"

Ammash did not stop speaking until the four Kurds, Brigadier Fuad Arif, Baba Ali, Talabani and Yusefi with one, all said "You have spoken exactly what is in our hearts". After this preface Ammash said: "Since we do not represent all the Kurds in Iraq and in the same way you do not represent all the Arabs in Iraq it is necessary that we should call a popular conference on a wider basis which will be attended on the Arab side in addition to the Government Delegation by all the following: Sadiq Shamsal, Faisal Habib, Khaisiran, Muhamed Kida Shabibi, Hussein Jamil and Essil Qubeis; and on the Kurdish side there should be added to the Delegation a number of Kurdish personalities to represent various popular sections; the meeting should take place on Thursday, February 22. The Kurdish Delegation agreed to this on the understanding that they represented a clear majority of the Kurdish people. Nevertheless, they would help in calling a popular Conference. The meeting was then broken up on the understanding that the Conference would be called on February 22.

On February 20 another unofficial meeting was called with Major-General Taher Yahir, present were Talabani, Yusefi, Akrawi, and Major-General Taher Yahir asked that they should send a telegram to Barazini to release the prisoners held by the Kurdish forces.

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By SP-NARA Date 11/18/05

Forces. The Kurdish Delegation agreed to this on condition that Kurdish prisoners also should be released, and the economic blockade on Kurdistan lifted. Immediately after that they went to the office of the Prime Minister Amr al-Mur. Amr al-Mur was present also and asked Talabani to send a telegram, which he did. The Prime Minister asked the Military Governor by telephone to release the Kurdish prisoners. Amr al-Mur asked that Talabani should go with the official Government Delegation to Cairo to congratulate the Egyptians on the occasion of the unity, in order to strengthen the position of the Iraqi Delegation and to prove its intention of finding a good solution. Talabani agreed to this in person but wished to get the opinion of Barazani.

On the morning of February 21 Talabani departed with the Delegation to Cairo and Algiers. Immediately after this the popular Conference which was to have been called on February 22 failed to take place.

The Military Governor sent a telegram openly to some of the prisoners to release the Kurdish prisoners, but he also sent a secret telegram demanding this. The Kurds were never released despite the fact that Barazani ordered that the prisoners who were in fact prisoners of war taken on the field of battle to be released. On the other hand the Kurdish prisoners were civilians who had been taken from their homes and families.

After the return of the Delegation from Cairo and Algeria the Kurdish side asked for the agreed Conference. The Government had avoided calling it on the excuse that more time for study was needed. Talabani asked for permission to return to Kurdistan to inform the people on the truth of the position and the consequence of his visit to Cairo and Algiers. He had a meeting with Ismail Hassan and Ben Hassan. Amr al-Mur also intended to travel with him to Kurdistan. The Kurdish side welcomed this and they agreed to travel by the same plane. However, when Talabani went to the military airport he did not find Amr al-Mur there and arrived alone.

Immediately after Talabani's return without success the state in Baghdad and Kurdistan grew critical and the National Council for the Provisional Government put out all the historical ties between the two sides and announced that the Kurdish question would be solved.

HAIDAR The announcement did not, however, reduce the tension and Major-General Tahir Yahya, Brigadier Foad Rif, Fata Ali and Ali Hassan al-Sulayman, the Ambassador of Iraq in the United States of America, went to Kurdistan and met Barazani. They heard his point of view as he insisted on the necessity for an announcement of agreement on the granting of complete self-government to create a brotherly atmosphere for the negotiations.

After this he laid down the rough lines for the type of self-government. Major-General Tahir Yahya asked Barazani to allow the Kurdistan Democratic Party to participate in the Government and Barazani made the condition that all national forces should be given a share in government and full democratic rights should be granted to all; arrests should be stopped and so also beating and torture.

During the first week of March a popular Delegation made up of Mohammed Rida Shabibi, Dr. Abdul Aziz Duri, Faisal Habib, Faik Samirani and Hussein Jawid left Baghdad and met Barazani, who insisted in his turn on the announcement to the press of self-government. After meetings for a period of two days it was agreed that the Government should announce the granting of national rights to the Kurdish people on a basis of decentralization, and at the same time the following, which should be done.

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1. All the Kurdish Nationalist prisoners would be released.
2. The economic blockade of Kurdistan would be raised.
3. A general pardon would be issued to those who had taken part in the Kurdish revolt.
4. Capital confiscated from those who took part in the Kurdish revolt would be released.
5. Corrupt civil servants would be transferred if they had demonstrated against Kurds; they would be replaced by clean officials.
6. The Army units should return to their normal headquarters.
7. Irregular ^{Police} ~~police~~ should be ^{Dismissed} ~~discontinued~~. After this a Joint Committee should be formed from both sides to draw up the broad lines of decentralisation.

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The popular delegation returned to Baghdad on March 9 and the National Council issued an announcement in which it declared after the preface that it recognised the national rights of the Kurdish people on a basis of decentralisation. After two days the law was issued pardoning those who had participated in the Kurdish revolt and called for those who participated in the armed Kurdish movement. Furthermore the economic blockade on most of the regions was lifted.

The announcement had a great effect on the Kurds and immediately after it Barazani called for a popular conference of wide scope between the 18th and 22nd of March. Barazani himself was present as were the heads of the Kurdistan Democratic Party, tribal leaders, those who had participated in the revolt and representatives of the popular organisations such as the student women's and workers organisations, the societies of farmers and a great number of educated men from outside the parties and many Kurdish personalities known for their past history in the Kurdish case. After the conference had considered the way in which the revolt had broken out and the stages of the negotiations which had been conducted with the Government and the announcement which had been issued by the National Council they laid down broad lines for decentralisation according to the Kurdish point of view and elected a delegation composed of 14 people led by Talabani to go to Baghdad and put the plan before the Government and to negotiate with it in order to arrive at a reasonable solution to the question. The delegation was composed of Jalal Talabani, Saleh Yusufi, Colonel Mustafa Aziz, Habib Mohammed Karim, Abdel Hussein Kayli, Hashim Akrawi, all members of the Kurdistan Democratic Party, Sheikh Hussein Khafiqah, Lawyer Masoud Mohammed, Colonel Racuf Ahmed, Lawyer Abu Bakir Mahmud, Engineer Rashid Arif, the merchant Mohammed Said Safaf, the teacher Akid Sadic and Abdussamad Mohammed.

The delegation got to Baghdad on March 30 and a few minutes after its arrival Hussein Jamil came to greet them. Also present were Baik Samirai, Feisal Habib, Abdel Aziz Durubi and others. On April 2 the preparatory meeting was held between the Kurdish side and the popular delegation which had previously visited Kurdistan. On April 3 a meeting was held in Baghdad University. Present were the Kurdish delegation and the popular delegation. The Kurdish delegation were asked to make an announcement of their claims but the Kurdish delegation said that the Government had already broadcast their announcement on the subject and so the delegation wished to consider what the Government was proposing to the Kurds. On April 4 another meeting took place at the same place and the Kurdish delegation asked the popular delegation to announce its competence and to state whether it represented the Government and whether the Government would stand by what they arrived at etc. and whether this was in fact the case. Immediately afterwards it was agreed that one man from each side should meet at the Prime Minister's office to announce the position. Agreement was reached that the Kurdish delegation should be represented by Lawyer Masoud Mohammed and the other side by Feisal Habib Khaliziran. After contacting the Prime Minister by telephone to arrange for a time to meet where the Prime Minister told them that he would be free to meet the Kurdish delegation from Saturday, April 6 and that he himself would head the Government side.

After about two hours from the telephone conversation with the Prime Minister Radio Baghdad announced that an Iraqi delegation would go under the leadership of the Prime Minister to Cairo to conduct talks on federal unity. Thus the matter was put off and no meeting took place until the return of the delegation on April 17 to Baghdad.

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While the delegation was in Cairo many meetings took place between responsible men such as Hasem Jawad, Taher Yahya and others on the subject of military concentrations in Kurdistan and the imposition of economic blockade and the failure to release prisoners whose number was increasing. There was also the failure to execute the law of general pardon and their reply was always that these were simple matters and that they were preoccupied with forming a Socialist Republic of Kurdistan and such like sweet words.

During the negotiations and the meetings Sadiq and Azmash both showed their fear of solving the Kurdish question because Cairo would use it as a weapon against them and would taunt them with having cut off a part of the Arab homeland. At one of the meetings Azmash said, pointing with his finger at his neck, "Gamil Abdel Nasser will cut our throats if we agree to your demands."

They also told the Kurdish delegation that Gamil Abdel Nasser would not agree to give the Kurds their rights. When Talabani revealed that Gamal Abdel Nasser agreed to both sides coming to meet him and that he agreed to the principle of self-rule Sadiq and Azmash would reply that "he talked that way with you and in another way with us."

After the Government delegation returned from Cairo, two days later contact was made with them and a meeting held in the Ministry of the Interior. Present on the Government side were Ali Saleh Saadi, Takriti and another officer. 7 members of the Kurdish delegation were present. After the meeting had lasted more than an hour Saadi said "You began a revolution and naturally you have your demands." He asked to be given them so that he could study them on the understanding that the Government had another plan and the two plans would be studied together.

On the 24th April the delegation handed a plan over and declared that this plan was open to negotiation and this represented the Kurdish point of view. They showed their willingness to avoid a set position in their attempt to reach a solution which would guarantee the national rights of the Kurds and the sovereignty of the whole state. No answer was given on the Kurdish plan but news kept coming from Kurdistan that the Government was concentrating its arms and had sent planes which were in Nasseria to Kirkuk regiments of artillery and infantry divisions that were in the south, tanks and heavy artillery and that there was terrorism and attacks on Kurds everywhere. The roads to the Kurdish regions had been cut, the economic blockade had been imposed again etc. The Kurdish side tried to meet the responsible people and were told that these things were individual actions and did not represent the policy of the Government and by the solution of the principal question all these secondary questions would be solved.

On April 29 a meeting was held between a number of members of the Kurdish delegation and Major-General Taher Yahya. He told them that the Prime Minister would meet them on Wednesday, 1st May. On the 1st of May a meeting was held in the Prime Minister's office. He told them in his turn that they had sent the plan to Cairo and Damascus to get their point of view. At this point Talabani asked permission to go to Cairo to see President Nasser to inform him of the Kurdish point of view also. The Prime Minister replied that he would put the question to the National Council. He asked their agreement on this and informed them of the decision through Taher Yahya the next day. During the discussions the Kurdish side revealed their dissatisfaction with temporising and deceit on the /part

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part of the Government side, in addition to preparations to resume the fight the Prime Minister raised the Quran and said "I swear by this Quran there are no evil intentions towards you." Talabani said "and by this Quran you may have no evil intentions towards us but the intentions of all the leaders of the Baath towards us are evil." He asked the Prime Minister to agree to the return of the delegation to Kurdistan on the occasion of the Id. He refused and said "This means cutting off negotiations and it is not in the interests of both sides that you should return before we arrive at a satisfactory result." Thus the meeting broke up without arriving at a result.

On the 1st of May Major-General Taher Yahya informed the Kurdish side that the National Council agreed to Talabani going to Cairo. They gave him a passport on the following day which was the occasion of the Id al Adha. When Talabani asked Barazani to agree to his travelling to Cairo Barazani immediately agreed because he does not believe that the Kurdish question can be solved except by the hand of Cairo so Talabani went to Beirut and Cairo. After Talabani had gone to Cairo the Baath realized their mistake in allowing him to leave Iraq and reveal their duplicity. Their intention had been to gain some time because Abdel Nasser was very occupied at that period and would excuse himself from meeting Talabani since it was the time of his return from Algeria and Jugoslavia and then the visit of Ahmed Ben Bella and the return of the Arab troops from Yemen and his trip to Addis Ababa. The Government asked the Kurdish delegation to telegraph to Talabani to return at once on the pretext that the Government's plan was ready and that a Ministerial delegation composed of 5 Ministers was ready to negotiate. They hoped by this, as has been said, to prevent Talabani from meeting Abdel Nasser on the one side and on the other hand to create a coolness between Cairo and the Kurds and if Talabani did not wait for the return of the President from Addis Ababa and failed to meet him.

The Iraqi Government printed some copies of some of the articles of the Law of Precedence which Nuri Said had laid down in the 'forties changing some of the expressions and put them before the Kurds in an indirect manner as a plan to meet their demands. It did not stipulate anything for the Kurdish national rights or any sort of decentralisation or self-government. What it was concerned with was the manner of election of village councils and other questions which have no relation at all to Kurdish demands. The Government side was told that this plan did not give a basis for discussion.

The Government informed the Kurdish side that there were three plans which it would put forward for discussion.

1. The plan which the Kurdish delegation had submitted.
2. The Government plan.
3. A plan composed of the first two plans.

The Kurdish delegation was put under close surveillance and then under ~~false~~ residence in the Samirami Hotel in Baghdad where they were guests of the Iraqi Government. At the beginning of June there was a secret meeting covering a wide field. Present were the leaders of the Baath including Michel Aflaq and Atassi and many officers and executives of note for their malice and open enmity toward the Kurdish people. They decided to resume the battle and at the same time the Government and particularly Ammash and Saadi decided that they would curry favour with the two Kurdish Ministers Fuad Arif and Baba Ali to ward off suspicion of their intentions. Besides this Taher Yahya visited the Kurdish delegation in their hotel and told them that the Government had almost finished preparing the plan and the solution of the problem was at hand in a satisfactory manner for both sides. He said this in the presence of Brigadier Fuad Arif.

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On the 5th or 6th of ^{June} July news kept coming from Kurdistan to Baghdad that the units had begun to move towards the Kurdish centres and tanks had begun to move after reconnaissance had been made within the towns for the purpose of terrorism and to sow the people. On June 8 the Minister Baba Ali and some members of the Kurdish delegation met at the Prime Minister's office and told him that army units were on the move as were tanks towards the Kurdish positions. The Prime Minister rose and put the Quran on his right hand and said "By this Quran and by my children I swear that the Government has no evil intention."

On the same day Salah Yusufi met the Defence Minister and told him of the matter but Amarah denied that and swore that the report was not true. On the morning of June 9 Tahar Jahye went to the Samirami Hotel with Foad Arif and Baba Ali and handed the Kurdish delegation the Government's plan to solve the Kurdish question and informed them that a helicopter was ready at Musassar Rashid airport to take them to Kurdistan to put the plan before Karzani. The Kurds were delighted and the news was spread among the people with great enthusiasm but the delegation was taken to the prison at Musassar Rashid instead of to the airport and was imprisoned there. The Government was hoping from these manoeuvres to encourage the Kurds to show themselves openly since the Government had prepared a list of 700 names of Kurds who were to be arrested in Baghdad alone so that they should not be in hiding.

In this atmosphere of intrigue and deception and premeditation and treachery announced its true intentions and on the 10th June it threatened the Kurdish forces and ordered them to hand in their arms. Otherwise the Government would and did declare war of extermination on them.

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SUMMARY

An account of the positions of the two sides since the coup until the present day may be useful.

The Kurdish Side

1. A telegram sent to congratulate the revolution of Ramadan 14, in its first hours.
2. On the first day of the revolution all Kurds, military and civil, support it.
3. Military operations halted on all fronts.
4. Delegation sent to Baghdad to offer congratulations. Talabani goes to Cairo and Algeria.
5. All prisoners of war released.
6. Evacuation of Kurdish forces from towns, at Government request.
7. Surrounded military forces allowed to return to their bases.
8. Relief of army units permitted.
9. Release of prisoners taken on March 21, 1963 during their provocative attack on Shwan area. Return of the 8 military vehicles abandoned by the army with all their arms.
10. Barazani sends telegram of thanks on occasion of the National Council's announcement on self-government.
11. Kurdish forces retire from approaches of all roads leading to cities.
12. Kurdish forces retire from oil producing areas.

Government Side

Positive Actions

1. Announcement of recognition of national rights of Kurdish people.
2. Amnesty law for participants in Kurdish revolt.
3. Temporary raising of economic blockade.
4. Freeing of 1700 prisoners.

Adverse measures during the period of negotiations.

1. Failure to implement general amnesty law for participants in Kurdish revolt.
2. Failure to free non-armed capital of participants in revolt.
3. Failure to release 3000 prisoners from time of Kassem and others thrown into prison.
4. Dismissal of all Kurdish officers from army, even during negotiations.
5. Release from work of great majority of Kurdish officials, especially those in executive positions.

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6. Reimposition in heretofore form of economic blockade.
7. Resumption of military movements near Kurdish positions.
8. Failure to transfer executive officials whose replacement had been requested by Kurds, and enemies of Kurdish people such as Badr Eddin Ali, Mutassarif of Erbil, and Brigadier Sadiq Mustafa of whom Ammash said he was a dangerous criminal who should pay for all his deeds.
9. Provocative raids and burning of villages by commandos during the conference of "Kolsanjak".
10. Failure to act to repair damage done by Qassem.
11. Failure to dismiss irregular police formed by Qassem from mercenaries.
12. Deception and temporizing for 4 months.

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W I T H D R A W A L N O T I C E

RG: 059
ENTRY: 1963

BOX: 3944

TAB #: 15
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Folder Title: POL 13 NON-PARTY BLOCS IRAQ
Document Date: 23/07/63

A-GRAM A-69 FR AMEMB BAGHDAD TO STATE

In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains:

X Security-Classified Information

NND: 939536

WITHDRAWN: 01/25/94 by: HOSKINS

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By SC-NARA Date 11/18/05

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAM

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TO : DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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ANALYSIS DISTRIBUTION

FROM : Amembassy MOSCOW

DATE: July 19, 1963

SUBJECT: BAGHDAD, CAIRO, ANKARA, TEHERAN, DAMASCUS

REF : Conversation with new Ambassador to Moscow

The new Iraqi Ambassador, Faisal H. KHAIZARAN, paid a courtesy call on the Ambassador on July 12. The bulk of the conversation was devoted to Soviet-Iraqi relations in the light of Soviet support for the Kurds. The Iraqi expressed the belief that the USSR would be "realistic" and modify its policy to avoid isolating itself from Arab opinion. The Iraqi Ambassador pointed out that the USSR continues to supply economic and military assistance to Iraq and has offered to increase its aid program. A memorandum of conversation is enclosed.

For the Ambassador:

Enclosure: att'

As stated.

Malcolm Toon
 Counselor for Political Affairs

GROUP 3

Downgraded at 12-year intervals,
 not automatically declassified.

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FORM 4-62 DS-323

Drafted by: POL:TRBuchanan:mjb:7-19-63

Contents and Classification Approved by: POL:MIOD

Clearances:

JMMcSweeney

Cleared in draft by the Ambassador

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Authority NND 938522

By SC-NARA Date 11/18/05

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C O N F I D E N T I A L

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

July 12, 1963

SUBJECT: Conversation with Iraqi Ambassador
PLACE: American Embassy, Moscow
PARTICIPANTS: Faisal H. KHAIZARAN, Ambassador of Iraq
Ambassador Foy D. KOHLER
Fakhri AL-QAISI, First Secretary, Iraqi Embassy
Thompson R. BUCHANAN, First Secretary, American Embassy

The new Iraqi Ambassador paid a courtesy call on the Ambassador on July 12. The following were the main points of interest.

1. Soviet-Iraqi Relations. To a question from the Ambassador about Iraqi-Soviet relations, Mr. Khaizaran replied that, in his view, the Soviets were a practical people, who would come to modify their present position of strong support for the Kurds. He pointed out that they risk antagonizing all the Arab states of the Middle East if they continue. Even the UAR, concerning whose attitude the Ambassador expressed some interest, was being forced to modify its stance by public opinion in its own country. Arab solidarity on this issue was recently demonstrated at a meeting of information officers of the Arab League.

The Iraqi Ambassador indicated that relations with the USSR were not as bad as one might suppose. During the presentation of his credentials, Soviet officials had expressed an interest in having good relations. He reported that the military and economic aid programs were continuing, with visas being issued all the time for Soviet aid officials to travel to Baghdad. The USSR had even indicated a willingness to expand its programs.

On the subject of Iraqi students in the USSR, the Iraqi official reported that only fifty out of several hundred had gone home, as a result of a factional fight among the students after KASSEM's demise. These fifty had been sent to the US, he said, by arrangement of the "Arabic League", and he indicated the League would take students from the USSR only when it could place them.

2. Iraq and the Kurds. Mr. Khaizaran sought to defend Iraqi policy toward the Kurds, arguing that Mulla Mustafa BARZANI was merely one of a

C O N F I D E N T I A L

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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HANDLING INDICATOR

TO : 1963 JUL 22 AM 8:28
Department of State

INFO : BAGHDAD, DAMASCUS, LONDON, MOSCOW, TEHRAN, USUN

FROM : AmEmbassy ANKARA

DATE: July 17, 1963

SUBJECT: Text of Soviet Statement to Turkey on
Iraqi Kurdish Problem

REF : Embassy Telegrams 80, 45.

Berduk OLGACAY, Director General of the Second Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, gave an Embassy officer the enclosed translation of the text of "Statement" on the Iraqi Kurdish problem which was given to the Turkish Ambassador in Moscow by the Soviet Foreign Minister.

For the Chargé d'Affaires a.i.

Philip Clock
Counselor of Embassy

GROUP 4 - Downgraded at 3-year intervals.
Declassified after 12 years.

Enclosure - 1
Statement

FORM 4-62 DS-323

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C. P. Clock

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Authority NND 938522

By SP-NARA Date 11/18/05

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A-50 *Ankara*
Enclosure

STATEMENT

The Soviet Government deems it necessary to state the following to the Government of the Turkish Republic.

A bloody massacre of the Kurdish people, accounting for almost a quarter of the population of Iraq, is now being carried out by the Iraqi authorities in the northern part of Iraq. Extensive military operations against peaceful Kurdish towns and villages are under way. Forces employing aviation, tanks and artillery are brutally annihilating the peaceful population, including children, women and old folk. Vast areas are being turned into ruins and the peaceful populace is being evicted en masse from their native places. The extermination of a whole nation is actually going on.

All this is taking place only because the Kurds in Iraq justly demand respect of their lawful national and civil rights, equality with the other citizens of the Iraqi Republic.

The Government of Turkey is informed without doubt about the facts relating to the cruel massacre of the Kurds, which is being carried out near the frontiers of Turkey and the Soviet Union. The tragedy of the Kurds in Iraq continues and has already turned into an international problem.

All this arouses the legitimate anger of the public opinion of the world at large. What is now happening in North Iraq signifies the trampling underfoot of the principles of the United Nations, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, signifies genocide, that is a policy of mass extermination of people because of race, nation or religion condemned by all of mankind and declared by the United Nations as the gravest international crime. There are the signatures of both the Soviet Union and Turkey under the convention condemning genocide.

The Soviet Union possesses information that certain states, including Turkey, have embarked upon the road of interfering in the events taking place in North Iraq, up to and including measures of a military nature, according to the published official statements of spokesmen of the military, colonial CENTO Pact, where the tune is called by the imperialist powers. The CENTO bloc has discussed especially the question of drawing up a common policy with regard to the Kurdish movement; and what is more, the position of the Iraqi Kurds was considered with a view to taking joint steps against the Kurds. The press has reported several meetings of military representatives of Iraq, Turkey and Iran, which also discussed plans of military operations against the Kurds with a view to stamping out the

GROUP 5 - Declassified following July 17, 1964.

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- 2 -

Kurdish movement, and it was proposed to use the forces of certain states bordering on Iraq to fight the Kurds in the territory of Iraq. According to the selfsame reports, an agreement was reached during the meetings on joint operations against the Kurds. It is known also that the armed forces of Syria are participating directly in the fighting against the Kurds, jointly with the Iraqi forces.

Regardless of how precise these or other details in the reports on the events in North Iraq are, judging by everything the fact that foreign states have a hand in these events is beyond doubt. And precisely this gives ground for the serious concern of every government which is aware of its responsibility for the destiny of the world.

Such a policy of the CENTO Governments is fraught with serious consequences.

All this brings to memory the events linked with the preparation and carrying out of tripartite imperialist aggression against Egypt in the autumn of 1956.

The Turkish side has justly stated more than once that it is necessary to abide by the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other states.

This is correct, and this principle is one of the corner stones of the foreign policy of the Soviet Union. But the question arises, how are we to reconcile the abovementioned statements of Turkey with the fact that the Turkish authorities are trying themselves to interfere in the affairs of neighboring countries jointly with other CENTO nations?

The Soviet Government proceeds from the fact that nobody should interfere in the affairs of Iraq. The Government of Turkey obviously cannot but agree with this too. But if this is so, how is one to assess the reported facts testifying to the interference of foreign states in the war in North Iraq?

After all, if one state or a group of states embarks under this or that pretext on the road of armed interference in the affairs of another state, it thereby openly tramples underfoot the principles of the United Nations. Then the field of cooperation among states, especially among neighboring nations, gets narrowed-down to a dangerous extent. The place of good neighborliness among states is taken in this case by enmity, strife and conflicts.

Troubled by the development of events in the area of the southern frontiers of the Soviet Union and guided by the interests of upholding peace, the Government of the U.S.S.R. has decided to set forth to the Government of the Turkish Republic these considerations

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Authority <i>NND 938522</i>
By <i>SC</i> NARA Date <i>11/18/05</i>

CONFIDENTIAL

- 3 -

and serve warning about the danger linked with this outside interference in the events taking place inside the Iraqi state. It hopes sincerely that the Turkish Government will weigh all the circumstances when interfering (Sic) its policy towards the events in Iraq.

The Soviet Government avails itself of this opportunity to state that it is firmly set on following the road of further improving relations with Turkey and wishes the people and government of Turkey prosperity and peaceful development in conditions of lasting good neighborly relations with the Soviet Union and the other states. It hopes that the measures which were carried out of late by the Soviet and Turkish sides and which are planned for the future will benefit both our states.

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Authority <i>NNO 938522</i>
By <i>SE</i> NARA Date <i>11/18/05</i>

ORIGIN/ACTION

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAM

POL 13-3 IRAQ

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RM/R	REP	AF
1	5	
ARA	EUR	FE
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A-38 NEA UNCLASSIFIED

MESSAGE CENTER

HANDLING INDICATOR

TO : DEPARTMENT OF STATE
1963 JUL 15 AM 10 11

INFO : AMMAN, ANKARA, BASRA, BEIRUT, CAIRO, DAMASCUS,
JIDDA, KUWAIT, LONDON, TAIZ, TEHRAN, TEL AVIV, ZAN

FROM : Amembassy, BAGHDAD

SUBJECT : Deadline for Surrender Kurdish Rebels Extended Again - "For Last Time".

REF : A-8; July 2, 1963

DATE: July 11, 1963

On July 10, 1963, the period of grace during which non-Barzani Kurdish rebels might surrender and be amnestied was extended to July 31, 1963. All those who are captured after this date will be executed. Defense Minister Ammash in making the announcement said that "at a time when the Iraqi Army was winning one victory after another" and "Kurdish tribesmen are expressing repentence and proclaiming loyalty to the Patriotic authority", the government had received reports of "serious splits between Barzanis, the killers, on one side, and the rest of the Kurdish tribes on the other." The Barzanis, he said, "are desperately seeking to prevent the other tribes from establishing contact with out advanced units."

"Therefore, the government proclaims to our Kurdish brothers that, in fulfilment of their mounting desire to lay down arms, we have decided to extend the amnesty period till the end of this month. This will be the last such extension and the last opportunity to distinguish between the sincere and those with sick souls".

Ammash denied the reports that the government is already "putting to death or jailing those who surrender themselves-such reports cannot be believed by anyone sincere to this country".

For the Ambassador:

James E. Akins
James E. Akins
Second Secretary of Embassy

FORM 4-62 DS-323

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Drafted by: JEAkins:mlh:07/11/63

Contents and Classification Approved by:

Clearances:

No action necessary
NEA/NEA/Kidgale

RM/R
File

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NND 938522

By SC-NARA Date 11/18/05

~~CLASSIFICATION~~

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAM

POL 13-3 IRAQ

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2

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HANDLING INDICATOR

TO : DEPARTMENT OF STATE

INFO : BAGHDAD, PARIS, LONDON, TEHRAN, ANKARA, CAIRO, DAMASCUS,
BEIRUT, USUN

FROM : Amembassy MOSCOW

DATE: July 2, 1963

SUBJECT: Iraqi Communist Accuses Baghdad of Deal with CENTO

REF : Embtels 3247, June 20, 3203, June 17, and 3159, June 13, 1963
EUR EUR EUR

Pravda of June 29 published a TASS despatch from Paris, reporting the publication in Humanité of extracts of a letter from Aivara MUSTAFY (transliteration), member of the Politbureau of the Iraqi Communist Party. The letter attacks the Iraqi Government's position on the Kurdish question, and says it is not the Kurds who are the lackeys of imperialism, but rather "those who conclude secret agreements with the imperialist pact CENTO... those who fawn before the oil companies of the imperialist monopolies and grant them privileges...".

COMMENT: The Soviets have already made clear their intense displeasure with the Baathist campaign against the Kurds (see telegrams under reference), and have accused the Baathists of collusion with CIA. Implied support of a charge that they have concluded "secret agreements" with CENTO represents a further step in the Soviet campaign of attack on the Iraqi Government.

For the Ambassador:

Malcolm Toon
Counselor for Political Affairs

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FORM DS-323

Drafted by: POL: JBNorbury:cs 7/2/63

Contents and Classification Approved by: POL: TRBuchanan: 7/2/63

Clearances: JMMcSweeney

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Authority NND 932522

By SE-NARA Date 11/18/05

no reply necessary
1963 JUL 8 AM 10 12
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Enc: Sov: WOA Anderson
7/9/63

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ORIGIN/ACTION

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ARMY CIA NAVY

OSD USA NSA

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAM

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POL 13-3 IRAQ

XR DEF-6-7 IRAQ

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TO 1963 JUL 8 AM 8 42

INFO : AMMAN, ANKARA, BASRA, BEIRUT, CAIRO, DAMASCUS,
JIDDA, KUWAIT, LONDON, TAIZ, TEHRAN, TEL AVIV.

FROM : Amembassy, BAGHDAD

DATE: July 2, 1963

SUBJECT: Deadlines extended for Surrender of Kurdish Rebels and Report
Army Classes 1939-41 for Duty.

REF :


On June 30, 1963 the Iraqi Ministry of Defense extended until July 10 the period of grace during which rebel Kurds may surrender and presumably be amnestied - or at least not be shot. "The deluded rebels" were instructed to "surrender their arms to the nearest police unit or Army garrison."

The offer was first issued on July 10 and gave soldiers, who had deserted to the rebels, until July 15 and others until July 25 to surrender to the government or to be executed when captured. On June 17 the offer was extended to June 30.

* * * * *

Army classes of 1939, 1940, and 1941 were recalled on June 17, 1963 for six weeks training "connected with military exercises." They were given until June 30 to report for duty. The Ministry of Defense on July 1 extended the registration period until July 30 "in order to give those who were unable to report to their recruitment committee, an opportunity to do so now."

For the Ambassador:



William C. Lakeland
First Secretary of Embassy

FORM 4-62 DS-323

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Drafted by: JEAKins:mlh:07/02/63

Contents and Classification Approved by:

Clearances:

no action necessary
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RM/R
File

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Authority NND 938522

By SC-NARA Date 11/18/05

ORIGIN/ACTION			DEPARTMENT OF STATE		
AIRGRAM					<i>POL 26 IRAQ</i> <i>POL 13-3 IRAQ</i>
RM/R	REP	AF	A-9 NO.		CONFIDENTIAL
1	5	5			AIR POUCH HANDLING INDICATOR
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ARMY	CIA	NAVY			
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OSD	USIA	NSA			
1	5	5			

TO : Department of State

INFO: Baghdad
Cairo
London
Moscow

FROM : Amembassy Beirut

SUBJECT : Kurds Charge Iraqi Betrayal

REF : Embtel 1212 to Department, June 26, 1963

1963 JUL 3 AM 2 03

ANALYSIS & DISTRIBUTION

DATE: July 2, 1963

Enclosed is a paper given me by Kurdish representative Showkat Aqrawi during the conversation on June 25 reported in the telegram under reference. The paper, which was presumably prepared by Aqrawi for the occasion, gives the Kurdish side of the story of negotiations with the Iraqi Government, their rupture and the resumption of hostilities. In short, the Kurds charge that they were deliberately betrayed by the Iraqis in the midst of negotiations in which they had engaged in all good faith and that the Iraqi Army took advantage of the element of surprise to perpetrate widespread atrocities upon the Kurds.

Armin
Armin H. Meyer

POL

Amb

O'Neal

Econ

Comm

FORM 2-62 DS-323

Drafted by: POL:dkorn:mas

July 2, 1963

Clearances:

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Contents and Classification Approved by:
The Ambassador

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 Authority NND 932522
 By SC-NARA Date 11/18/05

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Enclosure of A-9
From Beirut

Notes on Events In Iraq:

At the beginning of the month of June a meeting of top Baathist leaders took place in Baghdad, including Aflak, Attassi, some high ranking officers and the Mutaserif of Arbil who is noted for his hostility towards the Kurds.

This meeting decided to resume the conflict with the Kurds. Aflak and the Syrian government knew from the start. As result Syrian air force planes have been moved to Iraq, painted with Iraqi colors, and are now participating in the battle.

June 5 and 6 the Iraqi army started to move. First it demonstrated by driving tanks through all the streets of Kirkuk, Suleimaniya and other towns, then moved off towards the mountains.

June 7 and 8th army started fighting again everywhere.

On 8th Baba Ali and some of the Kurdish delegates went to Premier Baqr's and told him what was happening. He swore on the Koran that it was not true. He placed the Koran on his eyes and declared that he and his wife and children should all be struck blind if the government had any bad intentions towards the Kurds.

Baba Ali insisted that troops were moving towards Kurdish positions -- toward Azmar, Chwarte, Panjwin and Maydan, all in the heart of the Kurdish area -- in a way bound to provoke conflict.

Same day Yusseffi and other delegates went to Amash and told him the same thing. Amash, the Min Defense, swore "upon the divorce of his wife" that nothing of the sort was happening.

That day the government tried to show its friendliness towards Baba Ali, Fuad Aref and the Kurdish delegates (June 9): Taher Yahya with Fuad Aref went to the Semiramis hotel to meet (the Kurdish) delegation and handed them the government scheme for settlement of the Kurdish problem. Told them a helicopter was ready at Rashid camp so they could go and discuss the scheme with Barzani.

All asked Yusseffi to give their best wishes to Barzani and tell him the government was willing to end all misunderstandings.

Meanwhile the hotel was full of people who came to inquire about the news that fighting had broken out in the north. But when they heard what Yahya had said, all were glad. The word spread all over Baghdad that the delegates had gone back with specific proposals. (These proposals were submitted after those attributed to Ali Haydar Suleiman)

Everyone relaxed. Even some persons who had been hiding came into view again.

The two ministers, and Yahya, left the Semiramis; the delegation was driven to Rashid camp and there put right into prison.

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Authority	NND 938522
By	SE-NARA Date 11/18/05

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INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

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Action
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Control: 19166
Rec'd: JUNE 22, 1963
7:37 AM

Info

FROM: TEHRAN

SS

TO: Secretary of State

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NO: 1133, JUNE 22, NOON

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ACTION DEPARTMENT 1133, INFORMATION ANKARA 129, BAGHDAD 99,
LONDON 114.

EMBTel 1123

DISCUSSED KURDISH PROBLEM IN IRAQ WITH ARAM JUNE 22. HE SAID
IRAQI GOVT HAD EXPRESSED APPRECIATION OF TIGHTENED BORDER CONTROL
MEASURES MENTIONED REFTel. IRAQIS HAD REQUESTED PERMISSION
FOR THEIR PLANES TO CROSS IRANIAN BORDER IF NECESSARY IN COURSE
OF OPERATIONS AGAINST KURDS. ARAM SAID IRAN GOVT WOULD PROBABLY
CLOSE ITS EYES SHOULD IRAQI PLANES CROSS FRONTIER BUT THAT IT
COULD NOT RPT NOT OFFICIALLY GIVE PERMISSION TO DO THIS AND
THEREFORE WOULD NOT RPT NOT ANSWER IRAQI REQUEST ONE WAY OR
OTHER.

ARAM SAID GOI VERY DISTURBED OVER IRAQI-KURDISH PROBLEM.
ON ONE HAND IRAN RECOGNIZED DANGERS FOR ITSELF IN AN AUTONOMOUS
IRAQI KURDISTAN AND WOULD NOT RPT NOT WISH SEE THIS ESTABLISHED?
ON OTHER HAND IRAN TRADITIONALLY SYMPATHETIC TO KURDS AND
WOULD NOT RPT NOT WISH SEE THEM EXTERMINATED IN IRAQ. GOI
HAD CONSIDERED POSSIBILITY OF OFFERING MEDIATE BETWEEN IRAQI
GOVT AND KURDS BUT THEY DECIDED AGAINST THIS, BELIEVING IRAQI
GOVT WOULD REJECT AS INTERFERENCE IN WHAT IT CONSIDERED A
PURELY DOMESTIC MATTER. ARAM HOPED "SOMEONE ELSE" WOULD SUCCEED
IN PROVIDING MEDIATION IN ORDER PREVENT LOSS OF MANY LIVES
IN PROTRACTED STRUGGLE.

ARAM SAID JALAL TALABANI HAD NOT RPT NOT AS YET MADE APPLICATION
FOR PERMISSION RETURN IRAQI KURDISTAN VIA IRAN.

SCP-4.

BAP

ROCKWELL

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OFFICE SYMBOL: [Signature]	DIRECTIONS TO RM/R: [Signature]

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Authority NND 938522

By SE NARA Date 11/18/05

ORIGIN ACTION

NEA-5 35

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAM

Pol 13-3 IRAQ

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INT LAB TAR

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ARMY CIA NAVY 5 10 5

OSD USIA NSA 15 8 3

A-1190

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HANDLING INDICATOR

TO : DEPARTMENT OF STATE

1963 JUN 23 PM 1 04

INFO : BASRA

REMAN
ANALYSIS & DISTRIBUTION
BRANCH

FROM : Amembassy, BAGHDAD

DATE: June 20, 1963

SUBJECT: Property of Kurds and Their Supporters Seized

REF :

Property of sixty-two Kurds and their supporters was seized by two orders, Nos. 65 and 66, of the DG of Confiscated Properties published on June 18, 1963.

Included in the lists were the names of such prominent Kurdish leaders as Mulla Mustafa al-Barzani and Jalal al-Talabani. Thirty-nine of the names listed were of military rank, including four lieutenant colonels, five majors, and two captains.

For the Charge d'Affaires a.i.:

William C. Lakeland
William C. Lakeland
First Secretary of Embassy

Enclosure: att 1

List of names whose property has been confiscated.

FORM 4-62 DS-323

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Drafted by: *WMLord:mlh:6/18/63*

Contents and Classification Approved by:

Clearances:

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NEA/NE/Al Kielgore

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Authority *NNO 938522*

By *SE* NARA Date *11/18/05*

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Page 1, Enclosure 1
Airgram No. A-1190
Baghdad, Iraq.

List of those whose property was confiscated by Orders No. 65 and 66
of the DG of Confiscated Property, published in al-Tali'a, June 18, 1963

Major 'Abd al-Amin al-Rubai'i
1st Lt. Karim Jasim
Major Musa Kadhim al-Jaburi
Lt. (Reserve Medical Doctor) Fa'iq al-Alusi
Lt. Col. Ibrahim al-Ghazali
Lt. Col. Khalil Ibrahim al-'Ali
Lt. Col. Sa'id Kadhim Matar
Staff Maj. Mahmud Sami 'Abd al-Shukur
Staff Maj. Aribi Farhan
Maj. (Medical Doctor) Hikmat Hakim
Lt. (Res. Medical Doctor) Hasan Muhammad Kadhim
Kadha Ahmad Kamal
Lt. Jamal Qadir
Warrant Officer Abdullah al-Shaikh Mahmud
Lt. Subhi Muhammad Ali
Lt. Tahir Ali Wali
(Ret.) Warrant Officer Jamal Mahmud
Lt. Isma'il Qadir
1st Lt. Karim Shallal
Lt. Rahman Kamil al-Khaza'i
Lt. Tariq Muhi al-Din
Lt. Mahdi Kadhim al-Khaffaji
Warrant Officer 'Adnan 'Abd al-Amir
Warrant Officer Muhammad Sa'id Akram
Warrant Officer Tahir Shaikh Ra'uf
Lt. Khalid Shams al-Din
Captain Sa'id Sulaiman
1st Lt. Nadhim Muhammad al-Sa'di
Lt. Nuh Ali al-Rubai'i
1st Lt. Qahtan Muhammad Nuri
1st Lt. Yusuf Butrus
Rashid al-Haj Badri
Fu'ad 'Umr Sa'id (Warrant Officer)
Mustafa al-Barzani
Lawyer 'Umr Mustafa
Lawyer Jalal al-Talabani
Abdullah Isma'il
Salih Abdullah al-Yusufi

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Page 2, Enclosure 1
Airgram No. A-1190
Baghdad, Iraq.

Teacher Jalal Abd al-Rahman
Ali Hamdi
Dr. Murad 'Aziz
Major Muhammad Amin Faraj
1st Lt. Nawzad Salih Khushnawi
Lt. 'Aziz al-Atrushi
Hilmi Ali Sharif
Lt. Col. Sayyid 'Aziz 'Abdullah
Isma'il 'Arif
Teacher Ahmad Abdullah 'Amawi
Lawyer Ibrahim Ahmad
Engineer Ali Abdullah
Engineer Nuri Sadiq Shawish
Abd al-Husain Ali
Muhammad Hasa Baruz
Ali Abdullah al-'Askari
Nahida al-Shaikh Salam
Captain Kamal al-Mufti
Lt. Anwar Shairwan
Res. Lt. 'Umr Karim
Police Asst. Kamal Shaikh Ghuraib
Major (Ret.) Nuri Ahmad Taha
Muhammad Haj Tahir
Teacher Hashim 'Aqrawi

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Authority <u>NND 938522</u>
By <u>SC</u> NARA Date <u>11/18/05</u>

75

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

PERMANENT RECORD COPY

34
Action

CONFIDENTIAL

Control: 15601
Rec'd: JUNE 19, 1963
8:24 AM

NEA
Info

FROM: TEHRAN

SS

TO: Secretary of State

SR

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NO: 1123, JUNE 19.

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ACTION DEPARTMENT 1123 INFORMATION ANKARA 128 BAGHDAD 95
LONDON 211.

INFORMATION GIVEN ME JUNE 19 BY UNDERSECRETARY OF FORMINISTRY REGARDING IRANIAN POLICY TOWARDS KURDISH PROBLEM IN IRAQ REVEALS CERTAIN HARDENING OF THAT POLICY WITHIN FRAMEWORK OF CONTINUING AMBIVALENCE. MASUD-ANSARI SAID GOI HAD DECIDED KURDISH REVOLT WAS INTERNAL IRAQI MATTER AND THAT IRAN SHOULD NOT COME INVOLVED IN IT. ACCORDINGLY, ORDERS HAD BEEN SENT TO IRANIAN FRONTIER AUTHORITIES TO TAKE MEASURES TO ENSURE THAT THERE WOULD NOT BE "SUCH CONTINUING COMING AND GOING" ACROSS THE BORDER. THIS STEP HAD BEEN TAKEN IN ORDER TO REMOVE BASIS FOR AN IMPRESSION ON PART OF IRAQI GOVT THAT WIDESPREAD ASSISTANCE WAS COMING TO IRAQI KURDS FROM IRANIAN KURDISTAN. AT SAME TIME, MASUD-ANSARI SAID, IN VIEW OF FACT THAT KURDISH REVOLT WAS INTERNAL IRAQI MATTER, IRAN DID NOT WISH APPEAR PUBLICLY TO BE INTERVENING ON SIDE OF GOVERNMENT AGAINST KURDS AND, THEREFORE, NO PUBLICITY WOULD BE GIVEN TO TIGHTENING UP IRANIAN BORDER AND NO PUBLIC STANCE IN SUPPORT OF IRAQI GOVT WOULD BE TAKEN BY GOI.

SCP-4.

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HL-H

Microfilm by 10/1/63

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NAME OF OFFICER: <i>M. S. G. T. I.</i>	DATE OF ACTION: <i>6/19/63</i>	
OFFICE SYMBOL: <i>M. S. G. T. I.</i>		

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Authority NND 938522
By SC-NARA Date 11/18/05

ORIGIN/ACTION

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAM

POL 26 IRAQ

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HANDLING INDICATOR

TO : DEPARTMENT OF STATE

INFO : AMMAN, ANKARA, BASRA, BEIRUT, CAIRO, DAMASCUS, JIDDA, KUWAIT, LONDON, TAIZ, TEHRAN, TEL AVIV

1963 JUN 21 10 19 20

ANALYSIS & DISTRIBUTION BRANCH

FROM : Amembassy, BAGHDAD

DATE: June 18, 1963

SUBJECT : Approximate Positions Kurds and Government Immediately Before Open Hostilities Commenced; First reported Government Action

REF :

Although the Kurds stopped fighting the government immediately after the February 8, 1963 revolution and shortly thereafter released Arab prisoners captured during the revolt against Qasim, they were never fully convinced that the government intended to negotiate seriously with them and Kurdistan was the scene of considerable activity during the four month lull in fighting. The Kurds tried to lay in supplies and to entrench themselves in the mountains while the government tried to reestablish its authority throughout the area.

There were minor clashes between Arabs and Kurds during this jockeying for position, but neither side took concerted measures to alter the status quo in substantial fashion. According to Kurdish sources the Kurds controlled most of Kurdistan north east of a line from Khanaqin to Shaqlawa and thence to Zakho (see enclosed map) but with strong government forces stationed in Sulaimaniya, Darbandi Khan, Halabja and Zakho. The Kurds claim support of the inhabitants of the remainder of Kurdistan but admitted they could not act openly against the government's military forces stationed there.

Although the government's recent action against the Kurds was apparently carefully planned to take place before the grain could be harvested in the north and no single act can be cited as sparking the revolt, the government's attempts on June 8 to send heavily armored

GROUP 3

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FORM DS-323

Drafted by: JEA

JEAkins:mlh:6/14/63

Contents and Classification Approved by:

Clearances:

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NND 938522

By SC-NARA Date 11/18/05

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Page 2, Airgram No. A-1176
Baghdad, Iraq

columns to Azmir from Sulaimaniya and to Rawanduz through Gali Ali Beg which were blocked by Kurds, can conveniently be taken as the date for resumed fighting.

Details of military action since this time are not readily available as few Kurds are returning to Baghdad from the north. One traveler returning from Halabja has reported that in the Sulaimaniya-Halabja region the government has started the systematic destruction of all villages, is killing all live-stock it cannot remove, and is burning wheat fields throughout the Sulaimaniya plain.

According to IPC employees, the government has razed the Kurdish inhabited sarifa areas around Kirkuk and has ^{completing} the destruction of all Kurdish villages within a twenty-five kilometer radius of Kirkuk. The government has also started the ~~aerial~~ bombing of villages in Kurdish held territory. There are unconfirmed reports that these operations have been accompanied by great loss of civilian life and while such stories may be exaggerated, it can be assumed that the actions were not bloodless.

The press has spoken of the remarkable lack of Kurdish resistance and is confident that the revolt will be crushed in the next few days. It should be remarked that the government's land actions so far have been largely limited to flat areas, and that the real test will come with the "mopping-up" of the mountains.

Destruction of villages in the plains, along with their animals and grain, will however, place a heavy burden on rebels who will be forced to feed larger numbers of persons from decreased food supplies.

For the Charge d'Affaires, a.i.:

William C. Lakeland
William C. Lakeland
First Secretary of Embassy

Enclosure:

Government and Kurdish Positions on June 8, 1963.

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INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

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Control: 25055

Rec'd: JUNE 28, 1963
11:16 AM

Action
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FROM: CAIRO

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TO: Secretary of State

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NO: 2473, JUNE 28

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ACTION DEPARTMENT 2473, INFORMATION BAGHDAD 164, DAMASCUS 194

IN REGULAR WEEKLY ARTICLE JUNE 28 HAIKAL SETS FORTH UAR
POSITION ON KURDISH QUESTION.

FIRST PART OF ARTICLE IS EXTENDED CRITICISM OF DEP PM
SAADI FOR HAVING ALLEGEDLY SAID UAR PRESS "SERVES INTERESTS
OF IMPERIALISM". HAIKAL DEALS WITH SAADI IN PATRONIZING TONE
SAYING HE TOO YOUNG AND INEXPERIENCED TO REMEMBER THAT EGYPTIAN
PRESS WAS PRINCIPAL FORCE BRINGING ABOUT "DOWNFALL OF BAGHDAD
PACT". HAIKAL CLAIMS THAT TAPE RECORDING OF ALLEGED ANTI-GOI
KURDISH LANGUAGE BROADCAST FROM CAIRO, PRESENTED BY GOI TO UAR
EMBASSY BAGHDAD AND SENT TO CAIRO, WAS PROVED TO BE FORGERY UPON
BEING EXAMINED BY LATEST ELECTRONIC APPARATUS.

HAIKAL GOES ON TO ESTABLISH THAT BOTH IN OFFICIAL COMMUNIQUE
AND PERSONAL ASSURANCES CONVEYED TO NASSER BAGHDAD REGIME
RECOGNIZED KURDS AS SEPARATE NATIONALITY ENTITLED SOME FORM OF
SELF-RULE. HAIKAL THEN SUMMARIZES UAR POSITION (1) UAR IS
AGAINST ANY SECESSIONIST MOVEMENT (2) UAR WILL SUPPORT ANY SOLUTION
THROUGH NEGOTIATIONS (3) KURDS MAY NOT REALIZE IMPLICATIONS THEIR
DEMAND FOR AUTONOMY; UAR COMMENDS TO THEIR ATTENTION UAR OWN
EXPERIENCE IN "LOCAL RULE" WHICH PROBABLY CLOSER TO WHAT KURDS
MEAN (4) UAR WISHES SEE QUESTION PEACEFULLY SETTLED IN MANNER
PRESERVING ABSOLUTE UNITY OF IRAQI HOMELAND.

HAIKAL THEN TAKES PAINS EXPLAIN CAIRO DID ITS BEST TO HELP
MATTERS TOWARD NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT. ON ASSUMPTION GOI ACTING
IN GOOD FAITH UAR AGREED PROVIDE GOI ARMS, AMMO AND TECHNICIANS TO
REPAIR AIRCRAFT DAMAGED DURING FEBRUARY COUP. CAIRO'S MOTIVES IN
HOPING FOR PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT WERE AS FOLLOWS (1) EVEN IF GOI WON
MILITARY VICTORY OVER KURDS THIS WOULD NOT BE POLITICAL SOLUTION
(2) GOI SHOULD AVOID HOSTILITIES TO ERASE "SANGUINARY" IMAGE CREATED

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NAME OF OFFICER	DATE OF ACTION		
OFFICE SYMBOL: <i>RRB:rrd</i>			

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Authority: *NND 938522*

By: *SC-NARA* Date: *11/18/05*

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-2- 2473, JUNE 28, FROM CAIRO

BY FEBRUARY COUP (3) IRAQ'S INTEREST NOT TO IMPAIR ITS RELATIONS WITH-USSR (4) "CERTAIN IMPERIALIST ELEMENTS" WOULD BE HAPPY SEE GOI EMBROILED KURDISH WAR HOPING FOR DOWNFALL REGIME AND REPLACEMENT BY ONE WHICH OIL INTERESTS WILL HAVE EASY TIME DEALING WITH.

HAIKAL SAYS, RATHER SOURLY, THAT FIRST GUAR KNEW ABOUT GOI DECISION RESUME HOSTILITIES AGAINST KURDS WAS WHEN IT APPEARED IN PAPERS.

BRUNT OF HAIKAL PIECE SEEMS TO BE THAT IRRITATED AS GUAR MAY BE WITH BAATHI REGIME FOR HAVING ACTED UNWISELY AND IN BAD FAITH IN KURDISH QUESTION, UAR'S PRINCIPLES DO NOT PERMIT IT TO SUPPORT "SECESSIONIST MOVEMENT" SIMPLY IN ORDER TO SPITE BAATH.

BADEAU

HLN

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Authority <u>NND 938522</u>
By <u>SC</u> NARA Date <u>11/18/05</u>

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAM

POL 13-3 IRAQ

NEA

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A-1168 MESSAGE CENTER NO.

XR 500 14-1 IRAQ

HANDLING INDICATOR

TO : DEPARTMENT OF STATE
1963 JUN 17 AM 8 36

INFO : AMMAN BASRA BEIRUT CAIRO DAMASCUS JIDDA KUWAIT LONDON
TAIZ TEHRAN TEL AVIV

FROM : Amembassy BAGHDAD

DATE June 13, 1963

SUBJECT: Iraqi Government Releases Its Proposals for Decentralization in Iraq and Kurdish Demands

REF : A-1079, May 21, 1963; A-1011, April 30, 1963

SOL 14-1 IRAQ

POL 13-3 IRAQ

The Iraqi Government released on June 10 the text of its proposals for solving the Kurdish problem through administrative decentralization of the cities only (A-1079). The Iraq News Agency translation is enclosed.

The INA translation of the Kurdish demands released by the government at the same time is essentially the same as that submitted with A-1011. The enclosure to A-1011 can now be declassified.

For the Charge d'Affaires, a.i.

James E. Akins

James E. Akins
Second Secretary of Embassy

Enclosure: att

Iraq Government Decentralization Proposals

FORM 4-62 DS-323

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Drafted by:

JEAKins:ems:6/12/63

Contents and Classification Approved by:

Clearances:

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Authority NND 938522
By SC-NARA Date 11/18/05

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Page 1, Enclosure 1
Airgram No. A-1168
Baghdad, Iraq

Government's Proposal for Solving Kurdish Problem
Thru Administrative Decentralization of Iraq

PREAMBLE

1 --In fulfillment of the interim statement issued by the National Council of the Revolutionary Command on March 15, 1963, the system of decentralization means dividing Iraq administratively into provinces (muhafadhats) each enjoying a sufficient degree of freedom of work in running its own affairs under the supervision of the Government.

THE "MUHAFADHA" (province)

2 --The muhafadha is an administrative unit the frontiers of which are defined by a law and which will take the name of its centre--see Appendix 1. It is composed of one liwa or more--each liwa being composed of qadhas, each qadha of nahiya and each nahiya of a number of villages.

THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE MUHAFADHA

3 --A. Each muhafadha and its sub-units starting from village, will be run by government officials and elected councils to be named as follows: the village council, the nahiya council, the qadha council, the liwa council and the muhafadha council.

B. The number of the members of each council and the way of electing them will be defined by a regulation. This regulation will specify the officials who, by the nature of their posts, will automatically be members of these councils.


ADMINISTRATION OF THE CENTRE OF MUHAFADHA

4 --The administrative system at the centre will be composed of:

A. The governor who will be appointed by a Republican Decree and who will be responsible to the government for all the affairs of his muhafadha. By the nature of his post, he will be the head of the council of the muhafadha.

B. The council of the muhafadha. This will be composed (see 3.B above) of:

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Baghdad, Iraq

- I Members elected by direct secret ballot.
- II Appointed members selected by the authority and appointed by a Republican Decree.
- III Heads of departments at the centre of the muhafadha will be considered as natural members of the council provided their number, together with the appointed, does not exceed one third the number of the elected members.

C. The executive council. This is composed of heads of departments at the centre of the muhafadha. Its members and president are appointed by a resolution passed by the Council of Ministers. The vice president is elected by the members of the council.

THE DISTRIBUTION OF POWERS

THE COUNCIL OF THE MUHAFADHA

5 --A. The council of the muhafadha is a moral personality which has the right to administer movable and immovable properties and assets. Its properties and assets are considered as belonging to the state.

B. The council of the muhafadha will interest itself in the following affairs and will exercise powers through a law:

- I Education.
- II Municipal and rural affairs.
- III Development affairs, housing and communications.
- IV Supply and trade.
- V Health Affairs.
- VI Labor and social affairs.
- VII Agricultural and Irrigation.


(For the above see Appendix 2).

C. The council is, generally speaking, responsible for the administration of the governorate and for ensuring that the various administrative organs are discharging their duties most efficiently and in complete harmony with the policy of the Government.

D. The council empowered to issue "local regulations" in accordance with the lines specified in the law--these regulations being subject to

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Baghdad, Iraq

approval by the competent minister.

E. The council shall approve the annual budgets of the local administrations as well as the budget of the muhafadha and present them to the government for endorsement.

F. The council shall prepare and present to the ministers concerned proposals on development projects which are of importance for the betterment of the conditions of the muhafadha.

G. The council shall lay down an internal system for its meetings, mechanism and records.

THE EXECUTIVE COUNCIL

6.--This council is given the following powers:

A. To put into effect the resolutions passed by the council of the muhafadha unless these had been vetoed by the competent minister.

B. To put into effect the laws, regulations and instructions passed by the government.

C. The executive council shall assume the power and competence of the council of muhafadha during any period when the latter is non-existent.

D. This council is empowered to transfer officials--other than the members of the executive council--within the boundaries of the muhafadha.

E. It is also empowered to appoint officials and employees up to a certain grade to be specified by a regulation.

F. The council is empowered to prepare the budget of the muhafadha and the local draft regulations and to organize the muhafadha's accounts and hold them ready for checking.

FINANCIAL REVENUES

7 --The revenues of the muhafadha are composed of:

A. The remaining half of the net government revenues accruing from estate tax.

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By	SC-NARA Date 11/18/05

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Baghdad, Iraq

B. The second half of the petrol duties.

C. Agenda to the estates and consumption taxes and the municipal duties as fixed by the government provided this did not exceed one quarter of the origin.

D. The special grants offered by the central treasury.

E. Bridges and ferries charges.

F. Any share of the state revenues earmarked by the government in the form of a special law.

G. A share to be fixed by the central government from the death tax covering properties situated in the muhafadha together with the grants and bequests of heirless persons.

H. Loans.

I. Allocations set aside in the state budget for the local administration.

EXPENDITURE

8 --The expenditure of the Decentralized Administration shall include the following:

A. The salaries and allowances of the officials and employees of the decentralization administration and the allocations made to its departments.

B. The remunerations of the members of the council of muhafadha.

C. All expenses required by the services falling within the competence of the decentralized administration assigned to it under the existing laws and regulations.

GENERAL RULES

9 --The Council of Ministers is empowered to issue general directives to be complied with by the council of muhafadha. In the event of not compliance, the council of minister is empowered to suspend, veto or amend any resolution passed by the council of the muhafadha. The Council of Ministers is also empowered to withdraw any authority or line of competence from the council of muhafadha for this purpose.

10--The results of the local administration Law No. 16 of 1945 will remain valid unless they clash with the new muhafadhas administration law.

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By	SC NARA Date 11/18/08

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Baghdad, Iraq

APPENDIX I

1. The muhafadhas.

Iraq is to be divided into the following muhafadhas:

A. The muhafadha of Mosul with Mosul as its center. This muhafadha comprises the Liwa of Mosul.

B. The muhafadha of Kirkuk with Kirkuk as its center. This muhafadha comprises the Liwa of Kirkuk minus the Qadha of Chamchamal.

C. The muhafadha of Sulaimaniya with Sulaimaniya as its center. This muhafadha comprises the Liwa of Arbil, the Liwa of Sulaimaniya (plus the Qadha of Chamchamal) and the Liwa of Dahoak which comprises the qadhas of Zakho, Dohak, Amadiya, Aqra and Zibar of the Liwa of Mosul.

D. The muhafadha of Baghdad with Baghdad as its center. This muhafadha comprises the Liwas of Baghdad, Ramadi, Diyala and Kut.

E. The muhafadha of Hilla with Hilla as its center. This comprises the liwas of Kiwaniya and Kerbala.

F. The muhafadha of Basra with Basra as its center. This comprises the liwas of Basra, Nassiriya and Amara.

2. The Kurdish Language.

A. The Arabic and the Kurdish languages shall both be considered as the official languages in the muhafadha of Sulaimaniya.

B. The Kurdish language shall be the school language for the primary and its intermediate stages of education. The Arabic language shall be taught as a second language.

C. The Arabic language shall be the language used for the secondary stage of education.

APPENDIX 2 - A schedule of the powers of the Council of Muhafadha.

Education

1. Building and maintaining primary, intermediate and secondary schools as well as primary teachers training instituties, vocational, technical and industrial schools, running them and supervising them in accordance to the rules of law.

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Baghdad, Iraq

2. Establishing and maintaining public libraries and reading rooms.
3. Establishing and maintaining boarding sections for students of both sexes.
4. Establishing and maintaining textbooks and stationary stores.
5. Granting school subsidies.
6. Organizing the general policy cultural activities.
7. Organizing public exhibitions and art shows.
8. Stimulating physical education.

Agricultural and Irrigation Affairs

1. Meeting the requirement of the agrarian reforms plan in accordance to the rules of law.
2. Carrying out irrigation and drainage work as well as flood control work.
3. Handling the affairs of cooperatives.
4. Handling the affairs of agricultural loans.
5. Supplying the peasants with seeds, machinery, fertilizers and other services and forms of aid.
6. Handling the agricultural affairs and meeting their requirements for scientific methods as well as undertaking projects conducive to the growth of agriculture.
7. Promoting animal wealth.
8. Handling the affairs of agricultural extension.
9. Establishing chambers of agriculture as well as farms, experimental and model stations and stores for agricultural machinery.
10. Planting and preserving forests and pasture lands.

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Baghdad, Iraq

11. Improving crop yields and protecting plants from pests and other plant diseases.

12. Organizing agricultural statistics.

Public Health

1. Undertaking preventive work and rendering medical services.

2. Caring for maternity and childhood.

3. Building, maintaining and running hospitals, clinics, health centers and mobile clinics and rendering first-aid services.

4. Establishing and running health schools for dressers, nurses, health officials and other persons engaged in health services.

5. Providing adequate supply of drugs and supervising the marketing of drugs in accordance to the rules of law.

Labor and Social Affairs

1. Executing the laws and regulations of labor.

2. Social security.

3. Building and administering asylums and charity establishments.

4. Executing census laws and regulations.

5. Organizing statistics on living affairs and undertaking social researches.

6. Social care centers.

7. Establishing, supplying and running employment bureaus, supervising the affairs of workers and issuing financial subsidies and grants to them.

Development Affairs, Housing and Communications

1. Executing housing projects, building and maintaining houses and distributing them under lease or by sale.

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2. Constructing, maintaining and running public buildings and utilities.
3. Draining swampy areas.
4. Building and maintaining roads and ferries except where this is undertaken by the Ministry of Communications or the Ministry of Municipalities.
5. Establishing and running the Passenger Transport Services in the muhafadha whether inside its towns or between these towns.
6. River transport projects.
7. Running and organizing the projects of water, electricity and gas.

Municipal and Rural Affairs

1. Endorsing the budgets of municipalities and village councils and approving their affairs.
2. Deciding on the levying of municipal duties as specified in the municipalities duties law in respect to each municipality in the muhafadha, altering the rate or discontinuing them altogether.
3. Supervising the functioning of municipal and village councils as well as municipal and village affairs in general.

Trade and Supply


1. Establishing chambers of commerce and holding fairs and market places.
2. Providing essential commodities to the consuming public and ensuring their smooth distribution.

Industry

1. Encouraging local industries and working to develop and promote them.
2. Holding industrial fairs.
3. Encouraging the tapping of the local natural riches.

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AIRGRAM

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

POL 26 IRAQ

POL 13-3 IRAQ
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HANDLING INDICATOR

TO : DEPARTMENT OF STATE

FROM : Amembassy BAGHDAD

DATE: June 13, 1963

SUBJECT: Translations of National Council's Statement and Deputy Prime Minister al-Saadi's Press Conference on Kurdish Revolt

REF :

There are enclosed two copies of the Iraq News Agency translations of the "Notification Issued by the National Council of the Revolutionary Command" and the press conference of Deputy Prime Minister Ali Salah al-Saadi, giving the government's position on the renewal of the Kurdish revolt.

The theme of both is that the government has made every effort to reach a peaceful solution to the Kurdish problem but Mulla Mustafa, who has constantly provoked the Army, demands the division of Iraq and this cannot be tolerated.

For the Charge d'Affaires, a.i.

William C. Lakeland
William C. Lakeland
First Secretary of Embassy

Enclosures: *2*

1. NCRC's Notification
2. Press Conference of al-Saadi

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Drafted by: *W.C. Lakeland*
4-62 DS-323
Trans:ems:6/13/62

Contents and Classification Approved by:

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By *SC* NARA Date *11/18/05*

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By SC NARA Date 11/18/05

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Department of State PERMANENT RECORD COPY

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FROM: TEHRAN

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 1102, JUNE 12, 4 PM

PRIORITY

ACTION DEPARTMENT 1102, INFORMATION BAGHDAD PRIORITY 92,
ANKARA PRIORITY 126, LONDON PRIORITY 109.

REF: DEPCIRTEL 2121 EMBTEL 1100 INFO ANKARA 125 LONDON 108; AND
SINCE REPT. BAGHDAD 90 BAGHDAD'S 866 TO DEPT; 167 ANKARA
282 LONDON 201. TEHRAN.

IN LIGHT BOTH SITUATION IN IRAQ AND ATTITUDE IRANIAN GOVERNMENT
I BELIEVE IT WOULD BE CERTAINLY FRUITLESS AND PROBABLY INADVISABLE
MAKE APPEAL TO IRANIAN GOVERNMENT MENTIONED REFERENCE CIRCULAR.

SCP-4.

HOLMES

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KR POC 13-3 TR49

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NAME OF OFFICER <i>M. J. J. J.</i>	OFFICE SYMBOL: <i>1102</i>		

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Authority *NND 938522*

By *SC* NARA Date *11/18/05*

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
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POL 13-3 IRAQ

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HANDLING INDICATOR

NO. 1963 JUN 17 AM 8 37
TO : DEPARTMENT OF STATE 1963 JUN 14 AM 9 43
INFO : AMMAN, BASRA, BEIRUT, CAIRO, DAMASCUS, JIDDA, KUWAIT,
LONDON, TEHRAN, TAIZ
FROM : Amembassy, BAGHDAD
SUBJECT : Kurdish Reply to Iraqi Diplomat's Statements
REF :
DATE: June 10, 1963
ANALYSIS & DISTRIBUTION
BRANCH

The Iraqi Charge in Beirut, Nadhim Jawad was recently quoted by Lisan al-Hal, Beirut daily, as saying that most of the Kurdish tribes in Iraq reject Mulla Mustafa's demands for the establishment of a separate Kurdish state; that they will fight both government and Mulla Mustafa if the government agrees to Mulla Mustafa's demands and that most Kurds support the Iraqi governments proposal to give the Kurds a "sort of autonomy." He said Mulla Mustafa represents "only one tribe and a few other individuals."

Shortly thereafter, the acting head of the Kurdish delegation in Baghdad, Salah Abdullah Yusufi issued a mimeographed statement in reply to Jawad. Although the statement was distributed widely in Baghdad it was, of course, not printed in the local papers nor, has it appeared, apparently, in any papers outside Iraq.

Yusufi described the Kurdish revolution as one which started against Qasim's tyranny and developed into "the widest and deepest revolutionary movement in the contemporary history of the Kurdish people." He said the movement, "led by Mulla Mustafa al-Barzani and the Kurdistan Democratic Party", far from being emanating from one tribe is "supported by the overwhelming majority of the Kurdish people" and it "enjoys the

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Drafted by: JEAkins:mlh:6/10/63

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Clearances:

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By SE-NARA Date 11/18/05

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Page 2, Airgram No. A-1155
Baghdad, Iraq


sympathy and support of progressive and nationalist forces both in the Arab world and in the world at large." He described those who oppose Mulla Mustafa as a small group of "mercenaries who have disowned their nationality and have been isolated from the Kurdish people."

Yusufi said the Kurds have never demanded secession or the formation of a Kurdish government and that those fair-minded persons "who have examined their demands do not find anything in them which bears any relation to the declaration of the Iraqi Charge in Beirut."

Yusufi asked what "sort of autonomy" the Iraqi government was supposed to have offered the Kurds and said the only official Iraqi statement on the subject was that made by the National Council for the Revolutionary Command which "granted the national rights to the Kurdish people on the basis of de-centralization." He added that this "de-centralization has not yet been defined."

Yusufi concluded his statement with an expression of belief "that Sayid Nadhim Jawad's declarations do not express the views of the Iraqi government on the Kurdish issue."

For the Charge d'Affaires a.i.:


James E. Akins
Second Secretary of Embassy

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By SP-NARA Date 11/18/05

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TR	XMB	AIR
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ARMY	CIA	NAVY
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OSD	USIA	NSA
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAM

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A-1129 CONFIDENTIALPOL 13-3 IRAQ
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TO DEPARTMENT OF STATE ANALYSIS & DISTRIBUTION
INFO : BASRA

HANDLING INDICATOR

FROM : Amembassy, BAGHDAD

DATE: June 4, 1963

SUBJECT : New Mutasarrif of Kirkuk Favors Strong Stand Toward Kurds

REF :

In conversation with two Embassy Officers on May 28, 1963, the new Mutasarrif of Kirkuk, Dr. Fu'ad Shakir Mustafa, indicated that he favors taking a strong stand against the Kurds should they prove "un-cooperative." If the Kurds were willing to cooperate with the Government, there would not be trouble with them, he said, but he added carefully and with considerable feeling, "We Arabs know very well where the boundaries of our Arab homeland lie. We mean to maintain those boundaries. We will not give up any land to foreigners (i.e. the Kurds). If the Kurds do not cooperate, it will be the Government's duty to fight them and crush them in order to preserve its entity."

As Mutasarrif of Kirkuk, Dr. Mustafa, who was appointed to this post in early May, faces most serious security problems in the protection of the IPC oil fields and installations, should the Kurdish war be resumed. Shortly after his appointment, orders were issued by the Military Governor General for the Northern Area, making the Kirkuk Airport, oil fields and installations, and certain ammunition stores areas prohibited military zones (Emb A-1088, 21 May 63). The order may have originated at the suggestion of the new Mutasarrif. In any case, he can be counted on by the Government to take a firm hand in Kirkuk security affairs.

For the Charge d'Affaires, a.i.:

William C. Lakeland
William C. Lakeland
First Secretary of Embassy

GROUP 3

L Downgraded at 12-year intervals,
not automatically declassified.

FORM 4-62 DS-323

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☒ In ☐ OutDrafted by: *NJL* Lord: mlh:6/4/63

Contents and Classification Approved by:

Clearances:

No action necessary
NEA/NE/A/Kielgace

RM/R
File

DECLASSIFIED

Authority *NND 938522*By *SE* NARA Date *11/18/05*

ORIGIN/ACTION		
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RM/R	REP	AF
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ARA	EUR	FE
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RM/S	S/S	S/P
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AGR	COM	FRB
INT	LAB	TAR
TR	XMB	AIR
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ARMY	CIA	NAVY
5	10	5
DSD	USIA	NSA
15	8	3
		NSC
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AIRGRAM

POL 13-3 IRAQ
XR CSM 9 IRAQ
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A-1130 MESSAGE CENTER ^{NEA} ^{1963 JUN 8 AM 8 55} ^{CONFIDENTIAL}

TO : DEPARTMENT OF STATE
1963 JUN 10 AM 8 57
INFO : ANKARA, BASRA, CAIRO, DAMASCUS, LONDON, TEHRAN

FROM : Amembassy, BAGHDAD

DATE: June 4, 1963

SUBJECT: Reports of Communists Refuge and Communists Influence in Kurdistan Denied

REF : Embtel 729, May 4, 1963
Tua

There are widespread rumors in Baghdad that many Arab Communists have fled to the north and taken refuge with the Kurds. The government has done nothing to discourage these stories; indeed they were relayed to our Charge by Foreign Minister Shabib on May 3 (Embtel 729).

On a recent trip to northern Iraq, Embassy Officers had long and quite cordial talks with the Mudir Nahiya (mayor) of Darbendi Khan, the Director General of Security and the acting Mutasarrif (governor) of Sulaimaniya province. The reports were mentioned in the course of the conversation and all three officials denied them. They said that shortly after the February 8 revolution, some communists had tried to come to the north but had been fought in three places by Mulla Mustafa. In one of the encounters, 42 communists were killed. The acting Mutasarrif said that the communists who were captured by Mulla Mustafa were delivered to the government but the Security Director did not know if this was true.

Although none of the three men was favorably disposed to the Kurdish movement, all said that the communists now had very little influence among the Kurds. The Security director said they had none at all.

For the Charge d'Affaires, a.i.:

William C. Lakeland
William C. Lakeland
First Secretary of Embassy

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Drafted by:

AK
AK:mlh:6/4/63

Contents and Classification Approved by:

Clearances:

no action necessary
NEA/NE/NI/Killgore

RM/R
File

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 938522
By *SC* NARA Date *11/18/05*

ORIGIN/ACTION

NEA-5

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAM

POL IRAQ

XR POL 13-3 IRAQ

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A-1162

UNCLASSIFIED

AIR POUCH

NO.

HANDLING INDICATOR

TO : DEPARTMENT OF STATE

INFO : BAGHDAD CAIRO

FROM : AmEmbassy BEIRUT

DATE: May 22, 1963

SUBJECT: Iraqi Charge Says Majority of Kurds Oppose Barazani

REF :

The Iraqi Charge d'Affaires in Beirut, Nazim Jawad, reportedly told the press on May 18 that the majority of Iraqi Kurds do not support Mullah Mustapha Barazani's demands for a Kurdish state. Jawad, who is a brother of Minister of State Hazim Jawad, said that the majority of the Kurdish tribes support the Iraqi Government's proposals for decentralization and their leaders have declared themselves ready to take up arms against Barazani if he opposes the Government's plan. Jawad said that the Mullah represents only his own tribe and affirmed that the Mullah's brother Ahmed had broken with him and had come out in support of the Government's plan.

Comment: Jawad was apparently moved to make the above comments by the appearance in Beirut in mid-May of Kurdish nationalist negotiator Jalal Talabani, on his way to Cairo reportedly for talks with Nasser. Talabani reportedly departed Beirut for Cairo on May 18.

For the Ambassador:

Richard B. Parker

Richard B. Parker
First Secretary of Embassy

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☒ In ☐ Out

FORM DS-323

Drafted by:

POL:DKorn:wdj 5/20/63

Clearances:

Contents and Classification Approved by:

Mr. Parker

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NND 938522

By SE-NARA Date 11/18/08

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Department of State PERMANENT RECORD COPY

30-48
Action

SECRET

Control: 15752
Rec'd: MAY 20, 1963
12:27 PM

NEA
Info

FROM: TEHRAN

SS

TO: Secretary of State

SR

NO: 1013, MAY 20, 6 PM.

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ACTION DEPARTMENT 1013, INFORMATION BAGHDAD PRIORITY 74; ANKARA 107, LONDON 91.

REF: EMBTEL 1003 TO DEPT INFO ANKARA 104 BAGHDAD 72 LONDON 89.

FOREIGN MINISTER CALLED BRITISH AMBASSADOR AND ME TO FOREIGN OFFICE TOGETHER THIS MORNING. HE SAID THAT SHAH HAD INSTRUCTED HIM TO CONSULT WITH US JOINTLY WITH REGARD TO KURDISH PROBLEM IN IRAQ. ARAM RPT ARAM MADE IT CLEAR THAT WHAT HE HAD TO SAY WAS IN NO SENSE A PROPOSAL BUT AN INFORMAL CONSULTATION. HE SAID THAT SHAH HAD COME TO CONCLUSION THAT BEST INTERESTS OF IRAN WOULD BE SERVED BY AGREEMENT BETWEEN BAGHDAD GOVERNMENT AND IRAQI KURDS AND THOUGHT THAT IRAN SHOULD TAKE STEPS TO HELP BRING THIS ABOUT. HE FELT ALSO THAT SYMPATHY SHOULD BE EXPRESSED WITH THE KURDS BECAUSE OF THEIR RACIAL AND CULTURAL AFFINITY WITH IRAN.

BOTH WRIGHT AND I SAID THAT IT WOULD BE A VERY GOOD IDEA FOR IRAN TO URGE BOTH THE BAGHDAD GOVERNMENT AND IRAQI KURDS TO COME TO AN AGREEMENT AS SUCH A SETTLEMENT WOULD CLEARLY BE IN THE INTEREST OF EVERYBODY CONCERNED AND REMINDED FONMIN THAT BOTH OUR GOVERNMENTS HAD ALREADY MADE SUCH REPRESENTATIONS. WE BOTH SUGGESTED THAT IT PROBABLY WOULD BE UNWISE TO GO TOO FAR IN EXPRESSING SYMPATHY AND AFFINITY WITH THE KURDS AS TO DO SO WOULD AROUSE IRAQI'S SUSPICION AND MIGHT LAY THE SHAH OPEN TO ACCUSATIONS BY SOVIET AND EGYPTIAN PROPAGANDA THAT IRAN HAD DESIGNS ON IRAQI TERRITORY. WE BOTH SUGGESTED THAT ANY IRANIAN APPROACH TO BAGHDAD GOVT AND KURDS URGING THEM TO REACH AGREEMENT SHOULD BE BASED ON THE OBVIOUS FACT THAT A

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Authority NND 938522

By SC-NARA Date 11/18/05

W I T H D R A W A L N O T I C E

RG: 059

TAB #: 16

ENTRY: 1963

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BOX: 3944

ACCESS RESTRICTED

The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:

Folder Title: POL 13 NON-PARTY BLOCS IRAQ

Document Date: 18/05/63

TEL 1008

FR TEHRAN

TO SECSTATE

In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains:

X Security-Classified Information

NND: 939536

WITHDRAWN: 01/25/94 by: HOSKINS

FOIA RETRIEVAL #: 939536 03944 00016


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Department of State

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39
Action
NEA

CONFIDENTIAL

Control: 14971
Rec'd: May 18, 1963
9:42 a.m.

Info

FROM: Baghdad

SS

TO: Secretary of State

SR

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NO: 782, May 18, 3 p.m.

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PRIORITY

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ACTION DEPARTMENT 782, INFORMATION ANKARA 150, LONDON
256, TEHRAN 182, BASRA, TABRIZ, TAIZ UNNUMBERED

INR

RMR

Reference EMBTEL 772

KDP representative told Embassy officer May 17 that government appointed committee scheduled meet May 18 to study Kurds demands, government's proposals (text being pouched) and Ali Haidar Sulaiman's compromise suggestions. (Reference Embassy A-986, Apr. 23, 1963) said KDP hoped Government would begin actual negotiations shortly after Talabani's return from Cairo May 20 or 21.

Ali Haidar confirmed to Embassy officer May 18 that first meeting would include only Government group, which charged by Council of Ministers to study various proposals with view finding solution to Kurdish problem. He said obviously no solution could be reached without contact between government committee and Kurdish representatives. Hence he envisages such contact developing in near future. - possibly through naming of sub-committee for liaison with Kurds. Fact emerges, however, that GOI has not yet really committed itself to negotiations in true sense. Sulaiman remains very pessimistic about prospects of getting Government committee to take realistic view of problem which could lead to successful negotiation. He intends try his best get both sides moving toward compromise but he finds situation hopeless will leave for Washington. SCP-3.

CONFIDENTIAL

MELBOURNE

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OFFICE SYMBOL		

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Authority *NND 938522*By *SC* NARA Date *11/18/08*

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Department of State

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39

SECRET

Action
NEA

Control: 15009
Rec'd: MAY 18, 1963
10:53 AM

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FROM: TEHRAN

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 1003, MAY 18.

PRIORITY

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ACTION DEPARTMENT 1003, INFORMATION BAGHDAD PRIORITY 72, ANKARA
PRIORITY 104, LONDON PRIORITY 89.

DEPTEL 823

MEETING US AND UK DCM'S WITH UNDERSECRETARY FOREIGN MINISTRY
TOOK PLACE MAY 18. PHILLIPS REPORTED ON RECENT DEMARCHE
OF UK AMBASSADOR BAGHDAD TO IRAQI FOR MIN CONCERNING
KURDISH SITUATION. AMBASSADOR REFERRED TO UK CONCERN OVER
IPC INSTALLATION IN NORTH IN EVENT NEW OUTBREAK HOSTILITIES
BETWEEN GOP AND KURDS. URGED UPON FOR MIN THAT GOI MAKE
EVERY EFFORT REACH PEACEFUL AGREEMENT WITH KURDS. FOR MIN
REFERRED TO WHAT HE TERMED UNREASONABLE DEMANDS OF KURDS AND
MENTIONED POSSIBILITY OF APPROACH OTHER THAN PEACEFUL ONE
TO RESOLUTION OF PROBLEM. AMBASSADOR THEN SAID HE HOPED
GOI WOULD REFLECT LONG AND CAREFULLY BEFORE DECIDING UPON
COURSE OF WAR WHICH WOULD BRING SUCH SERIOUS REPERCUSSIONS
FOR ALL CONCERNED.

ROCKWELL GAVE ANALYSIS NE SITUATION CONTAINED DEPTEL 819
TO TEHRAN AND REPORTED MEETING BETWEEN MINISTERIAL COMMITTEE
AND KURDISH DELEGATION SCHEDULED FOR MAY 18 (BAGHDAD 772 TO
DEPT). SAID THAT IN VIEW URGENT NECESSITY ATTEMPT PREVENT
RESUMPTION HOSTILITIES IN IRAQ, USG HOPED IRANIAN GOVT
WOULD SEE FIT INSTRUCT ITS REPRESENTATIVE BAGHDAD URGE
IRAQI GOVT MAKE EVERY EFFORT REACH NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT
WITH KURDS. POINTED TO PREVIOUS US AND UK EFFORTS IN SAME
DIRECTION AND SAID BELIEVED ADDITION OF IRANIAN INFLUENCE
MIGHT PROVE VERY HELPFUL.

ANSARI APPEARED RECEIVE SUGGESTION WITH FAVOR BUT
MADE NO COMMITMENT RE POSSIBLE ACTION DURING MEETING

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NAME OF OFFICER: [Signature]	DATE OF ACTION: 5/20/63
OFFICE SYMBOL: [Signature]	DIRECTIONS TO RM/R: [Signature]

TEHRAN-1003

POL 26 IRAQ

POL 13-3 IRAQ

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By SC-NARA Date 11/18/05

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Action

Control: 11185

NEA

Rec'd: MAY 15, 1963
7:47 AM

Info

FROM: TEHRAN

SS.

TO: Secretary of State

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NO: 992, MAY 15, 2 PM

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ACTION DEPARTMENT 992, INFORMATION BAGHDAD 71, ANKARA 202, LONDON 7

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REF DEPTEL 826 TEHRAN 392 BAGHDAD 1060 ANKARA 6013 LONDON

WE ESTIMATE MEDIATION WILL HAVE GOOD CHANCE SUCCESS ONLY WHEN,
AFTER RENEWED FIGHTING, MILITARY STALEMATE HAS BEEN REACHED IN
WHICH NEITHER SIDE SEES ADVANTAGE CONTINUATION HOSTILITIES.UNDER SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES DO NOT RPT NOT NOW RPT NOW BELIEVE
IRANIAN GOVT WOULD STRONGLY OPPOSE MEDIATION. HOWEVER, SEEMS
ALMOST IMPOSSIBLE TO US NOW RPT NOW TO ENVISAGE CIRCUMSTANCES
WHICH WOULD exist INTERNATIONALLY IN THE EVENT DESCRIBED.WHATEVER THESE MIGHT BE, SEEMS UNLIKELY MEDIATOR FROM THIS AREA
WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE BOTH SIDES.AS TO AEGIS RPT AEGIS, OUR ONLY COMMENT IS THAT UN MIGHT BE
OPPOSED ALMOST AS MUCH BY IRANIANS AS BY IRAQIS ON GROUNDS THIS
WOULD GIVE A POWERFUL FILLIP TO KURDISH ASPIRATIONS AUTONOMY
OR EVEN INDEPENDENCE. SCP-3, HOLMES

COPY 112 destroyed, 11/2

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RECEIVED BY 11/2

1963 MAY 15 AM 10 22

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Authority NND 938522

By SC-NARA Date 11/18/05

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CONFIDENTIAL

Control: 7028
Rec'd: May 9, 1983
2:20 p.m.

FROM: Tehran

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 978, May 9, 3 p.m.

ACTION DEPARTMENT 978, INFORMATION ANKARA 101, BAGHDAD 70,
LONDON 86, PARIS 47

Reference: Embassy Telegram 904 To Department, Ankara 91,
Baghdad 64, London 83, Paris 46

Foreign Minister told me this morning that decision not to send special military representative to Baghdad for discussions about Iranian "cooperation" in the event of resumption fighting with Kurds remains valid. However, instructions have been sent to Iranian Embassy Baghdad for Military Attache to make inquiry as to what Iraqis mean by "cooperation." Attache is to inquire and listen only.

GOI continues to worry about relations with Iraq. Aram said that just as they are reaching the point where closer contact could be established, something happens to set efforts back such as the Iraqi press attack on Iran and Shah (Embassy telegram 955 to Department). Part of this, of course, is Shah's personal annoyance.

Foreign Minister said that he informed Iraq will soon ask for agreement for Ambassador replacing original nominee who was withdrawn. He said that as soon as this request is received, he will forward credentials to Iranian charge in Baghdad for whom agreement as Ambassador has already been granted by Iraq.

I took advantage of opportunity again to impress on Aram the advantage

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By SE-NARA Date 11/18/05

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Department of State

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39
Action

SECRET

Control: 3804
Rec'd: MAY 6, 1963
1:24 PM

NEA
Info

FROM: TEHRAN

SS
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TO: Secretary of State

NO: 960, MAY 6, 5 PM

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ACTION DEPARTMENT 960, INFORMATION LONDON 85, ANKARA 100,
BAGHDAD 69,

DEPTEL 800

WE BELIEVE THAT SUGGESTED APPROACH IRANIAN GOVERNMENT WOULD BE WORTH TRYING BUT PROBABLY WOULD NOT BE PARTICULARLY PRODUCTIVE IN VIEW OF CURRENT HIGH LEVEL IRANIAN UNWILLINGNESS TO COME DOWN ON EITHER SIDE OF IRAQI-KURDISH CONTROVERSY. IN VIEW OF PROBLEMS POSED FOR IRANIAN BY IRAQI-KURDISH SITUATION, IRANIAN GOVERNMENT HAS APPARENTLY DECIDED THAT BEST POLICY FOR IT IS ONE OF WATCHFUL WAITING WITHOUT A MAJOR COMPROMISE OF ITS POSITION. SUGGESTED APPROACH WOULD PROBABLY BE REGARDED BY IRANIAN AS COMING DOWN MORE CLEARLY ON SIDE OF IRAQI GOVERNMENT THAN THEY PRESENTLY DO, AND WOULD ALSO BE IN CONTRADICTION OF THEIR POLICY OF EXTENDING LIMITED ASSISTANCE TO THE KURDISH REBELS.

WE CERTAINLY SEE NO HARM IN MAKING THE PROPOSED APPROACH AND, AFTER CONCERTING WITH THE BRITISH HERE, SUGGEST THAT BEST WAY TO DO THIS WOULD BE FOR US AND UK TO TAKE THIS LINE TOGETHER IN NEXT MEETING OF INFORMAL COMMITTEE SET UP WITH UNDERSECRETARY OF FOREIGN MINISTRY TO DISCUSS ARAB DEVELOPMENTS. NO ACTION WILL BE TAKEN UNTIL DEPT'S FURTHER INSTRUCTIONS RECEIVED.

SINCE WRITING ABOVE HAVE SEEN BAGHDAD'S 730 TO THE DEPT. AND 172 TO TEHRAN. AGREE COMPLETELY IRANIAN ATTITUDE AMBIVALENT AND THAT PROBABLY LITTLE OF VALUE WILL COME OUT OF APPROACH TO IRANIAN AS SUGGESTED REF DEPTEL.

SCP-3

HOLMES

JTC

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By SC NARA Date 11/18/05

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30-48

SECRET

Action

Control: 479

Rec'd: MAY 1, 1968

12:26 PM

NEA

Info

FROM: BAGHDAD

SS

TO: Secretary of State

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NO: 716, MAY 1, 2 PM

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PRIORITY

ACTION DEPARTMENT 716, INFORMATION ANKARA 133, DAMASCUS 190, LONDON 234, TEHRAN 163, BASRA, ALEPPO, PARIS, TABRIZ UNNUMBERED.

POLICY

EMBTLS 715, 695, 593; A-1011

UNLESS GOI DOES MAKE SERIOUS COUNTER-PROPOSALS TO KURDISH DEMANDS - AND EVIDENCE POINTS TO DELIBERATE STALLING - EARLY RESUMPTION OF REVOLT APPEARS VERY LIKELY. DESPITE USG URGING, AT NO POINT HAS THERE BEEN ANY LOWERING OF BARRIER OF MUTUAL SUSPICION AS WITNESSED BY MANEUVERING ON BOTH SIDES TO GAIN VANTAGE POSITIONS IN EVENT OUTBREAK OF FIGHTING. BOTH HAVE CONTINUED AT ODDS ON PRINCIPLE, EXEMPLIFIED BY KURDISH INSISTENCE ON DECENTRALIZED OR AUTONOMOUS RULE AND BY FOREIGN MINISTER'S EARLY STATEMENT TO ME TO EFFECT GOI COULD NOT GRANT KURDS SUCH CONTROL OF LOCAL AFFAIRS AS TO INFRINGE NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY OR TO RAISE COMPARABLE DEMANDS ELSEWHERE IN COUNTRY (EMBTLS 593). KURDS HAVE PRESENTED COMPREHENSIVE PROPOSALS TO GOI (EMBTLS 695; A-1011) AND HAVE SAID THESE AS INITIAL STEP IN BARGAINING WERE SUBJECT TO NEGOTIATION. YET THEIR SWEEPING NATURE, FROM GOI PERSPECTIVE, MAY WELL HAVE STRENGTHENED HARD LINE OF REGIME'S REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL.

KURDS THROUGH FORCE OF CHARACTER AND AS RESULT HASHEMITE POLICY HAVE HITHERTO PLAYED ROLE IN IRAQI LIFE MORE SUBSTANTIVE THAN THEIR NUMBERS. YET QASIM REGIME'S HANDLING FORGED PRESENT LEGACY OF KURDISH SOLIDARITY IN COMMON POLITICAL CAUSE UNDER MUSTAFA BARZANI, WHO ADMITTED BY OTHER KURDISH LEADERS TO BE

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NAME OF OFFICER: A. Keelgare	DATE OF ACTION	file

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13-3 IRAQ

Pol 13-3 IRAQ

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Authority NND 932522

By SE NARA Date 11/18/05

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INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

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CONFIDENTIAL

Action

Control: 24615

SS

Rec'd: May 31, 1963

Info

FROM: Cairo

4:36 a.m.

TO: Secretary of State

001

NO: 2132, May 29, 5 p.m.

Cairo 8/32

ACTION DEPARTMENT 2132, INFORMATION BAGHDAD 147.

Department Circular telegram 2015

Embassy officer discussed Kurdish problem today with Nasser confidant Heykal. Heykal said that when Nasser first met Kurdish members of Iraqi delegation last February, he had been impressed with them and thought they were entitled to acceptance of some of their demands. Based on UAR experiences in Yemen, Nasser also believed resumption of guerrilla warfare with Kurds would be a disaster for fledgling Iraqi Government. UAR had so informed Iraqi Government and recommended full and frank talks between both sides. UAR still taking this line with Iraqis but unfortunately, no response. To contrary when Iraqis were here for unity talks in April, they asked Nasser to assign air unit to assist in military operations against Kurds. Iraqis argued that Kurds should be made to feel "full might of new United Arab Republic". Nasser adamantly refused. Iraqis then asked individual members of UAR air force mission when in Iraq to undertake reconnaissance operations against Kurds. Nasser then used uproar created by last month's Jordan crisis as excuse for recalling UAR air mission.

Doc 13-3 Iraq

HR Doc Iraq-UAR

Comment: Embassy officer came away with impression there is some genuine UAR sympathy with Kurds. Also we would not rule out possibility, if relations between UAR and Iraq continue deteriorate, that UAR might seek exploit Arab-Kurdish hostilities in Iraq. SCP-3.

BADEAU

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Authority NND 938522
By SC-NARA Date 11/18/05

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

This document consists of 4 pages

No. 1 of 9 Copies, Series A

(60)

Memorandum

SECRET

TO : NEA - Mr. Talbot

DATE: May 13, 1963

FROM : GTI - John W. Bowling

SUBJECT: Iranian Policies toward the Kurdish Movement

Set forth below are certain considerations regarding the Kurdish problem which appear to be important from the admittedly parochial GTI viewpoint. The Kurdish problem, and our attitudes toward it, must of course be based very heavily on U.S. interests with relation to the Arab world and the USSR. GTI is not capable of providing any complete answers to the problem, but we do wish to avoid the taking of major decisions based entirely on U.S. interests in the Arab states, and therefore are presenting these GTI aspects of the problem.

We heartily endorse the wisdom of U.S. actions to prevent the outbreak of hostilities between the Kurds and the Government of Iraq. A peaceful settlement between Baghdad and the Kurds is without any doubt the best possible outcome for the near future, provided that we do not have to sacrifice vital interests to obtain such a result, and it does not appear that vital interests will have to be sacrificed in the establishment of U.S. policies to maximize the chances for a peaceful settlement. Hostilities would increase the possibility of Nasserite domination of Iraq, of communist domination of Iraq, and of Soviet control over the Kurdish movement. All these things would be bad for GTI. The Turks are no problem in this respect, unless a situation should arise wherein the Turks could persuade the Iraqis not to agree to a solution giving the Kurds a reasonable measure of autonomy. This situation is unlikely. We agree that Iran should continue to be urged not to incite hostilities, either by word or deed.

A question arises as to what Iranian posture would minimize the outbreak of hostilities. One school of thought here appears to hold that the Iranians should be heavily pressured by the U.S. to come to positive agreement with Baghdad, as the Turks have, to mount a major effort to close the border tightly, and to display a solidly hostile attitude toward the Kurds. While we agree that we should do everything possible to keep the Iranians from launching a campaign of massive moral or material support for the Kurds, which would doubtless hasten an outbreak of hostilities, we doubt that Iran's lining up openly with Baghdad would actually contribute to a peaceful solution. We do not believe that Mulla Mustafa and his supporters are going to roll over and die rather than seek and accept Soviet support. We believe that they do not want Soviet support, but that they can get it if they are willing to pay the price, and that they would be willing to pay the price if the alternative

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NEA: JTI: J. J. Bowling

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Whereas UAR motivations in respect of Kurdish issue not rpt not entirely clear, Department believes might be useful explore further points made by Ghaleb to Turkish Charge. Dept leaves to your discretion whether soundings best handled directly or indirectly (e.g., through Turkish Charge). Effort might be made pin Ghaleb down on UAR intentions vis-a-vis Iran, specifically whether UAR willing make appropriate moves mend fences and restore relations. Latter would appear prerequisite to discussion of Request concerting policies on Kurdish question. / ~~Appropriate~~ Cairo's evaluation of Ghaleb's approach in relation Talabani visit and appraisal UAR intentions re Kurdish problem generally.

SCP-3.

END

ACTING

BALL

Drafted by:

NEA:NE:J Barrow:es:5/22/63

Telegraphic transmission and

classification approved by:

NEA - Phillips Talbot

Clearances:

NE - Mr. Strong
GTI - Mr. Miklos (draft)
SOV - Mr. Anderson (draft)

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TO: Secretary of State

NO: 3018, MAY 29, 6 PM

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SUMMARIZED BELOW IS WIDE-RANGING CONVERSATION I HAD WITH UAR AMB GHALEB ON MAY 28.

1. KURDISH QUESTION. GHALEB FEELS MAY 6 PRAVDA ARTICLE ON IRAQI KURDS VERY SIGNIFICANT. IN HIS RECOLLECTION, THIS IS FIRST TIME SOVIETS REFERRED TO OIL IN MOSUL REGION AS KURDISH OIL. GHALEB BELIEVES ARTICLE PROVIDES BASE FOR SOVIET EXPLOITATION OF KURDISH ISSUE. HE EXPRESSED OPINION SOVIETS ARE ADVISING BATTERED IRAQI COMMUNISTS TO MOVE INTO KURDISH AREAS, ESPECIALLY MOSUL REGION, WHERE THEY WOULD SEEK TO ENLIST SUPPORT OF KURDS IN A NATIONAL FRONT MOVEMENT. NEVERTHELESS, HE THINKS SOVIETS WILL MOVE CAREFULLY IN HANDLING KURDISH QUESTION. THIS CAUTION APPEARS REFLECTED IN THEIR GENERAL CHARACTERIZATION OF KURDISH MOVEMENT AT THIS STAGE AS A DEMOCRATIC MOVEMENT RATHER THAN A NATIONAL LIBERATION MOVEMENT.

2. TURKEY AND IRAN. BOTH TURKEY AND IRAN, GHALEB SAID, VERY NERVOUS ABOUT KURDISH QUESTION AND HE UNDERSTANDS BOTH GOVERNMENTS HAVE MADE REPRESENTATIONS TO SOVIETS ON THIS ISSUE. UAR-TURKISH RELATIONS ARE GOOD AND VIEWS HAVE BEEN EXCHANGED ABOUT REACHING A COMMON UNDERSTANDING ON KURDISH QUESTION.

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GHALEB, HOWEVER, TOOK HOSTILE ATTITUDE TOWARD SHAH, ASSERTING SHAH'S REGIME FULL OF CORRUPTION. UAR HAD SPLIT WITH IRAN IN PART BECAUSE OF IRAN'S DEALINGS WITH ISRAEL. GHALEB LEFT IMPRESSION HE SAW NO PROSPECT FOR RECONCILIATION BETWEEN UAR AND IRAN AT THIS TIME AND TENOR OF HIS REMARKS SEEMED INDICATE UAR WOULD NOT TAKE ANY INITIATIVE TOWARD IMPROVING RELATIONS WITH SHAH'S REGIME. I GATHERED THAT, IF THERE IS TO BE ANY UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN UAR, TURKEY AND IRAN ON COMMON POLICIES ON KURDISH QUESTIONS, THIS COULD ONLY COME ABOUT AS RESULT BILATERAL DISCUSSIONS INVOLVING UAR AND TURKEY ON ONE HAND AND TURKEY AND IRAN ON OTHER.

3. ALI SABRI VISIT. GHALEB CONFIRMED INFORMATION REPORTED EMBTEL 2922, EMPHASIZING THAT KHRUSHCHEV "ABSOLUTELY VIOLENT" ON SUPPRESSION OF COMMUNISTS BY IRAQI AND SYRIAN REGIMES. GHALEB NOTED THAT WHILE UAR NOT DIRECTLY ATTACKED BY KHRUSHCHEV OR IN SOVIET PRESS, EGYPTIANS HAVE BEEN SUBJECT OF OBLIQUE CRITICISMS, MENTIONING IN THIS CONNECTION CRITICAL SOVIET REVIEW OF HAIKAL'S BOOK ON "THIRD WAY".

4. UAR-SOVIET RELATION. GHALEB INFORMED ME THAT IZVESTIYA EDITOR ADZHUBEI, HIS WIFE, AND TWO CHILDREN WILL BE LEAVING FOR CAIRO MAY 31. ACCORDING TO GHALEB, VICE PRESIDENT AMER'S VISIT TO USSR WAS DIRECT RESULT OF KHRUSHCHEV'S INQUIRY ABOUT "HIS FRIEND" AMER DURING MEETING WITH ALI SABRI. KHRUSHCHEV SAID SINCE ADZHUBEI GOING TO UAR ON FRIENDLY VISIT, AMER MIGHT COME TO SOVIET UNION "TO VISIT ME". EGYPTIANS, GHALEB SAID, BIT RELUCTANT ABOUT SENDING AMER SINCE HIS PREVIOUS VISITS (LAST BEING IN 1960) GENERALLY ASSOCIATED WITH UAR-SOVIET DEALS. DESPITE HESITATION, HOWEVER, UAR DECIDED IT COULD NOT REFUSE INFORMAL INVITATION. GHALEB SAID NO AGENDA EXISTS FOR AMER VISIT AND ~~THERE~~ NOTHING SPECIFIC FROM UAR POINT OF VIEW TO BE RAISED BY AMER.

5. ARMS PAYMENTS. IN TOUCHING ON QUESTION OF ARMS, GHALEB SAID UAR PAYING HEAVILY FOR SOVIET ARMS SHIPMENTS, MENTIONING FIGURE OF 150 MILLION EGYPTIAN POUNDS ANNUALLY. GHALEB ADDED EVENTUAL

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TOTAL OVER 10-YEAR PERIOD WILL AMOUNT TO ONE BILLION EGYPTIAN POUNDS. HE SAID UAR PAYING IN WHAT AMOUNTED TO HARD FOREIGN EXCHANGE, I.E., COTTON.

6. UAR FEDERATION. GHALEB SAID HIS GOVERNMENT HAD FLATLY TOLD IRAQ AND SYRIA THAT UAR NOT INTERESTED IN IMPLEMENTING CAIRO DECLARATION UNTIL REGIMES IN THOSE COUNTRIES AGREE TO ESTABLISHMENT OF A NATIONAL FRONT. UAR BELIEVES THAT FAILURE TO ORGANIZE NATIONAL FRONT WOULD ONLY LEAVE WAY OPEN TO SERIES OF MILITARY COUP D'ETATS IN IRAQ AND SYRIA AND PROVIDE UNSTABLE BASIS FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF CAIRO DECLARATION.

7. SOVIET ATTITUDE ON ARAB UNITY. IN GHALEB'S VIEW, SOVIETS FEEL THEY HAVE TO PAY LIP-SERVICE TO IDEA OF ARAB UNITY BECAUSE OF BROAD APPEAL OF IDEA. FUNDAMENTALLY, HOWEVER, SOVIETS OPPOSE IDEA BECAUSE THIS WOULD OBSTRUCT SOVIET AIM OF KEEPING MIDDLE EAST FRAGMENTED AND IN CONDITION WHICH WOULD FACILITATE SOVIET ACQUISITION OF BASE OF OPERATIONS IN ONE COUNTRY AND EXPANDING FROM THERE. GHALEB SAID COMMUNIST TACTICS AND STRATEGY EMERGE CLEARLY IN BOOKS COMMUNISTS PUBLISHED IN IRAQ DURING QASIM REGIME UNDER SUCH TITLES AS "ARAB UNITY AND DEMOCRACY" OR "ARAB NATIONALISM AND DEMOCRACY". THESE PUBLICATIONS GENERALLY SIMILAR IN FORMAT. AFTER MAKING APPROPRIATE BOW TO ARAB UNITY FORMULA, PUBLICATIONS PROCEED TO DISCUSS CONTENT OF IDEA, SUGGESTING IT COULD ONLY BENEFIT COMMON MAN IF COMMUNIST IDEAS AT ITS CORE. UPSHOT OF THIS TREATMENT IS TO REVERSE ORDER OF PRIORITIES SUGGESTED IN TITLES, MAKING ATTAINMENT OF "DEMOCRACY" (I.E., COMMUNISM) FIRST PRIORITY AND ARAB UNITY LAST ITEM ON AGENDA. IN GHALEB'S OPINION, THERE IS CLOSE PARALLEL BETWEEN THESIS PRESENTED IN THESE PUBLICATIONS AND IN STALIN'S WORK ON "NATIONAL QUESTION".

8. ISRAEL. WHEN GHALEB QUESTIONED ME REGARDING US VIEW TOWARD ARAB UNITY, I ASSURED HIM THAT US DOES NOT OPPOSE CONCEPT SO LONG AS THIS HAS POPULAR CONSENT, IS NOT BROUGHT ABOUT BY FORCE, AND HAS POSITIVE PURPOSES. IN THIS CONNECTION, I NOTED US HAD ALWAYS TAKEN DIM VIEW OF OLD ARAB LEAGUE BECAUSE OF ITS

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UNMISTAKABLE HOSTILITY TOWARD ISRAEL. I SAID CAREFUL REVIEW OF US POLICY OVER YEARS WOULD INDICATE ITS CONSISTENCY AND THAT US NOT UNFRIENDLY TO ARABS. OBVIOUSLY, WE CONSIDERED ISRAEL HERE TO STAY AND COULD NOT ACCEPT ANY ARAB ATTEMPT TO LIQUIDATE HER. I REMINDED HIM OF PRETTY VIOLENT STATEMENTS SOMETIMES MADE ON THIS SUBJECT FROM ARAB SIDE. GHALEB SAID HE COULD CATEGORICALLY ASSURE ME THAT UAR WOULD NEVER TAKE INITIATIVE IN USING FORCE AGAINST ISRAEL. HE SAID HE BELIEVED EQUITABLE ARRANGEMENTS INVOLVING ISRAEL COULD EVENTUALLY BE ATTAINED BUT ONLY AFTER ARAB UNITY REGISTERED SOME PROGRESS. BASIC REASON FOR THIS ATTITUDE IS THAT EGYPTIANS AND ARABS IN GENERAL HAVE INFERIORITY COMPLEX ABOUT ISRAEL, RECOGNIZING THAT ISRAEL HAD ADVANCED POPULATION WITH MANY SKILLS. ONLY WHEN PROGRESS MADE ON ARAB UNITY COULD REASONABLE AND PEACEFUL SOLUTION AS TO HOW ISRAEL MIGHT LIVE IN PEACE WITH ITS NEIGHBORS BE WORKED OUT.

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27		1	FROM : Amembassy, BAGHDAD			DATE: 30 April 1963		
AGR	COM	FRB	SUBJECT : Kurdish Demands presented to Government of Iraq April 24					
INT	LAB	TAR	REF : Embtel 695					
TR	XMB	AIR						
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The Embassy's translation of the Kurdish demands presented to the Government of Iraq on April 24 is enclosed. The Kurds intended to use them (the document was summarized in Embtel 695) as the basis for negotiations with the Iraq government on the future of Kurdistan within Iraq. The Iraq government was to have presented counter-proposals during the April 24 meeting but did not do so.

For the Charge d'Affairs, a.i.:

William G. Lakeland
 William G. Lakeland
 First Secretary of Embassy

Enclosure: *att. att. w/*

Kurdish Demands Presented to Government of Iraq

GROUP 4
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FORM DS-323

FILED JUL 5 - 1963

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Drafted by: *JH*
 JH:mlh:4/27/63

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Page 1, Enclosure 1 A-1011
Baghdad, Iraq

Kurdish Demands Presented to Government of Iraq on April 24
as Basis for Negotiation on Future of Kurdistan

PREAMBLE

An Arab-Kurdish brotherhood, devoted to strengthening the firm relations and ties which have bound together the Arab and Kurdish peoples from the emergence of Islam to the present, and a sincere dedication to the coexistence of the Arabs and Kurds can only succeed if it is borne in mind that in working for affirmation of this coexistence on a strong and solid basis, we must learn from the truths of history. The best kind of tie between people is a voluntary brotherly union. It can develop, flourish and endure. On the contrary, forced amalgamation and absorption will result only in conflicts, problems, and enmity among peoples. Voluntary union is brotherly only if accomplished on a basis of complete and frank recognition of the rights of the coexisting nations, thereby enabling these nations to exercise their national democratic rights within the general entity of this union.

History has shown that a voluntary union of nations is stronger and firmer than forced annexations or absorptions. The former develops and grows while the latter fade away and die.

History also shows that the unity of a state based on voluntary union can be assured and will remain strong. It will develop, flourish, and remain stable. On the other hand, the unity of a state established on the basis of annexation or absorption remains puny, disjointed, and is doomed to collapse at any moment.

The truth about modern states is that national rule within the federal government, where brotherly nationalities exercise their rule in administering their particular political, economic, cultural, and social affairs, is the best guarantee of the permanence of voluntary union. This national rule is the very essence of union and forms its firm basis. There are before us many examples, such as Switzerland, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, the Indian Federation, and Nigeria, all of which achieved excellent voluntary unions with great benefit to all, even with regard to the unity of the state itself. Moreover, the benefits of this type of voluntary union are many and significant to a degree that kindred nations take it as the best kind of democracy. This is the case with the United Arab Republic whose establishment has been agreed upon by three Arab countries.

Thus the brotherly nationalities living under the auspices of a single state enjoy their national rights through their special legislative and executive councils, not only in harmony with the unity of the state, but in strengthening it and affirming it, and greatly invigorating its component parts.

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In the light of these above truths we may say that the acceptance by the Iraqi Government of this plan which we are herewith presenting in order to achieve the just national demands of the Kurdish people, and in dedication and sincerity to national unity for the Iraqi people, for whom we want strength, stability, and prosperity, will be an important contribution to the strengthening of real Iraqi unity and an affirmation of Arab-Kurdish brotherhood.

We hope that the present Iraqi Government will apply the principles of the ideology which its leaders have proclaimed - principles of the rights of peoples to self-determination and Arab-Kurdish brotherhood, and will agree to this plan.

TEXT OF KURDISH PROPOSALS

First: The Republic of Iraq is to be a united state composed of two principal nationalities, the Arabs and the Kurds, enjoying equal rights. Both have expressed their wishes on the basis of the right of self-determination.

Second: The Iraqi constitution is to include terms regarding the organization of the high legislative body of the Republic, the President of the Republic, and the Government. The constitution also is to include the organization of a national body which would permit the Kurdish people to exercise their national rights in legislative, executive, and judicial matters in the region of Kurdistan.

Third: The following matters would pertain to the central government:

1. Chief of State
2. Foreign Affairs, including:
 - a. diplomatic, consular, and commercial representation
 - b. international agreements and treaties
 - c. the United Nations
 - d. declaration of war and conclusion of peace
3. National defense (land, sea, and air forces)
4. Currency and its issue
5. Petroleum affairs
6. Customs
7. International ports and airports
8. Posts, telegraphs and telephones
9. Railroads and main roads
10. Citizenship matters
11. Organization of the national budget
12. Supervision of the central radio and television stations
13. Atomic energy

Fourth:

1. The Kurdish people will enjoy their national rights by means of an executive council derived from a legislative assembly elected by the inhabitants of Kurdistan in a direct, free and secret election.

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Baghdad, Iraq

2. The national (i.e., regional) government, in accordance with second article will be responsible for the following matters: justice, interior affairs, training and education, health, agriculture, tobacco, municipalities, labor, social affairs, development planning and summer resorts and all matters which pertain to raising the standard of living and social levels and the economic development, and all other matters which are not specifically allotted to the central government.

3. The legislative assembly through appropriate laws will exercise of the rights mentioned in paragraph 2 above. It will also elect the president of the executive council and will have the right to withdraw its confidence from him and from the members of the executive council.

4. The Executive Council will exercise executive powers in initiating pertinent national organizations provided for in paragraph 2 above, and on implementing laws which the legislative committee enacts and also laws and general orders issued by the central government in what pertain to its relations with Kurdistan. It will also appoint officials of the administrative organization and other departments in the region. It will be responsible to the legislative council for all its actions.


Fifth: The financing of the national ^{organization} in the region of Kurdistan will be from the following.

1. Local resources and taxes and dues payable in Kurdistan.
2. The Kurdistan share, in proportion to the number of inhabitants of Kurdistan to the total inhabitants of Iraq of
 - a. oil income
 - b. customs
 - c. airports
 - d. ports
 - e. money exchange and national banks
 - f. railroads
 - g. post and telegraph and telephones

After being subtracted from it the expenses of the

- a. presidency
 - b. defense
 - c. foreign affairs
 - d. experts
 - e. the expenses of the Ministries of Oil, PTT, and the Directorate of Summer Resorts in proportion to the number of its inhabitants of Iraq and the expenditures for railroads and public roads in proportion to their length in Kurdistan to the lengths in Iraq.
3. The Kurdistan share of foreign assistance and loans which the government receives will be in the same proportion.

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Baghdad, Iraq

4. Internal loans, non-military loans and aid which Kurdistan obtains.

5. Tobacco imports, resorts, and forests.

6. Kurdistan is to be considered as participating in proportion to the ratio of the number of its inhabitants to the (total) population of Iraq in the institutions, projects, and administrative departments concerned with the public interest.

Sixth: The region of Kurdistan is to be composed of the liwas of Sulaimaniya, Kirkuk, Arbil, and the Qadhas and Nahiyas in which the majority of inhabitants are Kurdish in the liwas of Mosul and Diyala.

Seventh: The Vice President of the Republic of Iraq is to be a Kurd whom the people of Kurdistan will elect in the way in which the President of the Republic is elected.

Eighth: The Constitution is to guarantee to the national entity for the region of Kurdistan cultural, social, and economic rights, and democratic and religious freedoms, for the minority groups of citizens such as Turkomen, Assyrians, Chaldeans, Armenians, and other religious sects and elements, including the guarantee of their complete equality in rights and duties with the member of the Arab and Kurdish nationalities. It will guarantee them representation in the legislative assemblies and executive councils, as well as the other bodies, in a just proportion.

GENERAL PROVISIONS

1. The Kurdish people will be represented in the Iraqi National Assembly by a number of deputies in the proportion of the population of Kurdistan to the population of Iraq.

2. The Kurdish people will have a number of ministers in the central cabinet in their same proportion.

3. The proportion of Kurdish officials in the relevant central ministries shall be this same proportion.

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Baghdad, Iraq

4. a) There will be admitted to Baghdad University and the higher Iraqi institutes a number of students from Kurdistan equivalent to the proportion of its population to that of Iraq.

b) The Government will annually send with the foreign missions, delegations and scholarship holders a number of students from Kurdistan equivalent to the proportion of its population to that of Iraq.

5. One of the assistant Chiefs of Staff of the Army shall be Kurdish.

6. The Iraqi Army shall retain its name; in case of a change in its name the Kurdish part of it shall be given the name "The Kurdistan Corps" and this corps shall include all of the soldiers, NCO's and officers in the Iraqi Army who are from Kurdistan.

7. The Sons of Kurdistan shall do their military service there. The officers and NCO's separated from the Iraqi Army for nationalist political activity shall be returned to the Army and shall be assigned to units of the Army stationed in Kurdistan.

8. A number of students from Kurdistan proportionate to the proportion of its population to that of Iraq is to be accepted by the military, police, staff, and air colleges and other military institutes.

9. It is the duty of the Central Government to send defending forces to the region of Kurdistan in case it is exposed to foreign attacks or there exists a real threat of foreign aggression against the Republic of Iraq. In other than these cases it must be with the agreement of the legislative and executive councils in Kurdistan, provided that the contents of this paragraph do not impede the Iraqi Army from its normal and reasonable training and leave.

10. The undertaking by the Iraqi Army of suppressive military movements inside Kurdistan will be by agreement with its legislative council or based on the report of the executive council.

11. Every legal provision is to be considered invalid whatever its source, if it is of a nature which limits the national, democratic rights of the Kurdish people or limits the scope for their enjoyment.

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Baghdad, Iraq

12. Martial law in Kurdistan, in cases other than the declaration of war or the existence of a real danger of foreign aggression, is to be proclaimed with the agreement of the legislative council.

13. One of present Kurdish ministers is to be entrusted with formation of the provisional executive council to exercise the authority of the council temporarily. Elections for the legislative council are to take place within a period not exceeding four months from the date of its (i.e. provisional council's) formation.

14. Effects of the oppressive rule are to be erased by just and prompt compensation of all those who suffered damages as a result of the War of Kurdistan within a period not exceeding four months.

15. In case of a change of Iraqi nationality to Arab nationality it will be specified in documents such as birth certificates and identity cards, and passports, that the bearer is a Kurdistani with the United Arab Republic if he is a citizen from the region of Kurdistan, and that he is a Kurd if he is of Kurdish origin.

16. If the Iraqi flag is changed, or the emblem of the Iraqi state is changes, there will be added to both a Kurdish symbol.

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Page 2, Airgram No. 986
Baghdad, Iraq

Kurds, enjoying equal rights.

5. Arrival at a just solution would put Arabs and Kurds in one rank working to achieve the country's aspirations for unity of the people, strengthening of Arab-Kurdish brotherhood, and progress in achieving sought-for goals of both in Arab policy aiming at unity.

6. Guarantee of the interests of the Kurdish nationality is a basic element in achieving unity of the country and positive harmony between the two nationalities based on mutual trust.

7. The State is to recognize that the Kurdish people have the right to develop their national character. In order to achieve this they are to be given the right to deal with matters which pertain to them as a people with a special character.

Ambassador Sulaiman then proposed the following Administrative arrangement for the Kurdish region:

1. A Council of Mutasarrifs of designated Liwas, to be headed by a commissioner of high rank. The council would organize and coordinate the area's administration and function as the executive apparatus for regional affairs plus such other functions as the Central Government entrusts to it.

2. A Department representing principal government agencies would be attached to the Council of Mutasarrifs to assist it in its work.

3. Councils for Liwa Administration would be elected in each Kurdish Liwa. These in turn would delegate a portion of their membership to form a Regional Council, whose functions in regional matters would be determined by legislation.

4. Heads of Departments should be proficient in the Kurdish language. Local employees (to a designated level) are to be either appointed by the Mutasarrifs, or nominated by the Mutasarrifs and agreed upon by the commissioner.

Heads of administrative units are to be appointed either by nomination of the Liwas, with the agreement of the commissioner, or by nomination of the latter with the agreement of the central

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authorities, according to their rank. Mutassarifs, judges, and officials whose work requires their appointment by central offices are exempted from this regulation.

5. The local police are to be under the regional administration.

6. The local administration is to handle such regional matters as agriculture, local industry, social affairs, village and town development, branch roads, afforestation, health services, smaller irrigation, water, electricity, and other projects.

7. Local teachers colleges and certain colleges are to be located in the Kurdish region, the colleges to form the nucleus of a regional university.

Sulaiman then proposed as measures to erase effects of past troubles: release of all prisoners by both sides; removal of government employees who contributed to the "bad situation"; return of teachers and other officials who were forcibly transferred to other parts of Iraq; estimation by experts of war damage to the villages followed by compensation for those who suffered damages to property; aid to refugees; a development plan for the region; no further troop movements or concentrations as the fighting is to be considered over; promise that Kurds will share in the Central Government in accordance with their percentage of Iraq's total population; similarly, the Kurdish region is to share in the National budget in accordance with the proportion of Kurds to Iraq's total population.

Roy M. Melbourne
Roy M. Melbourne
Charge d'Affaires, a.i.

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Authority	NND 938522
By	SC NARA Date 11/18/05

ORIGIN/ACTION			DEPARTMENT OF STATE		AIRGRAM		POL 3 UAR	
RM/R	REP	AF	A-983		CONFIDENTIAL		NO. 1263 APR 27 PM 2 41	
1	5	5	TO : DEPARTMENT OF STATE					
ARA	EUR	FE	INFO : ALEPPO, BASRA, BEIRUT, CAIRO, LONDON,					
NEA	CU	INR	DAMASCUS, ANKARA, TEHRAN					
E	P	IO	FROM : Amembassy, BAGHDAD				DATE: 23 APRIL 1963	
L	FBO	AIO	SUBJECT : Kurdish Memorandum to Iraqi Delegation to Cairo Unity Talks					
2			REF : Demands Kurdish Region if Iraq Enters UAR					
AGR	COM	FRB						
INT	LAB	TAR						
TR	XMB	AIR						
ARMY	CIA	NAVY						
5	10	5						
OSD	USIA	NSA						
15	8	3						

The enclosed memorandum dated April 8, 1963 from the Kurdish negotiating delegation now in Baghdad to the Iraqi delegation to the Cairo unity talks 1. demands Kurdish representation on the delegation to Cairo (they did not get this and the point is no longer relevant); 2. emphasizes that the Iraqi Kurds do not stand in the way of the Arab people in their desire to erect a new relationship with one another, but 3. warns that, while (a) Kurdish demands will be confined to implementation of the Government statement on decentralization, should the Iraqi entity continue as at present, nevertheless (b) the Kurds in Iraq will demand "autonomy as the word is commonly understood without reservation or restriction" if Iraq enters a federal union (ittihad federali), and (c) will demand to be a "region (iqlim) linked to the united state" should Iraq be "incorporated in a total unity (wahda kamila)".

As explained to Embassy officers by leaders of the Kurdish delegation in Baghdad, they consider the announced Cairo unity pact to fulfill the conditions of point (c) above, "incorporation in a total unity", and will therefore now put forward the demand that Iraqi Kurdistan become a region of the new UAR. They explained that point (b) above was intended to be a demand for autonomy should the Cairo unity negotiations result in a much looser "federal unity" than actually emerged in the unity pact (as understood by the Kurds

GROUP 1
Downgraded at 3-year intervals.
Declassified 12 years after
date of origin.

FORM 4-62 DS-323

CONFIDENTIAL

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Drafted by: JMLord:mlh:l/23/63

Clearances: RM:elpeurine, Charge d'Affaires, a.i.

Contents and Classification Approved by:

CONFIDENTIAL

Page 2, Airgram No. 983
Baghdad, Iraq

on the basis of the Cairo communique).

Reportedly, the Kurds did make a demand for such a Kurdish region in negotiations with Government Ministers which resumed with an hour-long session at Baghdad's Semiramis Hotel on the evening of April 20. The Government reportedly deferred discussion of the matter by saying that it would have to refer the matter back to the National Council of the Revolutionary Command. Meanwhile the Government asked the Kurds to prepare specific points on which negotiations may proceed. The Kurds are now doing so, and are expected to present these in the next few days, perhaps in a meeting on April 23. However, progress of the talks may be blocked if the Kurds continue to insist on regional autonomy for Iraqi Kurdistan.

For the Charge d'Affaires, a.i.:

Wm. C. Lakeland
William C. Lakeland
First Secretary of Embassy

as
Enclosure:

Translation of Kurdish Memorandum of April 8, 1963

CONFIDENTIAL

0 8 9 0

DECLASSIFIED
Authority <i>NND 938522</i>
By <i>SC</i> NARA Date <i>11/18/05</i>

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

ACTION COPY

PERMANENT RECORD COPY

37
Action

SECRET

Control: 13346
Rec'd: April 18, 1963
10:19

1963 APR 18 PM 12 59
MESSAGE CENTER
NEA

SS
Info

FROM: Ankara

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 1274, April 18, 3 p.m.

ACTION DEPARTMENT 1274, INFORMATION TEHRAN 155, BAGHDAD
53, MOSCOW 38, LONDON 177

LIMITED DISTRIBUTION S/S

British Ambassador, who previously informed re our approach to Foreign Minister Erkin re Kurds, told me yesterday he also had mentioned matter to Erkin April 13 but had done so in merely exploratory way indicating interest in knowing Turk views with view possible subsequent consultation. Erkin's response was practically identical with that given me and reported EMBTEL 1228.

SCP-3.

HARE

HMR/18

001 13-3 1699

FILED
JUL 31 1963
SECRET

SECRET

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ACTION	ASSIGNED TO.	NEA	ACTION	TAKEN	None
NAME OF OFFICER	Bowling - G. F.	DATE OF ACTION	April 19, 63	DIRECTIONS TO RM/R	File
OFFICE SYMBOL					

0 8 9 1

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 938522
By SC NARA Date 11/18/05

33
INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

ACTION COPY

PERMANENT RECORD COPY

30-48

SECRET

Action

Control: 8886

Rec'd: April 11, 1963

10:18 a.m.

SS

Info

FROM: Tehran

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 867, April 11, 5 p.m.

ACTION DEPARTMENT 867, INFORMATION ANKARA 85, BAGHDAD 60,
LONDON 79, MOSCOW 34, TABRIZ 94.

LIMIT DISTRIBUTION S/S

Reference: EMBTEL 853 Department information Ankara 84 Baghdad
58, Moscow 33, London 78, Tabriz unnumbered.

British Embassy has now received instructions from
London authorizing approach to Iranian Government re
Kurdish problem similar to that which US has made.
Embassy has decided make this approach to Foreign
Minister today.

SCP-3.

HOLMES

SGC

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ACTION ASSIGNED TO:	ACTION TAKEN	DATE OF ACTION	DIRECTIONS TO RM/R
NAME OF OFFICER & OFFICE SYMBOL		AUG 22 1963	file

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Authority NND 938522

By SF NARA Date 11/18/08

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

ACTION COPY

PERMANENT RECORD COPY

38

SECRET

Action

Control: 9104

Rec'd: APRIL 11 1963
1:03 PM

SS
Info

FROM: TEHRAN

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 869, APRIL 11, 7 PM.

MESSAGE CENTER
001
APR 11 PM 3 58

ACTION DEPARTMENT 869, INFORMATION ANKARA 86, BAGHDAD 61, LONDON 80, MOSCOW 35.

LIMIT DISTRIBUTION S/S

REF: EMBTEL 844 DEPT AND ANKARA 1228 TO DEPT INFO TEHRAN 150 BAGHDAD 51 LONDON 168 MOSCOW 35.

FONMIN RETURNED TO DUTY TODAY AFTER ABSENCE AND ILLNESS. I DISCUSSED IRAQI-KURDISH PROBLEM WITH HIM AT SOME LENGTH ALONG SAME LINES AS REPORTED IN EMBTEL 844. HIS RESPONSE TO THE FOUR POINTS WAS SUBSTANTIALLY THE SAME AS THAT OF ANSARI.

IN ADDITION, ARAM SAID THAT IRANIAN CHARGE BAGHDAD BEING APPROACHED BY IRAQIS ASKING IRAN'S "COOPERATION" IN THE EVENT OF THE RESUMPTION OF FIGHTING. HE SAID THAT HE WAS TRYING TO FIND OUT WHAT IRAQIS MEANT BY "COOPERATION" BUT THUS FAR HAD BEEN UNABLE TO DO SO BECAUSE OF THE ABSENCE OF MOST OF THE GOVT IN CAIRO. HE SAID THAT HE HAD DISCUSSED THIS MATTER WITH ERKIN DURING RECENT VISIT TO ANKARA IN WHICH HE HAD AGREED TO CLOSE CONSULTATION WITH TURKS BUT STATED THAT IRAN HAD NO RPT NO INTENTION OF MAKING FIRM COMMITMENTS TO IRAQIS. ARAM STATED THAT IN RESPONSE TO MY SUGGESTION HE HAD INSTRUCTED KHOSROVANI, NEW AMB TO TURKEY, TO KEEP IN CLOSE CONSULTATION WITH GOT ON THIS MATTER.

SCP-3

HOLMES

FILED
JUL 31 1963

WHC
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ACTION ASSIGNED TO: NEA	ACTION TAKEN: none	DIRECTIONS TO RM/R: File
NAME OF OFFICER: Bonny, LTF	DATE OF ACTION: April 12, 63	
OFFICE SYMBOL: Bony, LTF		

GPO 930 500

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 938522
By SC-NARA Date 11/18/05

ORIGIN/ACTION

NEA-5		
RM/R	REP	AF
1		
ARA	EUR	FE
NEA	CU	INR
		5
E	P	IO
L	FBO	AIO
AGR	COM	FRB
INT	LAB	TAR
TR	XMB	AIR
ARMY	CIA	NAVY
	10	
OSD	USIA	NSA
	8	3

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

44 **AIRGRAM**

POL 13-3 IRAQ

FOR RM USE ONLY

A-928 MESSAGE DECLASSIFIED

HANDLING INDICATOR

TO : DEPARTMENT OF STATE
1963 APR 16 AM 8 36

INFO : BASRA

1963 APR 15 AM 8 07

ANALYSIS & DISTRIBUTION
BRANCH

FROM : Amembassy, BAGHDAD

SUBJECT : New Peasants' Association Formed

REF :

DATE: 11 April 63

The Ministry of Interior announced on April 6 the formation of a provisional executive committee of the General Federation of Peasants' Association. A statement issued by the committee on April 8 reviewed the long record of oppression to which the Iraqi peasant has been subjected, but did not outline to committee's plans except for a brief mention of the possibility of forming a General Federation of Arab Peasants. The names of the committee members follow:

Husain Sayid Jabr	Chairman
Muhsin Sha'lan	Vice-Chairman
Husain Al-Jasim	Secretary
Karim Al-Jasim	Treasurer

Members: Ahmad Khalaf Khudhayr, Mutashar Muhsin, Shakir Abd Al-Samad, Ali Daham, Hasan Ibrahim, Yunis Shafiq, Muhsin Sayid Matar, Khalifa Jirjis, Daham Abdallah and Ibrahim Muhammad Ahmad.

For the Charge d'Affaires, a.i.:

James E. Akins
James E. Akins
Second Secretary of Embassy

UNCLASSIFIED

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In Out

Drafted by:

MDOWLING:mlh:l/11/63

Contents and Classification Approved by:

Clearances:

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NND 938522

By SC NARA Date 11/18/08

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

ACTION COPY

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42

SECRET

Action

SS

Info

FROM: ANKARA

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 1228, APRIL 9, 5 PM

Control: 7363

Rec'd: APRIL 10, 1963
2:57 AM

1

ACTION DEPARTMENT 1228; INFORMATION TEHRAN 150, BAGHDAD 51,
LONDON 168, MOSCOW 35

LIMIT DISTRIBUTION S/S

DEPARTMENT TELEGRAM 905 RE KURDS

DISCUSSED REFTEL FULLY WITH FONMIN ERKIN YESTERDAY WHO
EVINCED GREAT INTEREST AND EXPRESSED APPRECIATION OUR
SHARING VIEWS.ERKIN THEN RECALLED THAT GOT HAD OFFERED COOPERATE IN
PRINCIPLE WITH IRAQ ON KURD PROBLEM DURING KASSIM REGIME
BUT THERE HAD BEEN NO RESPONSE. AS CONSEQUENCE QUESTION
OF MEANS HAD NOT COME UP BUT IN ANY EVENT MILITARY INTER-
VENTION WAS NOT CONTEMPLATED.SEVERAL WEEKS AGO SITUATION WAS REVERSED BY PROPOSAL FROM
BAGHDAD FOR COOPERATION RE KURDS IN EVENT GOI PROPOSALS FOR
DECENTRALIZATION WERE NOT ACCEPTED BY KURDS. TO THIS GOT
REPLIED THAT IT PREPARED COOPERATE BY ISOLATING HOSTILITIES
CLOSING FRONTIER AND CONSULTATION BUT THERE WAS NO DISCUSSION
OF MEANS TO IMPLEMENT.MEANWHILE FONMIN ARAM VISITED ANKARA EN ROUTE TEHRAN (ENROUTE 1189)
AND SAID TEHRAN HAD BEEN APPROACHED IN SIMILAR SENSE BY BAGHDAD.
ERKIN TOLD OF GOT ACCEPTANCE COOPERATE IN PRINCIPLE AND ARAM
SAID WOULD SO RECOMMEND TO HIS GOVT ON RETURN. ASSUMING

IRANIANS IN

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	NEA	Reaction	10 April 63	File

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Authority NND 938522
By SC NARA Date 11/18/05

POL 13-3 Iraq

SECRET

-2- 1228, APRIL 9, 5 PM FROM ANKARA

IRANIANS IN AGREEMENT, THERE WOULD THEN BE DISCUSSIONS
BETWEEN THEM AND TURKS AS TO FORM WHICH COOPERATION
MIGHT TAKE BEFORE PROCEEDING FURTHER WITH IRAQIS. AS
MATTER STANDS ERKIN AWAITING FURTHER WORK FROM TEHRAN.

LACK TIME PREVENTED COORDINATION WITH BRITISH AMB
PRIOR TALKING WITH ERKIN BUT I DID SO LATER IN DAY AND
WILL FOLLOW UP WITH HIM AS OCCASION ARISES.

SCP-3.

HARE

RB/22

SECRET

0 8 9 6

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Authority	NND 938522
By	SC-NARA Date 11/18/05

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

ACTION COPY

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38

SECRET

Action

Control: 6812

SS

Rec'd: April 9, 1963
10:50 a.m.

Info

FROM: Tehran

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 853, April 9, 6 p.m.

ACTION DEPARTMENT 853, INFORMATION ANKARA 84, BAGHDAD
58, LONDON 78, MOSCOW 33, TABRIZ UNNUMBERED

LIMIT DISTRIBUTION S/S

Reference: EMBTEL 844 to Department information Ankara
83, Baghdad 56, Moscow 32, London 77,

I discussed substance of DEPTTEL 720 with new British
Ambassador, as well as London 3920 to Department 54
to Tehran. Wright has not received any instructions
in this connection but expressed himself in agreement
with our position.

SCP-3

HOLMES

DT

ROL 13-3 10749

JUL 31 1963

FILE
SECRET

1963 APR 9 PM 3 20

MESSAGE CENTER
NEA

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ACTION	ASSIGNED TO. <i>NEA</i>	ACTION TAKEN	DATE OF ACTION	DIRECTIONS TO RM/R
	NAME OF OFFICER			
	& OFFICE SYMBOL			

None
10 April 63
Fill

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Authority *NND 938522*
By *SC* NARA Date *11/18/05*

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

ACTION COPY

PERMANENT RECORD COPY

33

SECRET

Action

Control: 6032

SS

Rec'd: APRIL 8, 1963

Info

11:44 AM

FROM: TEHRAN

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 844, APRIL 8, 6 PM

ACTION DEPARTMENT 844, INFORMATION ANKARA 83, BAGHDAD 56,
MOSCOW 32, LONDON 77, TABRIZ UNNUMBERED.

LIMIT DISTRIBUTION S/S

REFERENCE: DEPTTEL 720

BECAUSE ARAM ILL I TOOK UP REFTEL WITH UNDER SECRETARY FONAFFS
ANSARI TODAY AND HAD GENERAL DISCUSSION OF IRAQI-KURDISH SITUATION,
CONCLUDING WITH EMPHASIS ON FOUR POINTS IN FINAL PARA REFTEL.
ANSARI AGREED THAT:

(1) SETTLEMENT OF IRAQI-KURDISH PROBLEM IN BEST INTERESTS OF
IRAN AND OTHERS CONCERNED;

(2) ALL GOVTS WOULD EXERT BEST EFFORTS IN BRINGING ABOUT PEACEFUL
SOLUTION;

(3) FRANK AND FREE CONSULTATIONS VERY DESIRABLE, IN REPLY TO DIRECT
QUESTION, ANSARI SAID THAT THERE HAD BEEN LITTLE CONSULTATION WITH
TURKS GIVING AS ONE REASON INTERNAL POLITICAL PROBLEMS OF TURKS
WHICH OCCUPIED THEIR FULL ATTENTION. IN RESPONSE TO DIRECT
QUESTION HE SAID THAT KHOSROVANI RPT KHOSROVANI, NEW IRANIAN
AMB TO TURKEY, WOULD LEAVE FOR ANKARA APRIL 14. I ASKED WHETHER
HE WOULD HAVE INSTRUCTIONS TO INITIATE CONSULTATION WITH TURKS
CONCERNING IRAQ. ANSARI MADE A NOTE AND SAID HE WOULD SPEAK
TO ARAM AND SUGGEST THAT SUCH INSTRUCTIONS BE GIVEN AND THAT
CONTINUOUS CONSULTATION WITH TURKS BE UNDERTAKEN;

(4) I ASKED WHETHER GOI HAD ANY PLANS FOR CONTROL OF FRONTIER

SECRET

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ACTION ASSIGNED TO: NEA	ACTION TAKEN: No action
NAME OF OFFICER: Bomby GTF	DATE OF ACTION: April 8, 63
OFFICE SYMBOL:	DIRECTIONS TO RM/R: File

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NND 938522

By SE-NARA Date 11/18/05

SECRET

-2- 844, APRIL 8, 6 PM, FROM TEHRAN

IN THE EVENT HOSTILITIES SHOULD BE RESUMED IN IRAQ. ANSARI ASSUMED THAT THE ARMY BEING DEPLOYED ALONG THE IRAQI BORDER WOULD EXERCISE CONTROL AS HAD BEEN THE CASE BEFORE THE CEASE-FIRE BETWEEN IRAQI ARMY AND MULLAH MUSTAFA RPT MULLAH MUSTAFA. HE SAID THAT IRAN WOULD EXERT EVERY EFFORT NOT RPT NOT TO BECOME EMBROILED AND IT CERTAINLY WOULD NOT RPT NOT TAKE SIDES IN THE EVENT OF RESUMPTION OF FIGHTING.

ANSARI TOOK NOTES ON WHAT I HAD TO SAY AND WILL REPORT TO ARAM, WITH WHOM I SHALL DISCUSS MATTER FURTHER AT FIRST OPPORTUNITY, AS ANSARI IS PROBABLY NOT RPT NOT PRIVY TO THINKING ON THIS MATTER AT HIGH LEVELS.

I SHALL DISCUSS THIS SITUATION WITH NEW RPT NEW BRITISH AMB TOMORROW.

SCP-3.

HOLMES

BAP

SECRET

0 8 9 9

DECLASSIFIED	
Authority	NND 938522
By	SC-NARA Date 11/18/05

FORM DST-868
5-22-56

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
JUSTIFICATION FOR MULTIPLE-ADDRESS AND CIRCULAR TELEGRAMS

This form must be completed for all circular or multiple-address telegrams that are being sent to five or more posts by telegraphic means. The form must be attached to the telegram when forwarded to S/S-CR for clearance and to DC/T for transmission.

IMPORTANT INFORMATION IN PREPARING A CIRCULAR OR MULTIPLE-ADDRESS TELEGRAM:

1. See sections 145.42 and 145.43 of the Manual of Regulations and Procedures for addressing procedure.
2. Note that these sections explain how to use "By Pouch" indicator for posts not requiring information urgently by telegram.
3. Remember that most consular posts normally handle an extremely small volume of telegraph traffic and are not equipped to receive long telegrams or telegrams of dubious urgency.
4. In using all-inclusive addresses like "All Diplomatic Missions" there rarely should be an instance where telegraphic transmission to all posts can be justified; therefore, make sure maximum use has been made of "By Pouch" indicator.
5. Prepare two circulars rather than one when: (1) many posts require the information urgently but only a few need a full explanation; (2) the major part of a message is unclassified and only the Departmental comment or instruction need be classified.
6. When press releases have to be sent to posts telegraphically, first determine whether the release is being broadcast by the USIA Bulletin, thus making the telegram unnecessary for many posts. When a circular telegram is classified because it contains a press release sent out in advance of the release date, send the full text to only the posts needing full text; to other posts, send a brief digest so as to reduce post decipherment work.
7. For information on pouch transit times, consult your pouch schedule or call extension 4233 in DC/P for specific details. For technical assistance involving circular or multiple-address telegrams, call DC/T, extension 4324. If assistance was obtained from DC on this message, show below name of person consulted.

(Write in name of person in DC/P)


(Write in name of person in DC/T)

CERTIFICATION

Following certification to be completed and signed by person whose name appears in authorizing block of telegram form:

Telegram Identification: Date drafted 4/5/63 Drafting Office Symbol GTI

The attached telegram has been prepared with full consideration of the above seven guidance points. The urgency of the subject matter makes it essential to send the message telegraphically to all posts shown. Pouch services will not provide sufficiently fast service except to those posts where the "By Pouch" indicator has been used.


(Signature)

J. W. Bowling, GTI

(Typed name and organization symbol of authorizing officer)

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NND 938522

By SC NARA Date 11/18/05

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COUNTRY
☐ CHARGE TO

SECRET
 Classification

03096

APR 5 5 35 PM '63

For DCT use only.

Origin
 Info

ACTION: Amembassy, TEHRAN 720
 " ANKARA 905
 INFO: Amembassy, BAGHDAD 335
 " MOSCOW 3108
 " LONDON 5038
~~Amembassy, YEREBAN 3338~~

TEHRAN pouch Tabriz.

RE Ankara's 1175 and 1189.

LIMIT DISTRIBUTION S/S

For the Ambassador.

We are concerned at dangerous situation which would follow a breakdown in Iraq-Kurdish negotiations and resumption hostilities. New Iraqi regime could be fatally weakened if Army not quickly successful; communists or pro-Nasser forces in Iraq would benefit. Dangers of parallel uprisings in Turkey and Iran would increase. Soviets would have opportunity exploitation threatening all states concerned.

We believe best interests Iran, Turkey, and U. S. would be best served by equitable solution Kurdish problem in Iraq in context previously-agreed local government formula. We remain convinced problem should be regarded as an internal Iraqi affair, and that should fighting be resumed, every effort be made, in accordance normal rules international law and respect for national sovereignty re domestic political problems, to isolate hostilities and refrain from interference.

Drafted by NEA:NE:RPD:GFI:JWB:Jby
 4-5-63

Telegraphic transmission and
 classification approved by:

NEA - Phillips Talbot

Clearances:

INR/RNA - Robert B. Elwood
 EUR/SOV - Mr. Henry
 EUR/BNA - Mr. Judd
 NE - Mr. Strong

SECRET

Classification

FORM
 5-61 DS-322

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Authority NND 938522

By SC-NARA Date 11/18/05

0 9 0 1

Page 2 of telegram to Amembassy, TEHRAN, ANKARA; INFO, Amembassy, BAGHDAD, MOSCOW,
LONDON, ~~AMEMBASSY, BAGHDAD, MOSCOW, LONDON, AMEMBASSY, BAGHDAD, MOSCOW, LONDON~~

~~SECRET~~
Classification

If further round of hostilities appears in prospect, we can expect that Iran and Turkey will be subject to requests both from Iraqi Government and from Kurdish rebels for some degree of active assistance. Turkey on invitation could possibly be tempted undertake military action within Iraqi territory in support Baghdad forces, although we presume common sense will dictate to Turks that they stay out of what could become a political and military morass for a foreign state. Iran, on other hand, could be seriously tempted support Kurdish rebels in effort divert hostile Kurdish action from its own territory. We feel such action on part of Iran would be short-sighted and inimical to Iran's overall security interests. Present Baghdad government is opposed extension Nasser's influence, is anti-communist, and holds promise of evolution to stable constitutional order if it can surmount Kurdish problem. To cope with Cairo pressures, it requires good relations with Turkey and Iran. Should an Iran-supported Kurdish movement threaten it, it would be forced look to Cairo for support on Cairo's terms. Thus it is most important that Iran maintain strictly correct attitude in case renewed hostilities and prevent flow of men, supplies, or money across its borders.

It might be argued that possibility Soviet support to Kurd rebels could be valid reason for Turkey to intervene on side Baghdad government or for Iran to provide assistance to rebels. We doubtful Soviets willing ^{at present time} ~~provide such assistance~~ provide such assistance; we doubt Soviets could provide sufficient assistance to Kurds to turn ~~without major military involvement~~ tide; and Iranian or Turkish assistance to one side or the other would not forestall and might stimulate Soviet intervention.

You may draw on above as necessary in making high level approach or approaches to host government with view to persuading it as to (1) U. S. unchanged views on

~~SECRET~~
Classification

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DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 938522
By SP-NARA Date 11/18/05

LONDON, and London Lake X TAPPOXX X GAGX X

SECRET

Iraqi-Kurdish problem, (2) Desirability governments concerned forego no opportunities assist in bringing about peaceful solution between Iraqi Kurds and Baghdad, (3) Desirability free and frank consultations, particularly as between Turkey and Iran, which have nearly identical security interests in area, and (4) Necessity for both Turkey and Iran to refrain from intervention and isolate fighting within Iraq should hostilities be resumed.

Suggest you coordinate with British Ambassador. SCP-3.

END

RUSK

~~SECRET~~
~~Classification~~

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NRD 938522
By SC NARA Date 11/18/08

ORIGIN/ACTION

NEA-5-

RM/R	REP	AF
1		
ARA	EUR	FE
NEA	CU	INR
E	6PM	10
6	1	AID
1	31P	12
RM/5	5/5	DE/T
1	27	1
AGR	COM	FRB
INT	LAB	TAR
TR	XMB	AIR
ARMY	CIA	NAVY
5	10	5
OSD	USIA	NSA
15		3

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAM

POL 13-3 IRAQ

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CA-9338

CONFIDENTIAL

HANDLING INDICATOR

TO : ACTION: Amembassy BAGHDAD
INFO : Amembassy Ankara
Amembassy DAMASCUS
Amembassy TEHRAN

MAR 1 3 17 PM '63

FROM : The Department of State

DATE:

SUBJECT: Kurdish-Arab Relations

REF :

Following is informal memorandum recently prepared by Departmental officer familiar with Iraq and Kurdish problem:

Although Kurds generally, in my experience, have felt they would face tougher opposition to their aspirations for a separate state by an Arab nationalist government in Baghdad, the coincidence of the Barzani-led, anti-Qasim revolt and the overthrow of Qasim by Ba'athis-cum-nationalists gives the Kurdish movement a lucky break. The new government needs a settlement with the Kurds. Had Qasim not bungled the problem presented by the aroused Kurds, the new government would not be faced with the dangerous question of autonomy. Now the GOI cannot avoid making concessions to the Kurds, and autonomy is a good way along the road towards even greater separatist aspirations. Barzani and his cohorts would have settled for a lot less in the fall of 1961.

During late summer 1961 one Iraqi Arab nationalist, not a Ba'athi, (Muhammad Alwan, an Iraqi FSO) expressed an opinion I had never previously (nor since) heard from an Iraqi Arab. He said, in effect: Why not negotiate a separate state or province for the Kurds? As Arab unity progresses, as he felt sure it would, the Arabs will be in a stronger position politically and economically. The Kurds need to be placated. Luckily, for the Arabs, they occupy only a small area on an edge of the Arab world. They would be little or no threat to a greater Arab homeland which stretched from Iraq to Morocco. Further, Arab nationalists some day must be honest in their estimate of Kurdish nationalism, and accord the latter the same right to a struggle for nationhood as the Arabs believe in for themselves.

The man who

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Drafted by: NEA - Lee F. Dinsmore:jk:2/28/63

Contents and Classification Approved by: NE - Robert C. Strong

Clearances: NEA - NE - Mr. Killgore

DECLASSIFIED

Authority: NND 938522

By: SC NARA Date: 11/18/05

CA-9338

CONFIDENTIAL

- 2 -

The man who expressed this opinion is probably representative of very few Arabs. However, we might be alert for conversations along this line. The emotional side of the Ba'ath ideology might find an adjustment to the idea of the "right" of the Kurds to "Kurdistan."

Request for Action:

Embassy's views and comments will be welcomed. Could rival Arab and Kurdish claims to Mosul oil area ever be compromised?

RUSK

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Authority	NND 932522
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